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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation explores the potential impacts of personality – as operationalized by 
the Big Five framework – on the preferences and behavior of state legislators. Within the study 
of American politics, scholars generally study the values, attitudes, and behaviors of the mass 
public or the characteristics and behaviors of political elites and the institutions in which they 
reside. Within both strains of research, we have developed an extraordinary understanding of 
how the political environment influences individual political thought and behavior.  
In recent years, scholars of the mass public have undertaken renewed efforts to study 
the role biological and resulting psychological predispositions play in shaping political behavior. 
As the acceptance of the Big Five framework in psychology has increased, political science has 
seen a resurgence of work investigating the effects of personality on political values, attitudes, 
and behaviors. Scholars have generally studied these streams – the environment and more 
individually-based biological and psychological factors – separately. Furthermore, while 
researchers have recently undertaken a great deal of work on how biology and personality 
affect values, attitudes, and behaviors at the mass level, they have largely failed to undertake 
similar attempts in studies of elite political behavior.  
In this dissertation, I develop a framework for placing the personality characteristics of 
state legislators into a broader institutional context. I argue personality traits serve as stable, 
biologically-based dispositions, and I demonstrate empirically personality does indeed influence 
the behavior of state legislators above and beyond existing institutional explanations. I argue 
personality plays an important role in shaping which activities legislators prefer to engage, the 
amount of time legislators dedicate to those particular activities, the number of introductions 
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and cosponsored measures to which legislators attach their names, the legislative success of 
legislators, and the pattern of campaign fundraising  legislators undertake.  
Rather than focusing solely on environmental explanations for engaging in activities 
such as introductions and cosponsorship or participating on committees, I argue for a more 
nuanced understanding of what motivates legislators to engage in legislative activities. 
Although factors such as constituency and party pressure certainly play significant roles in 
determining how legislators allocate their time in office, I believe individuals’ personalities also 
affect whether and how often legislators put forth effort within the institution. In addition to 
bringing new insight regarding the antecedents of legislative politics, this dissertation helps to 
demonstrate the benefit of incorporating key concepts from political psychology in the study of 
elite political behavior. 
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Chapter 1: A Theory of Personality and Elite Political Behavior 
 
Introduction  
 
Bruce Braley and David Loebsack represent the first and second congressional districts 
of Iowa, respectively. These two neighboring districts, situated in the eastern part of the state, 
have myriad similarities. Both districts are urban. Each contains a large city providing the home 
to a large industrial presence. The residents of these two districts are predominantly white, 
Protestant, and high-school educated. Finally, both districts are known as Democratic 
strongholds within the state.  
In addition to the district similarities, Congressmen Braley and Loebsack also share a 
variety of characteristics themselves. The two men have similar backgrounds. Born and raised 
in Iowa, they are married with children and possess post-graduate degrees. Also, Congressmen 
Braley and Loebsack had little political experience before running for Congress. Both were 
elected to the House of Representatives in 2006, neither having served in an elected office nor 
having worked in any meaningful capacity for the local Democratic Party organization. Finally, 
both barely held onto their seats in the 2010 elections (Barone 2011). 
Once in Congress, these two men have also behaved similarly. First, the two men have 
similar DW-NOMINATE scores. DW-NOMINATE scores provide a measure of ideological 
positioning within Congress by measuring with whom a member has voted during his time in 
office. Ranging from a possible score of -1 (liberal) to +1 (conservative), Braley has a DW-
NOMINATE score of -0.360, while Loebsack has a score of -0.357. In addition, neither holds a 
seat on the more influential House committees nor do they hold any leadership positions within 
the party or the chamber. In addition, both men share an interest in military issues. However, 
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the two men do differ on one noteworthy aspect. In the three full Congresses in which these 
men have served (the 110th, 111th, and 112th Congresses), Congressman Braley has sponsored 
93 pieces of legislation while Congressman Loebsack has sponsored only 54 pieces. As the 
average member of Congress introduced 18 bills each two-year congressional cycle during the 
period of 2000-2008 (Tanger, Seals, Jr., and Laband 2011), Congressman Loebsack has behaved 
in a predictable manner, while Congressman Braley has sponsored nearly 100% more legislation 
than the average legislator did during the same number of years. 
Current explanations for why individuals engage in particular legislative activities predict 
Braley and Loebsack should behave in similar manners. They have similar personal 
backgrounds. They have similar experiences with their party. Each has an interest in military 
affairs and serves on a committee involving the military (Veterans’ Affairs and Armed Services). 
Their constituencies likely share similar preferences. However, Braley has sponsored almost 
twice the number of bills as Loebsack. If prior political experience, party, and constituency do 
not explain this difference, what does? 
Political scientists, such as Hall (1996), have sought to understand why members of 
Congress participate in the creation and passage of legislation when they are under no 
obligation to do so. Hall identifies three reasons: the electoral connection, personal policy 
interest, and the furtherance of the president’s agenda. Although participation rates in 
committees and subcommittees are low, the reasons behind a member’s motivation influence 
where he or she puts forth effort. When the motivation is a policy interest, members spend 
more time in subcommittee and on bill markups; when the motivation is electoral, members 
put forth effort in more public arenas (63). Nonetheless, Hall stresses policies do not emanate 
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from the floor as a whole, the committee, or even subcommittees; rather, they arise from small 
groups of legislators inside these larger bodies. 
Undoubtedly, external factors influence the activities of members of Congress.  
However, Congressmen Braley and Loebsack have similar electoral connections, likely possess 
similar personal policy interests, and support the president’s agenda at similar levels. If careers, 
constituencies, and party affiliation do not account for the differences in Congressmen Braley 
and Loebsack, what does? By examining only the environmental factors influencing legislative 
behavior, I believe we have failed to provide sufficiently nuanced accounts of all the impulses 
leading to particular behaviors.  
External factors undoubtedly prove consequential. Yet, in standard work on legislative 
behavior, we take a bird’s-eye view on behavior but fail to consider important deviations from 
findings in the literature. Essentially, most current work on legislative behavior “…assumes 
members are continually looking outward for cues about how to legislate” (Burden 2007, 15). 
Certainly, partisanship and constituency preferences play roles in determining representatives’ 
actions. However, by themselves, it also is clear they tell an incomplete story. What we miss 
with an exclusive focus on environmental variables is the possibility that legislators’ core 
psychological dispositions also shape their behaviors. A full account of behavior must include 
three sets of variables: environmental factors, people’s core biologically-influenced traits, and 
interactions between environmental factors and biologically-based factors (Mondak 2010, 182). 
While current legislative behavior research focuses almost exclusively on the environmental 
factors, this dissertation focuses on the latter two sets of variables. 
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By including personality as an explanatory variable, I believe we can understand 
behavior in light of the fact legislatures are composed of individuals who have different ways of 
thinking and interacting with the world. Outside forces assuredly influence the behavior of 
legislators. However, what forces the members perceive and how members channel their 
responses to these forces could also be shaped by rather basic and inherent factors.  
Theory 
I propose a theory of legislative behavior integrating measurements of personality 
alongside existing explanations. Rather than relying solely on factors external to the legislator 
(his constituency, his party, or the institution itself), I propose scholars also include measures of 
personality. In doing so, we gain a more nuanced and complete understanding of legislative 
behavior. Currently, work on legislative behavior paints legislators as strategic: they engage in 
particular behaviors because it benefits them electorally; provides them power within the 
institution; and, allows them to create public policy.  
Undoubtedly, legislators do often act rationally and strategically, and external 
constraints affect how those legislators behavior (see Figure 1.1). However, personality may 
influence legislative behavior in two ways. First, personality could directly impact engagement 
in behaviors such as introductions and cosponsorship (see Figure 1.2). For example, why do 
members in safe seats continue to raise campaign funds? Perhaps they have strategically 
planned to build up a war chest for use in later elections. Or, the member could be extra-
cautious or even paranoid about his reelection chances and raise money as self-reassurance.  
However, personality might also impact how individuals perceive and interact with 
external constraints. In addition to both external constraints and personality directly influencing 
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behavior, personality and the environment likely interact (see Figure 1.3). By examining these 
interactions, we can understand the individual within a situation. In doing so, we gain greater 
knowledge of how internal and external factors interact to affect the final outcome – legislative 
behavior. 
Rather than providing a competing explanation for legislators’ behavior, I believe the 
use of personality offers a complement to extant approaches, allowing for a more complete 
understanding of the behaviors of interest to students of legislative politics. For instance, 
current literature suggests members (co)sponsor legislation because of directly observable 
reasons such as assisting the constituency, creating good public policy, building their 
reputations, and gaining electoral benefits and financial rewards. However, I believe the 
personalities of individuals also influence why, how, and to what extent members perceive and 
seek to achieve these goals.  
 The inclusion of personality in legislative behavior may seem like a challenge to rational 
actor approaches. As in the case of Congressmen Braley and Loebsack, rational-actor theories 
would dictate they behave similarly in Congress. But how do we account for two identical 
individuals forming different policy preferences or choosing different forms of legislative 
activity? These rational-actor perspectives essentially paint legislators as homogenous and do 
not allow for a rationality rooted in something other than costs and benefits and self-interest 
(Hibbing and Mondak 2012). The inclusion of personality allows for us to account for variance 
when external factors fail to predict differences in behavior. Thus, incorporating personality 
enriches the rational-actor approach. For example, after accounting for personality, we may see 
it is understandable why one actor is highly risk-averse and another is less so. 
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While I maintain the assumption of strategic action on the part of legislators – the 
consideration of party, constituency, and electoral environments – I also assume legislators 
possess individual differences driving their behaviors. When a legislator introduces or 
cosponsors a piece of legislation, he or she does so with the intention of furthering reelection 
goals, advancing constituency interest, and engaging in a psychologically satisfying activity by 
interacting with others in the institution. Members participate on committees to gather 
information, further party interests, gain perks for their constituencies, and to fulfill obligations. 
Intrinsic factors (here, personality) and external factors need not compete. Rather, intrinsic 
factors help determine how legislators respond to external pressures. 
As demonstrated in the highly simplified Figure 1.4 and explained more fully in the 
remaining pages, the dimensions of personality begin at the genetic level. Genes, when 
combined with environmental factors and biological structures, lead to the possession of 
particular personality traits. Those personality traits then influence individuals’ attitudes and 
beliefs, including those of a political nature. Those attitudes and beliefs then affect resulting 
behaviors.  
Although literature at the level of the mass public studies politics at the genetic, trait 
dimension, attitudinal, and behavioral levels, extant literature on legislative behavior almost 
exclusively emphasizes studying such activity at the attitudinal and behavioral stages. Though 
the existing explanations for legislative behavior certainly explain a great deal, I believe we have 
skipped the first half of the causal chain. Although focusing on studying political behavior 
through genes proves problematic and controversial, studying elite political behavior at the 
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personality level allows for the inclusion of genetically-influenced predispositions without 
necessitating chromosomal-level analysis.1  
Figure 1.4 alludes to the causal chain of the mass public. This dissertation proposes a 
slightly modified version for political elites (Figure 1.5). In the same manner as members of the 
mass public, genes influence the possession of personality traits. Personality traits, along with 
environmental influences, help determine the political values and attitudes an individual 
possesses. However, in addition to the external influences faced by everyday citizens, political 
elites must also contend with a variety of other external influences, including constituency 
desires, party preferences, and aspects of the institution such as professionalization. A 
legislator’s personality, moderated by potential external influences, then affects resulting 
legislative behaviors such as the time allocated to particular legislative activities like 
fundraising, participation on committees, introductions and cosponsorship, and levels of 
legislative success. 
Purpose and Significance of Study 
 
I believe this investigation has importance for reasons both normative and practical. 
First, current institutional design rewards certain behaviors. If personality influences the levels 
of engagement in these various behaviors, then institutional design may favor certain 
personalities over others. On its face, this potential does not necessarily prove problematic. 
                                                          
1
 Indeed, work into the potential relationships between genes and politics continues to prove controversial (see, 
for example, Fowler and Dawes 2008 and Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2008). These studies still fail to account for the 
mechanism by which genetics influence political orientations and behaviors. Certainly, when a single gene rarely 
determines the occurrence of a disease (e.g. Huntington’s Disease), one can understand skepticism about how a 
single gene or group of genes could determine something as complex as human behavior. However, employing 
personality as the independent variable allows us to account for the potential influence of genes on political 
behavior without requiring an individual to buy into the idea of discovering “the gene” for political behavior. 
Therefore, personality provides a potential missing mechanism, likely an important one at that. 
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However, it could lead to sub-optimal outcomes if the most valued traits are not those best 
serving the institution’s interests. For instance, if rewards come to the gregarious over the 
hard-working, perhaps we reward the “wrong” people.  
Second, extant explanations of legislative activity and entrepreneurship seem inherently 
unsatisfying. Scholars usually attribute legislative activities and entrepreneurship to 
constituency pressures, party pressures, reelection, or personal interest. All these factors 
assuredly influence the amount of time and resources a legislator commits to crafting and 
passing various pieces of legislation. Simultaneously, literature on congressional behavior 
discusses a difference between workhorses and show horses, individuals who work behind the 
scenes with little credit and individuals who attract attention but perform little of the everyday 
functions of legislators (see Payne 1980). Although in different areas, the exogenous forces 
above should lead all members of Congress to engage in entrepreneurship in some instances.  
Why, then, do we see some legislators acting as workhorses in all areas of their careers, 
some legislators performing a mixture of workhorse and show horse behaviors, and some 
legislators acting as solely show horses (Hall 1987)? I believe personality helps explain these 
differences in behaviors. Employing a personality framework allows us to account for the 
psychological differences of these unique individuals. In doing so, we gain the potential to 
devise much richer and more comprehensive accounts of legislative behavior. 
Third, political scientists often engage in the study of psychology at the mass level to the 
exclusion of elites. First, elites prove more difficult to access than members of the general 
public. Rather than directly approaching a legislator, one must often first make it through an 
initial gatekeeper in the form of staff. Second, should a staff member prove amenable, one 
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must then approach the legislator. Unfortunately, in an age of heightened media coverage and 
“gotcha” politics, legislators often express hesitancy at participating in studies. As a result, 
political psychologists have been unable to determine the extent to which psychological 
concepts travel. Applying a psychological framework allows scholars to ascertain how much 
personality influences perception and behavior in an environment where exogenous factors 
play such an important role. In other words, at what point do the exogenous factors 
determining legislative entrepreneurship overwhelm more endogenous explanations?  
By focusing on a particular population who already exhibit less variance on other 
dimensions such as age, gender, educational backgrounds, and income, legislators also likely 
exhibit less variance in personality than found in the mass public as a whole. For instance, 
running for office requires a certain willingness to engage with others. As a result, legislators 
likely score higher on an extraversion dimension than would members of the general public. 
However, legislators are still individuals, individuals with unique personality characteristics 
likely influencing behavior beyond choosing to run for office. 
Finally, as a result of an inability to study personality, scholars have made anecdotal 
claims about the inherent differences between elites and the mass public. Although we 
recognize the likelihood of personality’s influence on behavior, we have avoided including 
personality in the study of elite political behavior. As a result, we as political scientists cannot 
make many definitive claims about the potential psychological differences between these two 
groups. However, including personality variables in studies of elite behavior provides a way to 
examine the potential similarities and differences between the mass public and its 
representatives.  
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In an effort to synthesize techniques and findings from the fields of psychology and 
mass political behavior, this dissertation presents four distinct analytical chapters concerning 
the potential effects of personality on legislative behavior. Guided by findings in the mass 
behavior literature, I will demonstrate three things in chapter two. First, I will verify elites will 
indeed answer personality-related survey questions. Second, I will illustrate variance in 
personality amongst elites does exist. Third, I will investigate how that variance in personality at 
the elite level follows patterns concerning ideology and partisanship found at the mass level.  In 
the third chapter, I will move beyond establishing the groundwork and replicating previous 
findings to show how personality dimensions and institutional constraints help determine the 
amount of time legislators report engaging in particular activities, including meeting with 
constituents, writing and studying legislation, participating in committees and caucuses, and 
fundraising.  
In chapter four, I will more thoroughly investigate personality’s impact on three aspects 
of legislative behavior: introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative success. Rather than 
relying on roll-call behavior, which constitutes an activity in which all legislators participate, I 
have chosen to study introductions and cosponsorship because they afford the opportunity to 
study behaviors in which legislators choose their levels of participation and make unique 
contributions. In chapter five, I will discuss the implications for personality and gender. Rather 
than attributing behavioral differences in male and female legislators to gender itself, I argue 
the personalities of the men and women who serve in political office differ, and those 
personality differences drive variations in behavior. Finally, in chapter six, I will discuss the 
representational, policy, and real-world implications of individuals’ personalities in a legislative 
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setting. As a prelude to these analyses, the remainder of this chapter steps back to develop a 
foundation for the study of personality in this area. 
Personality and Political Science 
 
 For years, political scientists have recognized the potential importance of personality 
when discussing the behavior of both the mass public and elites (Fenno 1978; Campbell 1982; 
Lamb 1988). However, we have often failed to include personality as an explanatory variable in 
our research because of a difficulty in operationalization. Such a lack of implementation comes 
as no surprise because the guiding field for personality, psychology, has also had difficulty 
operationalizing personality as a construct. Indeed, for decades, psychologists struggled to 
simply define personality or its dimensions and put forth dozens of different scales measuring 
different facets of personality (McCrae and John 1992, 175). Unfortunately, these scales largely 
failed in mapping onto one another, creating confusion over which scale to use when 
measuring a particular aspect of personality. Additionally, scholars had myriad personality 
scales from which to choose but little overall guidance in choosing an appropriate scale. 
 However, in the last twenty-five years, perspectives within psychology have crystallized 
around a single framework, today known as the Big Five structure or Five Factor Model. Rather 
than replacing all the earlier works on personality, the Big Five framework has served as a 
unifying mechanism, helping to stitch together a more comprehensive view of personality 
based on previous efforts. The sheer number of different terminologies employed in previous 
works demonstrates the diversity in thinking about personality. Nevertheless, these multiple 
conceptualizations do display a good deal of overlap and convergence, and the Big Five seem to 
encompass these overlapping areas. 
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Origins of the Big Five Framework 
 
 Psychologists needed some kind of generalized framework or taxonomy before 
undertaking the task of understanding and measuring personality. Rather than focusing on the 
more microlevel facets of personality such as aggression or tolerance, this framework needed 
to create broader dimensions by which researchers could study specified areas of personality 
(John and Srivastava 1999). In creating this framework, early researchers began at a logical 
starting point – human language used to describe all the various ways individuals differ from 
one another. The lexical hypothesis, originating with Galton in 1884, predicts “…most of the 
socially relevant and salient personality characteristics have become encoded in the natural 
language” (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008, 117). Based on this hypothesis, scholars could use 
dictionaries to find a wide-ranging but finite number of adjectives from which to create clusters 
of similar or interrelated attributes. 
 Using Webster’s New International Dictionary, Allport and Odbert (1936) created a 
comprehensive list of almost 18,000 words used to describe individuals and how they interact 
with one another. Although the authors began with over 550,000 words in the dictionary, a list 
of 18,000 words still proved unwieldy. In an effort to further refine their list, Allport and Odbert 
separated the words into four categories: personality traits, temporary states, evaluative 
judgments, and physical characteristics. By focusing on the words placed in the first 
classification, the authors narrowed their list to 4,504 words. Although Allport and Odbert 
provided the foundation for the study of lexical descriptions of personality, their list of 
descriptors certainly overlapped, and the 4,504 words still proved onerous to put into any 
practical use. 
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 In the hopes of creating a more manageable list from which to work, Raymond Cattell 
(1943) took on the task of further refining Allport and Odbert’s list of personality traits. Cattell 
set about categorizing the 4,500 words previously identified into groupings of synonyms 
headed by a key term. Then, Cattell added an antonym to the key term, creating a number of 
bipolar traits. After paring down the expanded list semantically, Cattell then empirically 
clustered the list based on correlations, leading him to 35 variables. Using an early form of 
factor analysis, Cattell identified 12 separate factors of personality, which later became part of 
his Sixteen Personality Factors Questionnaire (16PF). Although Cattell claimed similar findings 
across multiple sources of measurement (e.g. self-reports, observer ratings, and tests), later 
scholars had difficulties replicating his results. Indeed, Digman and Takemoto-Chock (1981) 
went so far as to state Cattell’s findings could not have been correct (John, Naumann, and Soto 
2008, 118).  
 Despite the controversy surrounding Cattell’s findings, his work did spur other 
researchers to attempt to create more parsimonious lists of personality traits (see Fiske 1949 as 
an example). In a small-scale meta-analysis, Tupes and Christal (1961) reanalyzed the 
correlation matrices from eight different samples. In doing so, the authors found “…five 
relatively strong and recurrent factors and nothing more of any consequence” (14). The authors 
labeled these five factors as surgency, agreeableness, dependability, emotional stability, and 
culture. Others (e.g. Norman 1963, Borgatta 1964, and Digman and Takemoto-Chock 1981) 
used Cattell’s original 35 variables and parsed them down to these same five factors. Lewis 
Goldberg (1981) later labeled these five factors as the Big Five, not because the five factors 
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constituted the end-all-be-all of personality but rather because the five factors contained such 
broad characteristics (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008, 119). 
 Others have described frameworks similar, but not identical, to the Big Five. For 
instance, Hans Eysenck described two personality dimensions – Neuroticism and 
Introversion/Extraversion – in his book Dimensions of Personality (1947); he later added a third 
dimension called Psychoticism (1970). These three dimensions greatly correspond with the 
dimensions within the Big Five. In addition to works such as these, others have tried to expound 
upon the use of traits. For instance, McCrae and Costa (1995) make clear personality traits do 
not serve as summaries of behavior; rather, individuals can infer traits based on observation 
and use those inferences to make predictions on future behaviors. Additionally, traits do not 
constitute the entirety of personality to those advocating the factors within the Big Five 
(McCrae and John 1992, 177). Instead, traits “…interact with the environment to produce 
culturally conditioned and meaning-laden characteristic adaptations” (McCrae and Costa 1995, 
248). 
 Because of the origins of the Big Five, several competing theoretical perspectives have 
developed. These perspectives range from the purely descriptive to the purely biological. For 
instance, some individuals (see works by Goldberg) focus solely on the lexical component of 
personality rather than personality itself. As a result, they make no claims concerning causation 
(Saucier and Goldberg 1996). Although dissatisfying to those interested in personality as a 
concept, those advocating a lexical approach do highlight the phenotypic (observable) nature of 
personality. Others view the phenotypic aspects of personality as arising from particular 
genotypes meant to represent individuals’ survival needs (see Buss 1996). McCrae and Costa 
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also support this more genetically-based approach, wherein personality traits act as central 
tendencies of behavior influenced by environment and changes in the brain and body (e.g. 
structural or hormonal).  
This lack of agreement on a theoretical perspective both helps and hampers the Big Five 
as a construct. Many psychologists find the lack of theory troublesome in that the framework 
lacks grounding or testable causation. However, those advocating particular theoretical 
perspectives appreciate the Big Five’s flexibility in allowing them to use it while not 
compromising their underlying views. Nevertheless, the Big Five trait dimensions have provided 
research into personality with a common ground and common vocabulary alongside a variety of 
well-validated instruments suitable to a variety of testing circumstances. 
The Big Five Trait Dimensions and Their Effects on General Human Behavior  
 
 As previously discussed, the five-factor model provides a hierarchical organization of 
personality traits based on five broad dimensions: extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience. Remember, each of these 
broadly-based dimensions contains a plethora of facets. For example, overall measures of 
conscientiousness often contain more specific measures concerning industriousness, self-
discipline, and orderliness (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008, 126). Additionally, one must 
remember no ideal personality exists. Scores on each of the trait dimensions can lead to a 
variety of positive and negative behaviors. Having a high or low score does not normatively 
reflect upon an individual. Rather, the score on a trait dimension provides a general sense of 
how an individual reacts to various environments. 
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Because of the variety of conceptualizations of the Big Five, some of the factors appear 
with different names in different works. Some researchers continue to use the names given to 
the Five Factors by Norman (1963): I – extraversion or surgency; II – agreeableness; III – 
conscientiousness; IV – emotional stability; and, V – culture. Others simply employ the Roman 
numerals and forgo using terms. In addition, some scholars employ Costa and McCrae’s names 
for the traits: extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to 
experience. Obviously, the Roman numerals remove the ambiguity created by the multiple 
names for the same dimensions. However, they prove more difficult to remember (McCrae and 
John 1992, 177-80). For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen to employ Costa and McCrae’s 
names for four of the trait dimensions. However, I employ emotional stability rather than 
neuroticism because the linguistic term neuroticism often has a negative connotation 
associated with it.  
I - Extraversion  
 Extraversion relates to an individual’s level of activity outside himself and with the 
world. Individuals scoring high on extraversion tend to seek out the company of others and 
engage in social activities. They enjoy talking and display a certain level of assertiveness. 
Individuals scoring low in extraversion (introverts) lack the exuberance of their counterparts. 
Often described as quiet or shy, introverts tend to need less stimulation from the outside 
world. However, introversion does not imply laziness. Introverts may possess a great deal of 
energy; they simply choose not to use that energy in the social world. 
 Studies have elucidated relationships between extraversion and a number of arenas of 
life. Extraversion appears to have a particularly strong influence in the workplace, leading to 
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greater success in sales positions (Barrick and Mount 1991) and being a workaholic (Burke, 
Matthiesen, and Pallesen 2006). In addition, extraversion relates to health behaviors, including 
risk-taking (Markey, Markey, Ericksen, and Tinsley 2006) and smoking (Malouff, Thorsteinsson, 
and Schutte 2006). 
II – Agreeableness  
 Similar to extraversion in that it relates to individuals’ level of interaction with others, 
agreeableness corresponds with a general concern for social harmony. Agreeable individuals 
value getting along with others and not making waves. As a result, others often describe these 
people as friendly, compassionate, helpful, altruistic, and willing to compromise. On the other 
hand, disagreeable individuals tend to place their own self-interest over concern for others. 
These individuals are often described as unfriendly or suspicious.   
 As agreeableness relates to how individuals get along with others, studies have 
demonstrated a positive relationship between this dimension and success in the classroom 
(Chowdhury and Amin 2006). Additionally, agreeableness has several interesting effects in the 
workplace, including overall level success in the workplace (Matthews and Oddy 1993) and 
levels of income from work (Judge, Livingston, and Hurst 2011). Also, agreeableness has 
relationships with adult health outcomes (Hampson, Goldberg, Vogt, and Dubanoski 2007) and 
engagement in smoking (Malouff, Thorsteinsson, and Schutte 2006) and other risky behaviors 
(Markey, et al. 2006). 
III – Conscientiousness 
 Conscientiousness concerns an individual’s ability to regulate internal impulses. As a 
trait dimension, conscientiousness, first and foremost, relates to responsibility. Described as 
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careful, thorough, and deliberate, conscientious individuals generally work hard and exhibit 
reliability. Individuals scoring low in conscientiousness may be characterized as irresponsible 
and unable to internally motivate themselves to finish a task. 
 Scholars have demonstrated a number of ways in which conscientiousness affects 
everyday behaviors. The conscientious display higher levels of honesty (Horn, Nelson, and 
Brannick 2004); better eating habits (Goldberg and Strycker 2002); and, even have better 
driving records than the average individual (Arthur and Graziano 1996). In addition, 
conscientious people have greater success in the classroom (Chowdhury and Amin 2006) and 
higher scores on job performance criteria (Barrick and Mount 1991). On the negative side, 
those scoring high in conscientiousness tend to have high levels of workaholism (Burke, 
Matthiesen, and Pallesen 2006). Conversely, those scoring low in conscientiousness have a 
higher predilection to engage in procrastination (Dewitt and Schouwenburg 2002). 
IV – Emotional Stability  
 Emotional stability relates to a person’s tendency to experience negative emotions. 
Those scoring low on emotional stability are emotionally reactive and vulnerable to stress. At 
the other end of the scale, individuals high in emotional stability exhibit calmness and an even 
temper. However, one must remember the emotionally stable do not necessarily experience an 
abundance of positive emotions; those positive emotions instead relate to extraversion. Rather, 
they simply do not react strongly to stress (Costa and McCrae 1980). 
 Unlike the other dimensions in the Big Five, most of the research into the effects of 
emotional stability comes in the field of medical implications. Because of emotional stability’s 
relationship to stress and anxiety, scholars have tested the correlations between emotional 
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stability and overall levels of happiness (Hills and Argyle 2001), marital problems (O’Leary and 
Smith 1991), and hypochondria (Bolger and Schilling 1991).  In the workplace, emotional 
stability positively correlates with job success and performance (Judge and Bono 2001). 
V – Openness to Experience 
 The newest and most controversial of the Big Five dimensions (McCrae 1990), scholars 
characterize openness to experience through the pursuit of intellectual interests, general 
curiosity, aesthetic sensitivity, and unconventional values. Although related to intellect, 
openness to experience does not measure intelligence. Individuals scoring high in openness to 
experience value art, adventure, and the imagination. Conversely, individuals scoring low in 
openness to experience tend to prefer the routine over new experiences and the 
straightforward over the complex.  
 Individuals with high levels of openness to experience tend to have more positive adult 
health outcomes (Hampson, Goldberg, Vogt, and Dubanoski 2007), possibly because they eat 
more fiber (Goldberg and Strycker 2006). Conversely, those high in openness to experience also 
tend to engage in other high-risk health behaviors (Booth-Kewley and Vickers 1994). In terms of 
the more thought-based aspects of this dimension, scholars have demonstrated relationships 
between openness and divergent thinking (McCrae 1987). In addition, highly open individuals 
tend to express less ethnocentrism and right-wing authoritarianism (Butler 2000). 
The Big Five’s Effects on Political Behavior 
 
 Clearly, each of the trait dimensions of the Big Five has effects on how everyday 
individuals behave and interact with the world. Certainly, personality affects how individuals 
work and live. But in what other ways does personality impact individuals’ lives? Only relatively 
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recently have scholars begun investigating how the Big Five affect more politically-oriented 
attitudes and behaviors. 
Political scientists have focused a great deal of attention on ideology over the years (see 
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960 and Converse 1964 as the seminal examples). 
Indeed, recognizing the possible link between personality and political ideology, scholars as far 
back as the 1950s have investigated personality’s effect on the core beliefs and values held by 
individuals (see Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford 1950; Stouffer 1955; Lane 
1962; and, St. Angelo and Dyson 1968). However, these earlier works lack the coherent 
framework provided by the Big Five.  
In more current research, political ideology significantly and consistently correlates with 
two of the five trait dimensions. First, liberals tend to express higher levels of openness to 
experience while conservatives exhibit lower levels of the same. Second, conservatives possess 
higher levels of conscientiousness than do liberals (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Carney, Jost, 
Gosling, and Potter 2008; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Ha 2010).  
In addition, some studies have demonstrated positive relationships between 
conservatism and emotional stability and agreeableness with liberalism (Mondak 2010). In 
addition, personality also matters in terms of more concrete political affiliation, with 
researchers demonstrating positive relationships between extraversion and conscientiousness 
and support for center-right parties and agreeableness and openness to experience with 
support for center-left parties (Caprara, Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo 1999; Caprara, Barbaranelli, 
Consiglio, Picconi, and Zimbardo 2003; Barbaranelli, Caprara, Vecchione, and Fraley 2007; 
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Schoen and Schumann 2007). Additionally, scores on personality dimensions, particularly 
openness and extraversion, also correlate with particular policy positions (Mondak 2010, 138). 
Again, earlier scholars expressed an interest in identifying links between personality 
variables and more concrete political behaviors (see Mussen and Wyszynski 1952), yet these 
studies also lacked a cohesive framework. But not all traits matter for all forms of political 
behaviors. For instance, openness to experience positively correlates with turning out to vote, 
and emotional stability negatively correlates with the same. However, conscientiousness, the 
most logical factor to equate with voting, demonstrates no relationship at all (Mondak, Hibbing, 
Canache, Seligson, and Anderson 2010). Indeed, the conscientious, known for their respect of 
order and stability, avoid political protesting and casting votes (Mondak et al. 2010).  
Personality also has a relationship with political efficacy, both internal and external. 
Agreeable individuals have higher levels of internal efficacy, or confidence in their ability to 
understand and influence politics (Mondak and Halperin 2008). Additionally, openness to 
experience demonstrates a strongly positive correlation with internal efficacy, likely because 
openness to experience relates to feelings of self-confidence (Mondak 2010, 124). Finally, 
Vecchione and Caprara (2009) demonstrate a similar relationship between internal efficacy and 
openness to experience and extraversion. 
Not surprisingly, extraverts enjoy participating in the more social of political activities, 
such as attending and speaking at political meetings, contacting elected officials, and signing 
petitions (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2010; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, 
Raso, and Ha 2011). Need to evaluate (NE), or the “…proclivity to create and hold attitudes” 
(996) and an aspect of openness to experience, positively correlates with the number of 
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evaluative beliefs an individual holds about a candidate, the likelihood of voting, the likelihood 
of using party identification when voting (Bizer, Krosnick, Holbrook, Wheeler, Rucker, and Petty 
2004), and the probability of working for a campaign (Mondak, Canache, Seligson, and Hibbing 
2011). Additionally, openness to experience plays an important role in whether an individual 
tries to convince others to vote for or against a candidate, even when controlling for political 
knowledge and internal efficacy (Mondak et al. 2010). 
Finally, personality impacts whether and how much individuals engage in political 
discussion and seek out political information (Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011). First, 
openness to experience strongly and positively correlates with the number of discussion 
partners in a respondent’s political network; the number of days a week a respondent discusses 
politics; and, an individual’s amount of political knowledge (Mondak 2010, 100-102). Because 
individuals high in openness look for information, they logically include more individuals within 
their social networks in an effort to seek out a variety of different opinions. And, by seeking out 
all this information, those open to experience possess a much greater amount of political 
knowledge than those less willing to seek out information (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and 
Dowling 2011).  
Second, conscientiousness again plays the spoiler: rather than increasing political 
knowledge, conscientiousness negatively corresponds with levels of political knowledge 
(Mondak 2010, 102). This surprising finding likely occurs because those measuring high in 
conscientiousness value other things in their lives over politics – their families, jobs, hobbies, 
etc. In other words, the conscientious will only engage in politics at higher levels when they 
view political engagement as important. If they prioritize other activities over politics, then the 
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highly conscientious are no more likely to politically participate at higher levels than their less-
conscientious counterparts (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; Bloeser, McCurley, and 
Mondak 2012). 
Personality and Elite Political Attitudes and Behaviors 
 
Although few scholars have investigated the impact of personality on the behaviors of 
political elites recently, researchers have published reports sporadically for the last century. 
Because scholars can study personality in myriad ways, many of the earlier investigations of 
personality and political elites centered on small-N case studies (e.g., Lasswell 1930; George 
and George 1964; Kearns 1976; Latcham 1982; Barber 1992; Sigelman 2002). While these 
efforts prove useful in understanding the psyches of single individuals, they fail to provide any 
way to generalize a pattern to political elites as a whole. 
 Nonetheless, some scholars have undertaken more systematic studies of personality 
and political elites, even before the advent of the Big Five framework. These studies tend to fall 
along two lines of research: determining the differences between elites and the public and 
providing categorizations of elites. In the first vein, McConaughy (1950) administered 
personality batteries to members of the South Carolina state legislature and two control groups 
and found differences between the legislators and the control groups; the legislators displayed 
higher levels of emotional stability and extraversion than did those in the control samples. In 
addition, Hennessy (1959) did not detect many differences between “politicals” and 
“apoliticals” but did find a difference in what he termed “power drive”.  
Additionally, Barber (1965), Costantini and Craik (1980) and Stone and Baril (1979) all 
sought to investigate the personality differences between political elites. These authors, 
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however, began to go beyond describing the personality differences and also investigated how 
these differences affect behaviors. For instance, in studying Maine legislators, Costantini and 
Craik demonstrated how various combinations of personality attributes affect legislative 
effectiveness and perceptions of success. All of these studies attest to the usefulness of 
describing and categorizing legislators based on personalities and lead one to consider how 
personality likely affects other legislative behaviors. The above works demonstrate political 
elites will indeed answer personality questions. However, these works are all over three 
decades old (exceptions have more recently occurred in comparative literature, including 
Feldman 1996 and Best 2011)2.  
In more recent research involving political elites and the Big Five factors, other scholars 
have also investigated the personalities of followers and their political leaders. Not surprisingly, 
voters evaluate the personalities of candidates largely along the lines of extraversion and 
agreeableness (Caprara, Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo 2002).  In other words, voters prefer 
sociable and cooperative candidates. Additionally, elites appear to differentiate ideologically 
along the same lines as the mass public (Dietrich, Lasley, Mondak, Remmel, and Turner 2012) 
with two notable exceptions: center-left elites tend to score higher in extraversion than center-
left voters, and center-right elites tend to score higher in agreeableness than center-right 
voters (Caprara et al. 2003). However, these two exceptions make sense when considered 
inside the political realm of campaigns and policymaking. Nevertheless, while these studies 
incorporate the Big Five in their models, the focus of these studies largely remains with 
                                                          
2
 Additionally, Rubenzauer, Faschingbauer, and Ones (2000) used Costa and McCrae’s NEO-PI-R to evaluate and 
characterize the personality of 41 American presidents. However, instead of using ratings provided by the 
individuals in question, a truly impossible task, the authors had experts on each president complete the surveys. In 
a content analysis of presidential speeches, Thoemmes and Conway (2007) further analyze the Rubenzauer et al. 
data. 
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studying the mass public and its personality perceptions of elites rather than a thorough 
investigation of personality and its consequences for political elites themselves. 
Heritability of Personality 
 
 It appears as though personality plays a significant role in determining political beliefs, 
values, and behaviors at the both the mass and elite levels. However, from where does 
personality come? A number of scholars have undertaken studies concerning the biological 
origins of personality. As with much research on genetics and human behavior, the bulk of this 
research has centered on the use of twin studies. In these studies, scientists exploit the genetic 
similarities and differences between monozygotic and dizygotic twins. Monozygotic twins (MZ), 
often referred to as identical twins, have identical genes. Therefore, researchers can attribute 
any differences observed in behavior between MZ twins to environmental factors. Dizygotic 
twins (DZ), known more commonly as fraternal twins, share approximately 50% of their genes. 
Giving DZ twins the same heritability level as non-twin siblings means any differences in 
behavior could be genetic or environmental in origin. By comparing the differences between 
MZ twins and DZ twins, scientists can more accurately estimate the effects of genetic and 
environmental factors. Twin studies further break down environmental factors into shared and 
unshared environments. For instance, a shared environment could entail the home in which 
both twins lived, while an unshared environment could designate the various classroom 
environments each twin experienced independent of the other. 
 Undoubtedly, twin studies are not perfect. For instance, families treat their pairs of MZ 
twins differently. Some families choose to emphasize the similarities while other families try to 
raise the children independently. In addition, one cannot assume parents raise MZ twins and DZ 
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twins in identical environments, which allows for the attribution of all differences to genetics. 
Also, we can easily distinguish the difference between genetics and shared environmental 
influences. However, the unshared environmental category often serves as the catch-all for 
variance not attributable to genetics or the shared environment. Yet, we cannot rule out how 
much variance within the unshared environment researchers could attribute to gene-
environment interactions and measurement error. While keeping these issues in mind, 
however, one can get a general sense of the influence of genetics on behavior.   
 Heritability is the proportion of phenotypic (observable) variation in a population due to 
genotypic (genetic) variation between individuals. These scores range from zero to one, with 
higher scores indicating a greater genetic influence. More importantly, these scores describe 
the influence of genetics across populations, not within the individuals. Therefore, a 
hypothetical heritability score of 0.70 for handedness indicates genes account for 70% of the 
variance across the population and not a 70% genetic influence on my being left-handed. 
 Studies have repeatedly demonstrated the heritability of the Big Five. These heritability 
scores typically range from 0.25 to 0.50 (see Tellegen, Lykken, Bouchard, Wilcox, Segal, and 
Rich 1988; Bouchard, Jr. and McGue 2003; Bouchard, Jr. 2004). These same studies attribute 
virtually no influence to the shared environment, leaving the remainder to the unshared 
environment as providing the rest of the variance in personality. With such scores, it would 
seem as though we have left a great deal unexplained.  
However, we have several reasons to argue against such an idea. First, few scholars 
investigating genetics would claim genes can account for all the variance in a particular trait or 
behavior. Indeed, 0.80 appears to mark the apex of heritability (for height; see Xu 2006). 
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Therefore, scores of 0.25 to 0.50 appear impressive. Additionally, McCrae and Costa (2003) and 
McCrae, Jang, Livesley, Riemann, and Angleitner (2001) argue measurement error inflates the 
impact of the unshared environment. 
Therefore, rather than representing the maximum in genetic variation, heritability 
scores likely represent the minimum influence of genetics on variance in a trait or behavior. The 
studies arguing measurement errors inflates the impact of the unshared environment correct 
for reliance on self-reporting by comparing those reports with observer ratings and by 
accounting for implicit personality theory, which claims individuals make assumptions about 
trait covariance (e.g. assuming all introverts must also exhibit low openness to experience). For 
instance, Riemann, Angleitner, and Strelau (1997) produced heritability estimates based on self-
reported data, peer-reported data, and a combination of self-reported and peer-reported data. 
When investigating self-reported data, the authors produced heritability estimates ranging 
from a low of 0.42 (agreeableness) to a high of 0.56 (extraversion). However, when the authors 
employed both self-reported and peer-reported data, the heritability estimates jumped; the 
heritability estimate for agreeableness increased to 0.66, and the heritability estimate for 
extraversion increased to 0.68. However, other trait dimensions moved even higher. For 
example, self-reported data led to a heritability estimate of 0.54 for openness to experience; 
that same estimate increased to 0.79 when accounting for both self- and peer-reported data, a 
level almost identical to the heritability estimates for height. 
The strong levels of heritability for the Big Five speak directly to causality. If genes acted 
as the sole factors leading to variation in personality traits, and personality traits lead to 
variation in thoughts and behaviors, then genes indirectly influence thoughts and behaviors 
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through personality traits. Such findings would allow us to concretely say the directionality of 
causation for personality and politics begins at genes, goes through personality traits, and ends 
with predispositions, attitudes, and behaviors. Assuredly, environment and context play roles in 
that chain. However, environment and context come after genetics in the causal model. If the 
heritability of personality were low, there would be a greater possibility that the non-heritable 
content of personality traits is what matters for various facets of human behavior, including 
legislative behavior. However, with heritability instead being relatively high—even approaching 
the 0.80 mark associated with human height, widely regarded as among the most heritable of 
attributes—we can feel relatively confident any impact of personality on behavior signals an 
antecedent role for biology. 
Stability of Personality over Time 
 
 If genes do influence personality, it stands to reason personality should remain largely 
stable over time. Indeed, the usefulness of personality as a predictor of behavior depends 
greatly on personality’s stability over time. If personality changes drastically depending upon 
the situation in which the individual finds himself, then personality does not provide us with 
any leverage in predicting future behavior. In addition, any cross-sectional studies involving 
personality as an independent variable would appear highly suspect because those studies 
measure personality at only a single point in time.   
A major assumption behind the earlier work concerning personality traits rested on 
their stability over time. If personality is stable, life grows more predictable. Indeed, McCrae 
and Costa (1994) point out that within the political realm, “They [individuals] can vote on the 
basis of candidates' records, with some assurance that future policies will resemble past ones” 
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(175). However, if expressions of personality vary over time, then personality does not provide 
much in the way of predictive power. 
 It seems a debate concerning the stability of personality over time has existed for as 
long as scholars have studied personality. Even before the emergence of the Big Five trait 
dimensions, scholars such as Thorndike (1903) argued “…there are no broad, general traits of 
personality, no general and consistent forms of conduct which, if they existed, would make for 
consistency of behaviour and stability of personality, but only independent and specific 
stimulus-response bonds or habits” (29). As the study and inclusion of personality increased 
over later decades, scholars believed they had discredited such criticism by repeatedly 
demonstrating the same trait structure.  
Nonetheless, a resurgence of debate concerning the stability of personality occurred 
after the first round of research into the Big Five. The most prominent early critic, Walter 
Mischel, argued individual differences measured in personality inventories had little 
relationship to subsequent behavior (1968). Such an argument undermined the predictive 
importance and value of personality traits. Rather than personality affecting how individuals 
behaved in a situation, the environment and contextual cues played the major roles and 
affected an individual’s personality. Mischel’s criticism essentially paralyzed the field of trait 
psychology for years (Goldberg 1995). 
Although many scholars expressed frustration with Mischel’s criticisms, they likely took 
his argument to its extreme. Scholars conducted a flurry of studies in response, claiming an 
individual’s personality was largely concrete by the age of thirty (Costa and McCrae 1988; 
McCrae and Costa 1994; McCrae and Costa 1986; Terracciano, Costa, and McCrae 2005; see 
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Hampson and Goldberg 2006 and Ardelt 2000 as counterexamples). These studies testify to the 
overall stability of personality traits over time.  
However, while Mischel expressed concern over the low correlations between traits and 
behaviors, he did not dismiss them outright. As much of Mischel’s apprehension grew from 
concerns over observer ratings, later research has successfully defused much of the tension 
(see Eysenck and Eysenck 1990 as an example). However, inclusion of Mischel’s argument has 
led many scholars to believe less deterministically in traits, which has led to an increase in the 
study of trait-situation interactions.  
Indeed, Fleeson (2004) goes so far as to say both sides were right: an individual’s 
behavior over the short term proves highly variable and necessitates a more process-oriented 
approach, while an individual’s long-term behavior proves highly stable and can be explained by 
interpersonal differences. Essentially, while intrapersonal stability may vary greatly, 
interpersonal stability seems relatively constant. One must think of personality traits as central 
tendencies rather than as deterministic forces. Those scoring low on agreeableness do not yell 
at everyone with whom they come into contact. For instance, a disagreeable individual may feel 
comfortable arguing with just about anyone but his wife. However, on the whole, one can feel 
comfortable believing such individuals will engage in arguments and have less sensitivity to 
others’ feelings. Personality traits do not act as the sole determinant of behavior. However, 
they do provide researchers with a reasonable way to predict individuals’ future behaviors and 
reactions. 
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Reliability and Validity of the Big Five 
 
 In addition to demonstrating personality’s stability over time, scholars have undertaken 
numerous studies testing the reliability and validity of different methods of measuring the Big 
Five (McCrae and Costa 1987; Costa and McCrae 1986; Borkenau 1992; John, Naumann, and 
Soto 2008). These works demonstrated the ratings of other individuals highly correlated with 
self-reported personality measures (McCrae 1982; McCrae and Costa 1983; Funder, Kolar, and 
Blackman 1995; Watson, Hubbard, and Wiese 2000). Certainly, agreement between the 
individual and another person tends to increase as the two know each more intimately and for 
longer periods of time.  
However, it appears individuals generally know their personalities and provide realistic 
descriptions of themselves to investigators rather than responding to some kind of social 
desirability bias (Graziano and Tobin 2002; McCrae and Costa 1983). Additionally, scholars have 
created measures to correct for extreme differences between individuals and others, likely 
allowing for a more precise measurement of personality traits (McCrae 1993; McCrae 1994; 
McCrae, Stone, Fagan, and Costa 1998). Furthermore, because of the high correlation between 
individuals and others’ ratings of them, scholars have grown more comfortable in using others’ 
ratings of an individual’s personality, particularly when that individual cannot be reached or 
studied.  
In addition, it does not appear as though the way individuals use vocabulary in everyday 
life has affected how the terms apply to individuals. For instance, Goldberg, Sweeney, Merenda, 
and Hughes (1998) demonstrate small group differences in personality based on race, gender, 
age, and educational level (though see Costa, Terracciano, and McCrae 2004 for a cautionary 
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note).3 With such results, it appears as though the five dimensions found over time did not arise 
as merely some lexical fluke. Indeed, Digman (1990) goes so far as to say, “At a minimum, 
research on the five-factor model has given us a useful set of very broad dimensions that 
characterize individual differences. These dimensions can be measured with high reliability and 
impressive validity” (436).  
The various instruments used have included ratings by others and a variety of different 
questionnaires. These questionnaires tend to rely on Goldberg’s Big Five framework or Costa 
and McCrae’s Five-Factor Model. Both systems posit that five trait dimensions compose a 
substantial amount of individual’s personalities. However, the systems differ somewhat in 
terminology, theoretical grounding, positions on causation, and type of questionnaire items.  
First, Goldberg titles his five factors as surgency, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
emotional stability, and intellect, while Costa and McCrae term their five dimensions 
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience. 
Second, Goldberg arrived at his five factors through a reexamination of the lexical hypothesis 
(1990) whereas Costa and McCrae took a more contextual approach wherein traits (of a genetic 
origin) interacted with environmental contexts. 
Third, Goldberg largely sidesteps the issue of causation and discusses only the resulting 
behaviors and qualities of traits, while Costa and McCrae posit a combination of genetics and 
environment as the cause and expression of those dimensions. Finally, due to the different 
methods by which they arrived at their factors, the two camps differ in how their 
                                                          
3
 Allik and McCrae (2005) undertook a study on the geographic distribution of personality based on the five-factor 
model. While typical measures of geography, such as distance from the equator and mean temperature, did not 
prove significant, geographically-proximate cultures had more similar personality profiles, with a clear demarcation 
between American/European cultures and Asian and African cultures. However, the authors attribute this 
difference more to acculturation rather than genetics. 
33 
  
questionnaires measure the five dimensions. Goldberg uses single words and adjectival 
phrases, and Costa and McCrae use complete sentences. As a result, while Costa and McCrae’s 
Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) inventory has proven the best validated measure 
because the sentences tend to negate potentially ambiguous adjectives, scholars tend to 
employ Goldberg’s Trait Descriptive Adjectives (TDA) more frequently because of its brevity 
(John, Naumann, and Soto 2008, 131). 
The Big Five across Multiple Cultures and Languages 
 
 The results presented so far suggest the Big Five provides a replicable structure of 
personality traits. However, scholars conducted all these studies in English, based on lexical 
clustering of adjectives found in English dictionaries, and in the United States of America. 
However, generalizability across cultures and languages provides another important criterion 
for a successful personality taxonomy. According to Buss (1996), evolution has made the same 
tasks universally important to the survival of humans. It stands to reason, then, that the 
differences between individuals and the ways people describe those differences should also 
occur universally. Therefore, not only do cross-cultural studies involving personality help 
further our understanding of differences and similarities between societies (McCrae 2000), 
studies of cross-cultural generalizability prove vitally necessary to support the idea of a five-
factor structure (Katigbak, Church, and Akamine 1996).  
 Scholars conducted the first non-English studies in Dutch and German, both Germanic 
languages linguistically very similar to English. Not surprisingly, these studies found only five 
factors of personality dimensions across different adjectives and samples, though the openness 
to experience factor in Dutch emphasized “…[u]nconventionality and [r]ebelliousness rather 
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than [i]ntellect and [imagination]” as in English (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008, 121). However, 
the difference between the facets of the openness to experience factors of English and Dutch 
likely involves differences in how the authors included different types of descriptive words. 
 Others have undertaken studies in non-Germanic languages, including Italian (Caprara 
and Perugini 1994), Chinese (Yang and Bond 1990), Croatian (Mlacic and Goldberg 2007); 
Filipino (Katigbak, Church, and Akamine 1996); Greek (Saucier, Georgiades, Tsouasis, and 
Goldberg 2005); and, Turkish (Somer and Goldberg 1999). This strain of literature demonstrates 
factors similar to the Big Five occurring in other languages. While this evidence proves strongest 
in the Germanic languages (e.g. English, German, Dutch/Afrikaans, Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, 
and Icelandic), non-Germanic languages also appear to have five factors, as well. However, the 
non-Germanic languages also sometimes contain a sixth factor, such as honesty-humility, a 
factor likely subsumed within the Germanic languages as agreeableness (Ashton, Lee Perugini, 
Szarota, de Vries, di Blas, Boies, and de Raad 2004; see also Saucier and Goldberg 2001).  
Evidence as to the generalizability of the five factors found in English seems weakest for 
openness to experience, which different languages and cultures appear to conceive in a variety 
of manners. However, we must keep two things in mind. First, any additional factors are just 
that – additional. Scholars have produced evidence the five factors of extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience exist in a 
variety of cultures and languages, with some cultures tacking on a sixth (or seventh) factor. 
Second, the additional factors appear sporadically in research, oftentimes found by one group 
of researchers but not by another studying the same language. Nevertheless, the five trait 
dimensions found in English appear to be universal. 
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Other Criticisms of the Big Five 
 
Other Independent Variables Accounting for Personality Differences 
  
 Perhaps studies including a standard battery of independent variables such as age, 
education level, gender, or race account for personality. If these variables account for 
differences in personality, scholars would gain little in the way of accounting for personality 
independent of these other factors. One could argue, for instance, age would correspond with 
openness to experience or conscientiousness; perhaps the young possess a propensity for risk-
taking behaviors not seen in older populations or the old prove more responsible and dutiful 
than younger cohorts.  
 Previous scholars (Goldberg, Sweeney, Merenda, and Hughes, Jr. 1998; Mondak 2010) 
examined whether these four demographic indicators correlate with the Big Five personality 
dimensions. Employing bivariate correlations between personality dimensions and 
demographic indicators, this research has demonstrated at most only moderate relationships. 
As a result, scholars can feel confident the content measured through personality dimensions 
differs from the content measured through demographic indicators. Therefore, including 
personality dimensions in addition to demographic indicators brings additional value to 
research. 
Number of Factors – Too Many or Too Few? 
 
 The five-factor framework often faces criticisms of the Goldilocks variety – too many or 
too few factors. Some scholars claim the five factors, in fact, really equate to only two or three 
factors. Remember, Eysenck’s models (1947 and 1970) call for three dimensions: psychoticism, 
extraversion, and neuroticism. Additionally, Digman (1997) argues the five factors actually 
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group together into two metatraits – what he calls alpha and beta. In his model, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and openness to experience comprise one metatrait, while extraversion and 
emotional stability comprise the other. Unfortunately, the various proposals for combining the 
five factors are mutually inconsistent; a trait one model emphasizes will collapse into a different 
domain in another. As a result, it appears all five trait dimensions prove necessary to the 
framework.  
 However, the more critical concern involves not too many factors but rather not 
enough. Some people argue five factors is simply too few and prefer other models of 
personality, like Cattell’s 16PF for nuance and stronger predictive power. Scholars of this line of 
thinking argue five factors seem a bit on the low side when describing the complexity of human 
personality or find additional factors in their own works (see Lanning and Gough 1991).  
Assuredly, other studies have found additional factors. However, these studies often 
vary on the dimensions and contents of this extra factor. These findings could occur due to 
differences in languages and culture (see above), method bias, varying sampling procedures, or 
the selection of variables (McCrae and John 1992, 191). Nevertheless, these studies also 
repeatedly confirm the five factors already in existence. Extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience appear to represent 
universal dimensions of personality, regardless of language, culture, or statistical method. As a 
result, we as social scientists should feel most comfortable employing these five dimensions 
and withholding approval on the odd additional sixth factor found sporadically.  
Additionally, most advocates of the five-factor approach do not believe the five 
dimensions represent the end-all-be-all of personality. Rather, they represent the highest level 
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of a hierarchical framework of personality, providing a foundation on which to conduct further 
research. Finally, explorations of personality’s effects on political attitudes and behavior are in 
their infancy. Rather than trying to subsume all behavior into two overarching trait dimensions 
or determining how aspects of each trait dimension manifest themselves in particular behaviors 
(e.g. studying particular components of openness to experience), we must first understand how 
these five trait dimensions matter. 
Realism vs. Projection 
 Implicit personality theory, or the general expectations we build about individuals’ 
personalities after observing some of their central traits, also poses a threat to the validity of 
the Big Five framework. If individuals’ implicit personality theories structure themselves on 
dimensions similar to those of the Big Five, then the Big Five could simply represent a cognitive 
artifact. Rather than arising from the individuals we observe, we could be forcing our own 
projections onto others. The extreme conclusion of this line of thinking mandates the Big Five 
has occurred as an artifact of language. However, Borkenau (1992) discusses two reasons why 
this criticism falls flat.  
First, if individuals simply project a cognitive schema onto personality, then substituting 
the personality terms used in a lexical analysis would change the factors at which we arrive. 
However, studies in languages radically different from English still come to the conclusion of the 
same five factors. Surely, one can more easily believe human nature has created terms to 
describe these five factors rather than each language and culture independently creating the 
same set of five factors (McCrae and John 1992, 193). Second, studies have repeatedly 
demonstrated the link between the Big Five and behavior. If not true manifestations of 
38 
  
personality but rather cognitive schemas of personality, how can we explain the Big Five’s 
apparent effects on behavioral outcomes?  
Research Design 
 
This dissertation employs survey methodology with a variety of independent and 
dependent variables designed to test the potential influences of personality on legislative 
behavior. Put in the field in September 2010 (just before the November general elections), the 
survey researchers contacted 7,199 state legislators by email, of which 835 legislators 
responded (a response rate of approximately 12%)4. The researchers assured participants of 
confidentiality. They also provided their contact information in the forms of phone numbers 
and email addresses; however, in no instance did a legislator contact the investigators to 
express concerns of confidentiality. The primary focus of the study was on legislative attitudes 
towards legislative professionalism. However, the survey also asked respondents about 
partisanship, length of service, attitudes towards particular legislative behaviors, and a short 
personality inventory.  
Unfortunately, not all of the responses provided prove useable for my purposes. First, 
not all 835 individuals answered the personality-related questions in the survey. Because these 
                                                          
4
 The survey did not include any mechanism to ensure legislators themselves completed the survey and did not 
delegate the task to a staffer. However, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, self-reported measures and reports 
from second parties familiar with the subject prove highly correlated. Unfortunately, I do not have the data to test 
whether self-reported personality information and personality information provided by staffers correlate within 
this sample. Nevertheless, prior research in both legislative behavior and personality leads me to believe I can trust 
and employ information potentially provided by legislative staffers, even if those staffers prove relative strangers 
(Watson 1989) and  especially if one considers legislative staffers as part of an enterprise wherein staff “...share an 
identity and a set of goals not because of the payroll they are on, the office they work in, or the tasks they 
perform, but because of their loyalty and commitment to that particular member” (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981). 
Furthermore, because the majority of respondents serve in less professionalized legislatures, we can likely assume 
one of two things. Because legislators in less professionalized legislatures often lack access to permanent staff, it is 
more than likely the members themselves completed the surveys. Yet, even if a staffer did complete the survey, 
that staffer likely has greater knowledge of the legislator because he or she is one of only one or two staffers. 
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questions provide the basis for my independent variables of interest, I have chosen to perform 
my analyses on those responses containing answers to the all ten personality questions. 
Therefore, I have 685 useable responses for analysis in the following chapters5. Nevertheless, I 
cannot employ all of these responses in predicting my dependent variables. For example, 
several states (including Idaho, Kansas, Oregon, and Pennsylvania) do not maintain records on 
introductions and cosponsorship. However, the remaining sample still provides a large number 
of observations with which to test how personality affects legislative behaviors and 
preferences. 
Conclusion 
 
An individual’s personality seems a logical place to investigate when searching for 
explanations of attitudes and behaviors. Indeed, for decades, academics have sought to include 
personality in their studies of human behavior. Unfortunately, the lack of a definition of 
personality within scholarly literature, the resulting myriad conceptualizations of personality, 
and the multiple personality scales led to great confusion and a body of research composed of 
studies isolated from one another.  
However, recent innovations in psychological research have helped define some of the 
major boundaries of personality through lexical analysis and genetic studies. The resulting five 
trait dimensions of personality – extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional 
stability, and openness to experience – make a great deal of intuitive sense and help explain a 
                                                          
5
 Please see chapter 2 for a discussion on the potential differences between the group of legislators who provided 
personality information and the group who did not. Briefly, t-tests demonstrate almost no significant differences 
between the two groups save one: the group who did not provide personality information comes from more 
professionalized state legislatures than the group who did provide personality information. However, even when I 
use other methods to increase the overall Ns of the sample (e.g. using imputation for those missing responses or 
including those who answered at least one question per trait dimension), the overall results stay the same. 
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variety of different attitudes and behaviors, ranging from the mundane to the consequential. 
While critics have brought up a number of concerns over this framework, studies have 
demonstrated the reliability and validity of the instruments used to measure the five 
dimensions.  
Some worried the framework only applied to English speakers and the Western world. 
Yet, cultural studies have demonstrated the universality of these five trait dimensions. Some 
have worried the framework contains too many factors while others worry the framework 
contains too few. Perhaps critics of the Five Factor model simply do not appreciate the 
roundness the number five provides. Although the Big Five do not represent the entirety of 
personality – for personality obviously expresses itself as a function of genetics, the 
environment, contextual changes, and structural changes to the brain – they do provide us with 
a cohesive framework, allowing scholars across multiple subfields and even disciplines to speak 
to one another in a coherent and logical fashion. 
The use of personality variables provides researchers an opportunity to account for 
internal factors motivating the behavior of individuals. Because of the largely genetic origins of 
personality, researchers can employ personality variables and find reassurance in the 
directionality of the causal chain. Genes, in combination with environmental influences and 
structural changes to the brain, influence personality. Personality affects beliefs, values, and 
attitudes; and, those beliefs, values, and attitudes affect the behaviors in which individuals 
engage. Personality allows us to account for the “nature” side of the equation in the “nature vs. 
nurture” debate without necessitating studying and attributing political attitudes and behaviors 
to the genotypic level, something even those in the hard sciences fail to achieve. 
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 With the acceptance of the Big Five framework has come a flurry of research concerning 
the effects of personality on individuals’ beliefs and behaviors. While initial work investigating 
personality’s impact on behavior focused on aspects of life such as education, work, and health, 
scholars in political science have increasingly begun to employ the Big Five framework to study 
political beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. Through these works, researchers have demonstrated 
a clear link between personality and politics. Indeed, personality influences the ideological 
stances of individuals and whether and how much individuals engage with aspects of political 
life, including everything from voting to news consumption to protesting.  
However, the vast majority of these works take place at the level of the mass public for 
understandable reasons – the mass public represents the majority of those encountering 
politics, they prove the foundation for the construction of our political system, and they are 
easiest to study. Indeed, for years, political scientists have recognized the possibility of 
personality’s effects on the political behaviors of political elites. Unfortunately, the lack of a 
distinctive personality framework from the field of psychology meant researchers had to 
engage in methodologically unsound investigations using small-N studies or controversial 
psychoanalytic techniques.  
Now, political scientists interested in elite political behavior can employ a framework 
proven valid, reliable, and generalizable across cultures. While this dissertation only begins to 
probe personality’s effects on elite political behavior, I believe it provides a solid first step in 
including personality dimensions amongst the variety of explanatory variables currently 
employed by scholars. In combining both intrinsic and external independent variables, we can 
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more fully account for the wide variety of possible influences on a legislator’s behavior and gain 
a fuller understanding of human behavior within institutionalized settings. 
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Chapter 2: Validating Measures of Personality among State Legislators 
 
Introduction 
 How an individual behaves in any situation reflects the influence of factors both intrinsic 
to the individual and to the context or environment. For instance, how an individual spends his 
vacation will depend on whether he enjoys lounging around on the beach or going parasailing 
in shark-infested waters and whether he can only travel to a local lake or the Bahamas. 
Similarly, these intrinsic and external factors also affect an individual’s political behavior: vote 
choice depends not only on ideology and party identification but also on economic conditions 
or the presence of a challenger.  
 In this chapter, I focus on the attitudes and behaviors of elected officials, particularly 
state legislators. In doing so, I make the explicit assumption the behavior of legislators will vary 
based on the influence of institutional norms and structures and individual-level factors such as 
political predispositions, values, and motivations. Legislators do indeed differ from one another. 
Some hold much more ideological positions while others work the middle ground. Some will go 
on to seek higher office while others will serve only a limited time and leave politics altogether. 
Certainly, these differences emerge partly in response to situational factors. For instance, an 
elected official might want to pursue higher office but never encounter a friendly electoral 
context in which to do so. However, basic psychological tendencies also influence these 
differences in behaviors. While previous work on elites largely focuses on how external factors 
affect their political behavior, I contend attention to personality can also help explain how 
legislators behave in a variety of contexts. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, various scholars have sporadically undertaken 
research concerning the possible effects of personality on political elites, both in how they 
might potentially differ from those they represent and how their personalities influence their 
behaviors once in office. While these works can provide a great deal of insight about a single 
individual or a very small sample of political elites, these approaches do not allow for broad-
scale analysis in which researchers can obtain and analyze data in a systematic fashion.  
 This chapter has three primary purposes. First, it seeks to demonstrate political elites 
will indeed answer questions concerning their personalities, allowing for more rigorous analysis 
than psychoanalytical profiles of individuals. Second, it will establish whether variance in the 
personality responses of elites exists. Third, it will determine whether the self-reported 
responses to personality questions demonstrate results consistent with findings concerning 
personality’s effects on politics at the mass level. In the next chapter, I will move on from laying 
the groundwork for personality and political elites to demonstrate personality does indeed play 
a role in shaping legislative behavior.  
Descriptive Statistics of the Data 
The survey data I employ in this dissertation come from a study conducted by 
researchers at Western Kentucky University, in collaboration with a team of researchers at the 
University of Illinois, myself included (Dietrich, Lasley, Mondak, Remmel, and Turner 2012). Put 
in the field in September 2010 – just before the November general elections – the researchers 
contacted 7,199 state legislators by email, of which 835 legislators responded (a response rate 
of approximately 12%). The researchers assured participants of confidentiality. They also 
provided their contact information in the forms of phone numbers and email addresses. 
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However, in no instance did a legislator contact the investigators to express concerns of 
confidentiality. While the primary focus of the study was on legislative attitudes towards 
professionalism, the survey also asked respondents about partisanship, length of service, 
attitudes towards particular legislative behaviors, and a short personality inventory.  
Unfortunately, not all of the responses provided prove useable for my purposes because 
not all 835 individuals answered each of the ten personality-related questions in the survey. As 
those questions provide the basis for my independent variables of interest, I chose to discard 
those responses lacking a response to both of the two personality trait items for each trait 
dimension. In total, 685 legislators did indeed answer all ten personality trait items; an 
additional 39 answered at least one of the two trait dimension questions for all five traits. 
However, because the personality inventory included in the survey consists of only two 
questions per trait dimension, I have chosen to include only the respondents who answered all 
ten personality questions rather than also including those who answered at least one of the 
two trait dimension questions for each trait.6 
Undoubtedly, skeptics could claim any results I find might be attributable to differences 
in the two groups of respondents: those who provided personality information and those who 
did not. To ensure the comparability of the group containing the legislators who provided 
answers to the ten personality questions and the group who did not, I conducted t-tests. Using 
a dummy concerning whether I had responses to all ten personality inventory responses as the 
factor, I analyzed the variance of means of the two groups concerning gender (t = -1.931, p = 
                                                          
6
 I conducted all the analyses in this chapter and the following chapter three times: once using only the 
respondents who answered all ten personality trait items, once imputing the means of responses to the 
personality items for those who did not answer all ten personality questions, and once using both the respondents 
who answered all ten personality trait items and the additional respondents who answered at least one of the trait 
items per trait dimension. The results do not significantly differ. 
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0.06); education (t = 0.236, p = 0.81); race (t = 1.309, p = 0.09); chamber (t = 0.830, p = 0.41); 
political ideology (t = 1.158, p = 0.25); party identification (t =.610, p = 0.54); length of service in 
office (t =-0.642, p = 0.52); majority status (t =- 0.134, p=0.89); legislative professionalism (t = 
3.178, p = 0.00); and, serving in a state with term limits (t = 1.315, p=0.19). Of these measures, 
the two groups only differ statistically in terms of legislative professionalism, although effects 
approaching significance emerge in two additional tests. Not surprisingly, individuals serving in 
more professional legislatures feel more reticent providing answers to more personal 
questions.  
Of legislators who provided both their identifying information and answered both 
questions per trait dimension (N=685), 470 were men (68.6%) and 215 were women (31.4%). 
According to the National Conference on State Legislatures, women constitute approximately 
23.5% of state legislators across all fifty states. The sample also proves overwhelmingly white 
(626 respondents; 91.8% of the sample); other ethnicities include black (28 respondents; 4.1%), 
Latino (8 respondents; 1.2%), and an “other” category, including Asian-Americans and Native 
Americans (20 respondents; 2.9%). I cannot determine race for three respondents.  
More members of the lower chambers of state legislatures responded to the survey 
than did members of the upper chambers of state legislatures – 559 representatives (81.6%) vs. 
126 senators (18.4%). In terms of party affiliation, more Democrats (377; 55.1%) responded to 
the survey than did Republicans (307; 44.9%); one representative identified as an independent 
but caucuses with Democrats. Although more Democrats responded to the survey than 
Republicans, the balance of power in state legislatures in 2010 leaned Democratic and could 
explain this disparity.  
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Majority-minority status also influences legislative behavior. During the legislative 
session year in which the survey was conducted, 247 respondents (36.9%) served in the 
minority of their chamber in their state at the time of survey administration while 422 
respondents (61.1%) served in the majority. The remaining legislators served in the Nebraska 
nonpartisan unicameral legislature or did not provide their names, so I cannot determine 
whether they served for the majority party or the minority party. 
Finally, the respondents possess a variety of legislative experience and leadership 
experience. In terms of tenure in office, 149 respondents (21.8%) had served fewer than two 
years; 222 (32.4%) had served between three and six years; 132 (19.3%) had served between 
seven and ten years; and, 182 (26.6%) had served more than ten years as legislators. In 
addition, only 39 individuals (5.8%) held party leadership positions during the time of survey 
administration, while 111 (16.5%) held committee leadership positions as either chairs or 
ranking minority members. 
Personality and the Legislator 
 Although obtaining personality information from legislators likely has a great deal of 
utility, that utility remains unrealized if legislators simply refuse to answer such personal 
questions. While past research has not encountered difficulty in obtaining personality data 
from legislators, researchers conducted many of these works decades ago. While a more recent 
and smaller effort demonstrated state legislators will indeed answer survey questions 
concerning personality (Dietrich et al. 2012), I still must confront the possibility something over 
the last few decades has changed, leaving legislators less responsive to answering personality-
related questions.  
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First, I begin with a simple examination concerning response patterns in the raw data. 
As mentioned above, the survey researchers sent the survey to 7,199 state legislators and 
received 835 responses, which constitutes a response rate of 11.6 percent7. Certainly, such a 
response rate demonstrates legislators do not respond to academic surveys at the same level as 
members of the public. In addition, not all of these 835 responses contain answers to the ten 
personality questions, as 151 respondents did not provide answers to all ten personality 
measures.  
However, other questions in the survey also demonstrate variance in the number of 
legislators willing to provide responses. Remember, approximately 18% of the legislators who 
responded to the survey did not complete all ten personality inventory items. But, other, less 
personal survey items also had similar rates of nonresponse. For instance, 11.6% (N=96) of 
respondents did not answer a question asking their opinions on the overall quality of the 
legislatures in which they served. In addition, over14% (N=120) of respondents refused to rank 
the priority they placed on particular policy issues. Therefore, response rates for the personality 
measures prove comparable with other items in the survey. The difficult threshold to surpass in 
studying the personality of political elites involves getting them to answer the survey at all. But, 
it appears if legislators choose to respond to an academic survey, the vast majority of them will 
indeed respond to the personality questions. 
Certainly, as over 600 legislators responded to all ten personality items, we can feel 
confident legislators will respond to personality-related questions on surveys. However, simply 
obtaining personality-related information from legislators does not necessarily mean that 
                                                          
7
 Other elite survey efforts have faced similarly low response rates (see Broockman and Skovron 2013, Maestas, 
Fulton, Maisel, and Stone 2006, and Maisel and Stone 1997 as examples). 
49 
  
information will prove analytically useful. Therefore, I now move to a more thorough 
investigation of personality and the legislator by examining whether personality data from 
legislators provides any meaningful variance and how differences in personality correlate with 
legislators’ attitudes. 
Drawn from the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann, Jr. 
2003), the trait items used in the survey employed a univocal seven-category response format. 
Respondents read a prompt stating, “Here are a series of personality traits that may or may not 
apply to you. Using the scale below, please tell me which answer indicates the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits 
applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.” The terms 
posed to the respondents included: “sociable and active person”; “critical and quarrelsome 
person”; “dependable and self-disciplined person”; “anxious and easily upset person”; “open to 
new experiences and intellectual person”; “quiet and shy person”; “generous and warm 
person”;  “disorganized and careless person”; “calm and emotionally stable person”; and, 
“uncreative and unimaginative person”. The respondents could choose from the following 
responses: “strongly disagree”; “disagree”; “somewhat disagree”; “neither agree nor disagree”; 
“somewhat agree”; “agree”; and, “strongly agree”.  
 Table 2.1 summarizes legislators’ responses to the ten personality items. Certainly, 
results prove mixed with regard to variation. On the plus side, one or more respondents opted 
for every available response option. In addition, under no circumstances did a majority of 
respondents place themselves in the highest category. Unfortunately, on the negative side, a 
minimum of 58.9 percent placed themselves in one of the two extreme categories for each 
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item. Indeed, for openness to experience, only approximately 3 percent of respondents placed 
themselves in one of the lower categories.  
 However, the lack of variation in the legislator Big Five responses does not prove 
surprising. As personality likely plays a role in career choice (e.g. an introvert would likely not go 
into sales as a profession), we should expect to observe less variance when studying a particular 
profession rather than a random sample of the entire population. Unfortunately, Table 2.1 does 
not give us enough information to determine if the limited variation amongst respondents 
proves useful for analysis. At a glance, it does not appear as though the distributions are so 
narrow as to prove useless for analysis. However, rather than relying on impressions, one can 
answer questions of the usefulness of limited variation empirically. 
To demonstrate whether the limited variance in personality measures proves 
analytically fruitful, I now turn to whether personality corresponds to measures of ideology and 
partisanship. Remember, research amongst the mass public demonstrates clear relationships 
between the Big Five and ideology, and to a lesser degree, partisanship (see Chapter 1 for more 
information). In testing whether personality effects emerge with the legislator data, I regress a 
measure of self-reported ideology (0 = extremely liberal, 1 = liberal, 2 = somewhat liberal, 3 = 
moderate, 4 = somewhat conservative, 5 = conservative, 6 =  extremely conservative) and 
partisanship (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican) on the Big Five measures, controlling for age; 
gender (1 = female, 0 = male); education level (0 = high school education; 1 = some college; 2 = 
associate’s degree; 3 = bachelor’s degree; and, 4 = post-graduate degree); and, race (0 = white; 
1 = not white). I employed ordered logistic regression to estimate possible personality effects 
on ideology and binomial logistic regression for the model of partisan affiliation. 
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Table 2.2.summarizes the findings concerning the relationships between personality 
variables and measures of ideology and partisanship.8 The legislators in the sample possess a 
mean score of 0.72 on openness to experience (N = 717; sd = 0.22). The average 
conscientiousness scores falls below that of openness to experience at 0.68 (N = 713; sd = 0.22). 
The mean score on extraversion is 0.63 (N = 722; sd = 0.25). With the lowest mean score of the 
Big Five dimensions, agreeableness averages 0.60 (N = 715; sd = 0.21). Finally, the emotional 
stability of the legislators displays a mean of 0.63 (N = 718; sd = .23).  
Even when controlling for variables typically associated with ideology and partisanship, 
including age, education level, gender, and race, the Big Five measures still prove both 
substantively and statistically significant. Indeed, all five personality measures demonstrate 
significance for ideology and party identification, with even emotional stability reaching 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Furthermore, I achieve nearly identical results 
employing Shor and McCarty’s data (2011) on the ideological positions of state legislators9. 
Such concurrence provides further evidence self-reported personality data can predict not only 
self-reports of ideology and partisan affiliation but also objective measures of ideal points.   
Additionally, these findings replicate previous work on the relationships between the Big 
Five dimensions and ideology and partisanship. Indeed, liberals and Democrats display higher 
levels of openness to experience and agreeableness. Conversely, conservatives and Republicans 
                                                          
8
I created personality scales by flipping each original measure to run from one (high trait) to seven (low trait), 
taking the natural log, and then adding the two matching personality items and flipping them back to run from low 
to high. I then rescaled these variables to run from 0-1. All remaining analysis in this chapter and the following 
chapters employs these scales rather than the legislators’ responses to single trait items. 
9
 Shor and McCarty employ roll-call data and legislators’ responses to Project Vote Smart’s National Political 
Awareness Test (now called the Political Courage Test) to estimate state legislators’ ideal points. Similar to Poole 
and Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate scores, ideal points of less than zero signify a more liberal ideal point, and scores 
above zero signify a more conservative ideal point. 
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report higher levels of conscientiousness and extraversion. Because the findings concerning the 
Big Five and ideology and partisan affiliation of elites conform to findings for members of the 
mass public10, we should feel more comfortable in formulating hypotheses concerning elite 
political behavior and personality. In other words, because being a political elite does not alter 
how personality affects political values and attitudes, we should feel reassured personality will 
affect the political behaviors of elites in a manner similar to the mass public. Had I found null 
results, one could argue the present data are useless. Thus, any null results in the remainder of 
this dissertation could simply be the result of bad data. However, by validating the data, any 
later null results can be deemed to signify the true absence of effects. 
The Predictive Value of Personality 
Personality certainly has a strong substantive influence on ideology. When the average 
legislator in the sample – a 58.5-year-old, white, college-educated male – with mean values on 
the other four trait dimensions increases his openness to experience score from zero to one, 
the predicted probability the legislator identifies as liberal rises from 0.088 to 0.251, and the 
predicted probability the legislator identifies as conservative falls from 0.774 to 0.496. An 
increase from zero to one in agreeableness raises the predicted probability the legislator 
identifies as liberal from 0.099 to 0.282 and lowers the predicted probability of identifying as 
conservative from 0.750 to 0.457. However, increasing the scores of both openness to 
experience and agreeableness from zero to one proves most influential, raising the predicted 
                                                          
10 Studies of the mass public finding Big Five effects on ideology and/or partisan affiliation include Alford and 
Hibbing 2007; Barbaranelli, Caprara, Vecchione, and Fraley 2007; Carney, Jost, Gosling, and Potter 2008;  Gerber, 
Huber, Doherty, and Dowling 2011; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, Raso, and Ha 2011; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, 
Dowling, and Ha 2010; Jost, Federico and Napier 2009; Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008; Mondak 2010; Mondak, 
Hibbing, Canache, Seligson, and Anderson 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Riemann, Grubich, Hempel, Mergl, 
and Richter 1993; Stenner 2005; and, Van Hiel, Kossowska, and Mervielde 2000.  
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probability of identifying as liberal from 0.043 to 0.357 and lowering the predicted probability 
of identifying as conservative from 0.881 to 0.373.  
            Additionally, increasing a member’s score on extraversion from zero to one moves the 
predicted probability of a legislator identifying as conservative from 0.450 to 0.654 and lowers 
the predicted probability of identifying as liberal from 0.288 to 0.149. Moreover, an increase in 
conscientiousness from zero to one increases the predicted probability of identifying as 
conservative from 0.389 to 0.666 and decreases the predicted probability of identifying as 
liberal from 0.342 to 0.142. Finally, increasing emotional stability from zero to one increases the 
probability of identifying as conservative from 0.411 to 0.676 and lowers the predicted 
probability of identifying as liberal from 0.322 to 0.137. Again, however, raising extraversion, 
conscientiousness, and emotional stability simultaneously from zero to one increases the 
probability of identifying as conservative from 0.158 to 0.802 and cuts the predicted probability 
of identifying as liberal from 0.638 to 0.076. 
Not surprisingly, personality also influences the predicted probability of identifying as 
either a Democrat or a Republican. Both openness to experience and agreeableness increase 
the probability of identifying as a Democrat while extraversion, conscientiousness, and 
emotional stability increase the probability of a respondent identifying as a Republican. Again, 
for the average legislator in my sample (a 58.5-year-old white, college-educated male), an 
increase from zero to one in the respondent’s score for openness to experience increases the 
predicted probability of identifying as a Democrat from 0.260 to 0.527 and reduces the 
predicted probability of identifying as a Republican from 0.740 to 0.473. Additionally, an 
increase from zero to one in agreeableness raises the predicted probability of identifying as a 
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Democrat from 0.249 to 0.593 and lowers the predicted probability of identifying as a 
Republican from 0.751 to 0.407. However, the biggest change occurs when the respondent’s 
scores in both openness to experience and agreeableness increase from zero to one, with the 
predicted probability of identifying as a Democrat increasing from 0.125 to 0.667 and 
decreasing the probability of identifying as a Republican from 0.875 to 0.333. 
As expected, increasing a legislator’s extraversion score from zero to one increases the 
predicted probability of identifying as a Republican from 0.429 to 0.621. In addition, an increase 
from zero to one in conscientiousness increases the predicted probability of identifying as a 
Republican from 0.344 to 0.646. In line with previous findings (Mondak 2010, 129; Gerber et al. 
2010) and achieving greater statistical and substantive significance than expected, an increase 
from zero to one in emotional stability also increases the predicted probability of identifying as 
a Republican from 0.432 to 0.621. Again, simultaneously increasing all three of these scores 
from zero to one raises the predicted probability of identifying as a Republican from 0.164 to 
0.836. 
 Results for ideology and partisanship prove encouraging. Although the raw personality 
data display a limited amount of variance, legislators’ self-assessments correspond in a manner 
similar to findings concerning personality and ideology and partisanship at the level of the mass 
public. These results provide me confidence in the validity of the data. Had the data failed to 
produce the expected effects in models of legislators’ political predispositions, I would have 
had a difficult time moving to models of other legislative behaviors. Though limited, what 
variance occurs in the personality measures appears meaningful. To place this variance in 
context, consider the batting averages of professional baseball players and the average 
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individual. In baseball, every position player in the Major Leagues, even pitchers, hits infinitely 
better than the average American. Therefore, if we employed an average American hitting 
scale, Major League players would reside within the far right tail. However, within Major 
League players themselves, the difference between batting averages of 0.200 and 0.400 has 
meaning. The same concept applies here. Certainly, legislators likely possess higher levels of all 
five trait dimensions than members of the average public. However, the limited differences 
between the legislators themselves still prove meaningful. 
I devote the remainder of this chapter to demonstrating how personality affects 
progressive ambition – both intrainstitutional and extrainstitutional. I do so for two reasons. 
First, scholars have demonstrated the importance of ambition for current and future behavior 
(see below). Yet, these studies tend to focus on the environmental factors influencing whether 
a legislator opts to run for higher office. But second, a desire to run for higher office seems a 
likely place to study how personality might affect legislative behavior. For instance, how open 
or extraverted an individual is might influence his willingness to take the risk of running for 
higher office. I proceed by discussing the extant literature on progressive ambition and 
demonstrate how personality affects the desire to run for higher office. In the next chapter, I 
will move on to discuss the literature on a variety of legislative activities, such as working with 
constituents; studying legislation; participating in caucuses; attending floor debate; and, 
working with party leaders to build coalitions. Then, rather than replicating previous results as I 
do in this chapter, the models in the next chapter demonstrate how personality affects the 
amount of time in which legislators engage in various activities. 
Personality and Progressive Ambition 
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 The study of progressive ambition began with Joseph Schlesinger’s Ambition and 
Politics: Political Careers in the United States (1966). In this work, Schlesinger argues all 
legislators possess ambition in some manner. He categorizes ambition in three ways: discrete, 
static, and progressive. Schlesinger describes discrete ambition as seeking political office for a 
set period of time or until the achievement of a particular policy goal. Once the legislator’s self-
imposed time limit arrives or the legislator accomplishes his goal, he voluntarily leaves office. 
With static ambition, a legislator remains in office indefinitely, content with the office he holds 
and does not seek a different office. Finally, progressive ambition concerns legislators who 
leave their current offices in pursuit of more prestigious offices.  
 Following Schlesinger’s work, scholars undertook studying progressive ambition in two 
ways: differentiating between those who display progressive ambition and those who do not 
and studying how progressive ambition affects behavior in office. Undoubtedly, the first vein of 
research has proven far more dominant and focuses on the personal characteristics of 
legislators and the characteristics of the district and/or state.  
Certain personal characteristics make a legislator more or less likely to pursue higher 
office. For instance, the young and the old often avoid running for higher office, making those 
of middle age most likely to pursue higher office (Brace 1984; Maestas et al. 2006). Also, 
minority members, more likely to risk losing their seats than majority members, also run for 
higher office more frequently (Gilmour and Rothstein 1993; Schansberg 1994). Finally, women 
members, who often face greater personal costs than their male counterparts, run for higher 
office at lower rates (Maestas et al. 2006; Fulton, Maestas, Maisel, and Stone 2006). 
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Though personal characteristics certainly play roles in the decision-making calculus of 
progressive ambition, district- and state-level characteristics also play an important part. First, 
the imposition of term limits increases the likelihood a legislator will run for higher office 
(Powell 2000). By limiting the amount of time a member can spend in a single office, term limits 
often lead these individuals to run for higher office in furtherance of their goals (whether 
personal or policy). Second, the competitiveness of a district also influences the decision to run 
for higher office. Essentially, when a legislator faces a close race, he will often forgo seeking 
reelection in pursuit of a higher office. 
Nevertheless, choosing to run for a higher office or seeking a prestigious position within 
the institution constitutes a personal decision. As such, personality should influence those 
decisions. In particular, three of the Big Five trait dimensions seem particularly applicable when 
considering how personality might influence intrainstitutional and extrainstitutional ambition. 
First, openness to experience could possess a positive relationship with progressive ambition. 
Scholars have demonstrated risk-taking more strongly correlates with progressive ambition 
(Rohde 1979). Because jeopardizing a currently-held position for the chance to win a higher 
office constitutes a great risk, open individuals (who often thrive on risk-taking behavior) will 
likely consider a run for higher office at greater rates than less open individuals. Second, 
running for higher office provides two new arenas in which extraverted individuals can interact 
with others – on the campaign trail and by reaching a larger electorate through media 
exposure. Therefore, extraversion could also demonstrate a positive relationship with 
progressive ambition. Finally, because pursuing a higher office entails greater media scrutiny, 
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effort in raising campaign funds, and a longer election cycle, the emotionally stable may 
consider running for higher office more than their more neurotic counterparts. 
In the following table, the variables are coded as follows: age (continuous variable); 
gender (0 = male, 1 = female); race (0 = white, 1 = non-white); education (0 = high school 
diploma or GED; 1 = some college; 2 = associate’s degree; 3 = bachelor’s degree; 4 = post-
graduate degree); time in office (continuous variable); first term dummy (0 = not first term, 1 = 
first term); party affiliation (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican); competitive election (0 = not a 
competitive election; 1 = competitive election, defined as winning by less than 20%); majority (0 
= minority; 1 = majority); term-limited (0 = no term limits; 1 = term-limited); party leader (0 = 
not a party leader; 1 = party leader); committee leader (0 = not a committee leader; 1 = 
committee leader); and, progressive ambition (0 = will not run for higher office; 1 = not 
currently interested in running for higher office; 2 = would run for higher office if opportunity 
presented; 3 = will definitely run for higher office). 
Unfortunately, results proved mixed in regards to personality’s potential effects on 
progressive ambition, both intrainstitutional and extrainstitutional (see Table 2.3). Although 
openness to experience appears to have very little effect on the decision to run for higher office 
(labeled progressive ambition in the table), extraversion proves influential. Indeed, a move 
from zero to one on extraversion increases the predicted probability of the legislator reporting 
he will certainly run for higher office from 0.037 to 0.145. Though no personality variables 
reach conventional levels of statistical significance in predicting whether a legislator holds a 
leadership position on a committee, both openness to experience and emotional stability 
appear to have some influence on whether an individual holds a party leadership position. An 
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increase from zero to one in openness to experience negatively correlates with the chances a 
legislator holds a party leadership position, reducing the predicted probability from 0.103 to 
0.024. Conversely, increasing a legislator’s score from zero to one in emotional stability 
increases the predicted probability of serving as a party leader from 0.013 to 0.068.  
These findings do not prove particularly surprising given the characteristics associated 
with openness to experience and emotional stability. Those high in openness may feel 
constrained by the work of a party leader and not enjoy having limited opportunities to engage 
in wider variety of legislative activities and policy topics. On the other hand, the emotionally 
stable may find themselves better mentally equipped to deal with the stress associated with 
leadership. Furthermore, the metaphor of herding cats seems appropriate for this finding, as 
well; the emotionally stable may handle the constraints of attempting to further the party’s 
agenda while working with legislators operating in such a candidate-centered electoral system 
better than their more neurotic counterparts. 
Conclusion 
 For decades, scholars have indicated the potential significance of the personalities of 
political elites. Unfortunately, these earlier efforts lack any rigorous scientific method and relied 
largely on a case study approach. Certainly, the lack of large-N studies of political elites traces 
to uncertainty in the grounding field of psychology. Until relatively recently, psychologists 
lacked a comprehensive framework for personality employable by political scientists. Without 
that common framework, scholars could highlight the potential significance of personality while 
having no way to act upon those suspicions. In this chapter and the preceding chapter, I have 
argued the Big Five framework provides the conceptualization and operationalization of 
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personality necessary to overcome this problem. This five-factor model, focusing on openness 
to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability, has 
gone on to become the predominant psychological perspective. 
In furthering the work of Dietrich et al. (2012), I have sought to demonstrate three 
things. First, political elites will indeed respond to personality-related measures. The major 
obstacle comes in simply getting political elites to answer a survey instrument in the first place. 
However, when legislators do respond to surveys, they do not avoid answering personality 
questions at a higher frequency than they avoid answering less personally-invasive questions. 
Second, political elites do display some variance in personality. Certainly, they likely display less 
variance than a random sample of members of the mass public. If personality has any influence 
of career choice, I would likely discover the same lack of variance in populations of sales 
associates, medical professionals, or artists. However, the level of variance in personality 
amongst political elites does not appear so concentrated as to prove useless for analysis.  
Third, validity tests yielded encouraging results. The patterns of political influence of the 
Big Five in the mass public appear to replicate themselves at the elite level. For instance, 
personality corresponds with both political ideology and partisan identification. Conservatives 
tend to possess higher levels of conscientiousness, extraversion, and emotional stability while 
liberals tend to possess higher levels of openness to experience and agreeableness. The same 
patterns also appear for partisanship, with Republicans demonstrating higher levels 
extraversion, conscientiousness, and emotional stability and Democrats having higher levels of 
openness to experience and agreeableness. Because personality behaves similarly at the mass 
and elite levels in regards to ideology and partisanship, the manner in which personality 
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influences political behavior at the mass level provides us with meaningful guidance concerning 
how personality affects political behavior at the corresponding elite level. 
However, while demonstrating personality influences ideology and partisan 
identification in similar ways at both the elite and mass levels, does personality also influence 
legislative behavior in manners expected based on findings at the mass level?  Or, do 
institutional constraints play such a dominant role as to minimize any influence of personality? 
In the next three chapters, I delve more deeply into how personality influences engagement in 
a variety of legislative behaviors, both subjective and objective. 
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Chapter 3: Personality and Engagement in Legislative Activities 
 
Introduction 
 Investigations concerning political psychology and political behavior study engagement 
with politics at different stages by studying values, which lead to attitudes, which lead to 
engagement in political behaviors. Undoubtedly, personality appears to play an important role 
in determining the most basic political inclinations of individuals: their ideological positions. 
Personality also influences how individuals take their ideological positions and formalize them 
by attaching themselves to a particular political party, and additional research has 
demonstrated personality also drives engagement in a variety of political activities at the mass 
level. 
 However, while recent works have established personality plays a similar role among 
both the political elite and the mass public, very little, if any, research has investigated whether 
personality affects political elites’ engagement in activities consistent with findings from the 
mass public. Certainly, research replicating findings from the mass level concerning ideology 
and partisanship at the elite level provides us with confidence personality will impact the 
political behavior of elites in manners consistent with the public. This chapter seeks to act as a 
first step in studying whether and how personality influences elite engagement in political 
activities by investigating personality’s effects on the self-reported time legislators spend on 
various activities related to their work. In this chapter, I will first discuss the conventional 
wisdom concerning what influences engagement in a variety of legislative activities. Then, 
rather than focusing solely on environmental factors exogenous to the legislator, I will include 
personality measures in addition to established explanations of legislative activity in an effort to 
63 
  
determine whether legislators’ personalities also impact engagement in particular legislative 
behaviors. 
Engagement in Extrainstitutional Activities – Constituency Service and Fundraising 
 What factors determine how much time legislators devote to their constituencies? For 
many legislators, constituency activities prove their least favorite aspect of their jobs. Indeed, a 
retired legislator told Hibbing, “I came to Washington to be a member of the greatest legislative 
body in the world and I ended up being an errand boy” (1991, 145). If members dislike engaging 
in constituency activities so much, why do they bother at all?  
First, interacting with constituents can provide electoral benefits to the legislator. In 
fact, most state legislators believe performing service activities will benefit them electorally 
(Rosenthal 1993, 129). Engaging in constituency activities allows members to make names for 
themselves back in the district, earn the approval of the public, and hopefully garner more 
votes in the next election. Electorally vulnerable members may engage in greater constituency 
service as a means to boost sagging approval ratings or to expand their support bases, while 
less vulnerable members may engage in constituency service to shore up their support bases 
during the protectionist phases of their careers where established incumbents face younger 
challengers (Fenno 1978).  
However, electoral safety does not necessarily always guide members’ engagement with 
their constituencies. One would assume electorally vulnerable members would lessen their 
amount of engagement in institutional activities and increase their engagement with their 
constituents in an effort to garner more votes. However, the opposite often proves true. More 
marginal members increase their participation within the institution (Hall 1996, 204). Rather 
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than going back to the district for support, these electorally vulnerable members may feel the 
need to “try harder” within the institution itself. Nevertheless, the simple feeling of electoral 
vulnerability may increase the amount of time a legislator devotes to constituency-related 
activities.  In addition, progressive ambition may drive some legislators away from more “work 
horse” activities such as constituent service and toward more “show horse” activities such as 
speeches to attract publicity (Ellickson and Whistler 2001).  
Second, tenure in office influences the amount of time legislators devote to 
constituency-related activities. Conventional wisdom concerning members and their 
constituents dictates a decrease in local legislative activities over time. The theory postulates 
that as members grow more embedded within the institutional structure, they will spend less 
time engaging in district-oriented activities. Essentially, junior members will engage with their 
constituencies more frequently than senior members, likely in an effort to shore up their next 
reelection bids, while senior members grow less attentive to constituents but more involved in 
actual legislating (Hibbing 1991, 174). While this conventional wisdom  still holds true – longer 
periods of tenure in the House lead to fewer trips home and fewer staffers allocated to the 
district– tenure does not provide the same level of variation in constituency activities as in the 
past (Hibbing 1991, 155).  
Nevertheless, legislators tend to devote more time to constituent activities early in their 
legislative careers when they are less established in their districts and have less influence over 
policy matters while devoting more time to policy in the later stages of government service 
(Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987). Although state legislators do not necessarily face the same 
constraints on time and resources when considering going back to their districts (traveling from 
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Austin to Abilene does not require the time and planning of traveling from Washington, DC to 
Abilene), the same tenure pattern likely holds true at the state level, though perhaps not as 
drastically. 
Third, the demographic characteristics of legislators also play a role in determining the 
amount of time legislators allocate to their constituents. Female legislators and legislators of 
racial minority groups tend to spend more time on constituency-related activities (Richardson 
and Freeman 1995; Thomas 1992). However, women and racial minorities tend to represent 
more urban districts from which scholars believe a greater demand for casework emanates 
(Nelson 1991: 27, 45). In addition, minority legislators believe more than their white 
counterparts their constituents have a greater interest in service than issues and also feel an 
obligation to serve their minority constituents (Thomas 1992, 171). Finally, legislators who 
believe in a greater role for government (e.g. liberals) may devote more time, energy, and 
resources to constituent service than those who believe in a smaller government (e.g. 
conservatives) (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987, 95; Ellickson and Whistler 2001). 
 Undoubtedly, electoral marginality, tenure in office, and legislator demographic 
characteristics play roles in the amount of time legislators allocate to engaging with their 
constituencies. However, some members simply do not follow the predictable patterns. For 
instance,  “…some members, regardless of career state, electoral situation, or formal position, 
pay much more attention to constituents and are more legislatively involved than others” 
(Hibbing 1991, 166). What accounts for this variation and deviation from prescribed patterns? I 
posit personality helps account for these legislators who do not follow the more typical 
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patterns of behavior based on their other characteristics. In particular, it seems logical to argue 
the extraverted would enjoy working with constituents over the introverted. 
Another form of behavior outside the legislature itself involves campaign fundraising. 
Here, too, gender and race appear to affect legislators’ fundraising efforts, with women 
worrying about campaign finance at a higher rate than men, leading them to engage in more 
fundraising efforts (Jenkins 2007). Also, women in highly professionalized legislatures still face a 
disadvantage in terms of fundraising. Thompson, Moncrief, and Hamm (1998) show women in 
professionalized legislatures receive less funding than men, which could indicate an increased 
necessity to engage in fundraising for women in professional legislatures. Finally, minority 
candidates may also face a fundraising disadvantage (particularly in more professional 
legislatures) and may need to engage in fundraising more frequently than white candidates 
(Hogan and Thompson 1998).  
Additionally, electoral vulnerability also greatly influences the amount of fundraising in 
which a candidate engages (Hogan 2001; Goodliffe 2005). Essentially, weak incumbents raise 
more money in an effort to deter challengers and to build a war chest for the upcoming 
election. Yet, the characteristics of the state in which an individual serves also influence the 
necessity to engage in fundraising. Studies have demonstrated a consistently positive 
relationship between levels of legislative professionalism and fundraising (Moncrief 1992; 
Hogan and Hamm 1998; Hogan 2001). Candidates must raise more money for campaigns when 
they participate in elections for the more professional legislatures.  
Certainly, these personal and state characteristics play roles in determining who would 
engage in more fundraising efforts. However, personality also likely plays a role. Because 
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fundraising often involves associating with a wide variety of individuals, extraverted individuals 
may enjoy participating in fundraising as a social activity. Additionally, emotional stability might 
negatively correlate with fundraising. High-stress individuals, low in emotional stability, might 
engage in fundraising in an attempt to alleviate reelection anxieties.  
Participation in Aspects of the Legislative Process 
 The survey I employ asked legislators about the amount of self-reported time they 
devote to particular activities within the institution, including committee participation, studying 
legislation, participating in caucuses, attending floor debate, and working with party leaders to 
build coalitions. What does literature on legislative behavior say about who participates in 
these particular activities and why?  
First, tenure in office plays a role in determining the amount of time individuals devote 
to legislative activities. Overall, a generally linear relationship exists between tenure in office 
and engagement in floor speeches, introductions, and amendments offered on the floor 
(Hibbing 1991, 115). Over the course of their careers, members undoubtedly grow more active 
in the legislative process by speaking on the floor more frequently, offering amendments to 
legislation on the floor, and introducing legislation. Additionally, members grow more 
specialized and more efficient the longer they serve in office (Hibbing 1991, 126).  
Indeed, legislators also grow more successful in pushing their bills out of committee and 
oftentimes out of the institution itself over time (Hibbing 1991, 127). Years of experience have 
likely taught these legislators how to target their limited resources towards legislative success. 
Tenure also plays a role in the amount of committee participation members display. Despite the 
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decline of apprenticeship norms in legislatures, junior members participate less in committees 
than do more senior members (Hall 1987).  
 Second, seniority within the institution influences behavior within legislatures. Typically, 
more senior members gain formal leadership positions whether within the party or on 
committees and subcommittees. This pattern could potentially prove problematic for data 
concerning formal leadership positions in state legislatures. Likely due to the lower levels of 
professionalism in many state legislatures, more junior members often serve in formal 
leadership positions. However, the trend of seniority and tenure in office influencing the 
acquisition of leadership positions in Congress has grown more tenuous over time. 
Representatives now acquire formal leadership positions earlier in their legislative careers than 
in the past (Hibbing 1991, 181). Therefore, I expect a similar relationship between tenure and 
formal leadership positions at the state level, with tenure playing a minor role in determining 
who holds formal leadership positions.  
 Third, both gender and race appear to have varying effects on behaviors within the 
institution. As women first gained a foothold in legislatures, they participated in activities like 
introductions and floor speaking at lower rates than their male counterparts. However, women 
have begun to participate more equitably in the full range of legislative activities (Thomas 
1994). Nevertheless, research has suggested men may act more aggressively in committee as 
the number of female legislators increases, which in turn decreases the participation of those 
female legislators (Kathlene 1994). Additionally, black legislators participate at higher levels in 
committee than their white counterparts on both racial and nonracial legislation (Gamble 
2007).   
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The leadership positions gained through service within the institution also influence 
engagement in various legislative behaviors. For example, those in formal leadership positions 
participate in committee meetings and hearings more frequently than rank-and-file members 
(Evans 1991; Duffin 2003). In addition, progressive ambition also plays a role in determining the 
amount of time legislators engage in particular legislative activities. As in the case of 
constituent services, progressively ambitious legislators often forgo participating in committees 
(Perkins 1980), typically considered a work-horse behavior, for more show-horse behaviors. 
Participation in Legislative Caucuses 
 Caucuses provide an interesting area of exploration because they allow members to 
voluntarily select into a group wherein they can gather information, represent their 
constituencies, build reputations, and signal to other members and the institution more 
broadly. Unfortunately, studies of legislative organization and behavior have focused primarily 
on the committee system and individual roll-call behavior. Somewhat surprisingly, scholars 
have undertaken very little work on investigating legislative caucuses although research into 
caucuses seems to be increasing in response to the rapid rise in the number of caucuses in the 
last thirty years. Nonetheless, a few researchers have conducted the majority of the existing 
preliminary work on caucuses, providing information and routes for further exploration. 
 Much of the existing work on caucuses has a descriptive tone. Such works often detail 
the histories of congressional caucuses, provide typologies of congressional caucuses, and 
discuss how congressional caucuses interact with congressional leadership (Forgette 2004) and 
forces outside the legislative branch, oftentimes the executive branch (Hammond 1991, 1998). 
70 
  
However, others have detailed how caucuses provide a service to the institution as a whole 
through an agenda-setting mechanism (Hammond, Mulholland, and Stevens, Jr. 1985). 
 According to Fenno (1973), members of Congress pursue three goals: reelection, the 
creation of good public policy, and power within the chamber. Caucuses, or “…voluntary 
associations of members of Congress, without recognition in chamber rules or line item 
appropriations, which seek to have a role in the policy process” (Hammond, Mulhollan, and 
Stevens, Jr. 1985, 583), help members of Congress achieve all these objectives. Members can 
appeal to constituency interests by joining particular caucuses. Legislators can affect the 
creation of public policy by joining caucuses and receiving information or crafting legislation. 
Some caucuses appear to hold quite a bit of leverage within the chamber. However, despite 
this multitude of purposes, all caucuses exist to affect policy in some manner (Hammond 1998, 
23).  
Because caucuses can serve a variety of important functions within legislatures, I find it 
important to understand who joins these caucuses and how those individuals invest their time 
in them. Indeed, caucuses do have distinctive patterns in membership. Different types of 
legislators appear to join caucuses at different rates. For instance, more Democrats join 
caucuses than Republicans; junior members join more caucuses than senior members; and, 
party leaders join fewer caucuses than rank-and-file members (Hammond 1998, 78). However, 
personality also likely influences caucus membership. For example, caucuses could potentially 
provide an outlet for legislators to meet one another, build coalitions, and gain support for 
legislation.  Such an outlet provides a great opportunity for those who enjoy engaging in social 
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activities, like extraverts. Also, caucuses can supply unique information to members, piquing 
the informational interest of those high in openness to experience.  
Legislative Professionalism 
 Although not an issue when studying Congress, state legislatures display highly varying 
levels of legislative professionalism. Because legislative professionalism could play an important 
role in the story of how personality affects legislative behaviors, I will provide a brief overview 
of the concept and how scholars have measured it. Scholars typically associate year-round 
legislative sessions, increased permanent staff resources, and adequate pay with legislative 
professionalism. Essentially, these measures seek to identify how similarly to the United States 
Congress a state legislature treats its members.  
The most well-known professionalism index, developed by Squire in 1992 and updated 
by the same in 2007, compares congressional pay, days in session, and the number of staff per 
member to the same attributes of state legislatures. A score of 1.0 would represent a perfect 
resemblance between Congress and a state legislature while a score of 0.0 represents no 
resemblance. While the component measures of Squire’s professionalism index relate to 
attributes of the institution itself and not the individuals serving within the institution, more 
behaviorally-based measures also indicate similar levels of professionalism (see Maddox 2004 
as an example). 
 The component measures of professionalism have implications for both the legislators 
and the legislatures in which they serve. Increased salary provides a greater incentive to serve a 
longer time in office. The existence of these more veteran members creates a more 
experienced and knowledgeable body. Additionally, the number of days spent in legislative 
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session places a potential burden on the legislators in terms of the activities in which they can 
engage outside the legislative arena. Nevertheless, spending more time in session allows for 
greater policy creation and deliberation. Finally, increased staff provides for greater 
policymaking capabilities. Because such a resource allows for improved policy creation and 
enhanced reelection prospects, more professional state legislatures have greater power vis a 
vis the executive.  
While measures of legislative professionalism somewhat overlap with careerism, they 
do not necessarily concern the same underlying concepts. For instance, legislative pay 
constitutes a component of legislative professionalism, with legislators in more professional 
legislatures making more money than individuals in less professional legislatures. While the 
higher salary could provide greater incentive for a legislator to consider serving a longer tenure 
in office, pay also represents compensation for the time demands placed on legislators. In 
addition, state term limits on legislators do not affect legislative professionalism. Term limits do 
not restrict the number of staff members can employ, the number of days they spend in 
session, or the amount of money they make as legislators.   
Models of Legislative Activity 
 In the following models, I employ personality variables rescaled to run from zero to one. 
Remember, within the full dataset, the legislators average 0.72 on openness (N = 717;  sd = 
0.22); 0.68 on conscientiousness (N = 713; SD = 0.23); 0.63 on extraversion (N = 722; sd = 0.25); 
0.60 on agreeableness (N = 715; sd = 0.21), and 0.63 (N = 718; sd = 0.23) on emotional stability. 
The dataset I employ asked legislators to describe how much time they spent on eleven 
activities: (1) meeting with citizens back in the district; (2) meeting with constituents in the 
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capital; (3) fundraising; (4) participating in committee matters; (5) working on legislative issues; 
(6) studying legislation; (7) working with caucuses; (8) attending floor debate; (9) working with 
party leaders to build coalitions; (10) engaging in oversight; and, (11) giving speeches about 
legislation outside the district. These questions employed a four-category response format, 
with response options of “almost none” (0), “a little” (1), “a moderate amount” (2), and “a 
great deal” (3). 
Undoubtedly, the legislators demonstrate far more variance in their self-reports 
concerning the amount of time they dedicate to the variety of legislative activities than they do 
for personality (see Table 3.1). Because of desirability bias and the use of self-reports, 
legislators could have indicated they spend a great deal of time engaging in every activity. 
Fortunately, in only three circumstances (committee attendance, studying legislation, and 
attending floor debate) do a majority of respondents place themselves in the most extreme 
category. In every other instance, the majority of legislators place themselves in the two middle 
categories of “a little” and “a moderate amount”.  
Next, I move on to whether personality affects engagement in various legislative 
activities. While I include a table with the results of eleven separate regression models (see 
Table 3.3), it seemed prudent to determine whether the activities included in the survey 
constitute dimensions of some higher-level factors. Therefore, rather than solely running 
models on all eleven activities separately, I conducted factor analysis to determine whether 
which, if any, of these activities load together on some underlying dimension. Using varimax 
rotation, ten of the eleven dependent variables appear to load on two underlying dimensions. 
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 Almost all the variables fall along two fundamental dimensions (see Table 3.2). First, the 
variables concerning meeting with citizens and constituents, fundraising, working with party 
leaders to build coalitions, engaging in oversight activities, and giving speeches about legislation 
outside the district load onto some dimension concerning the tasks in which most legislators 
engage (labeled Factor One).  Second, the variables concerning time spent working on 
committee matters, working on legislative issues, studying legislation, and attending floor 
debate all load onto some dimension concerning more purely legislative tasks (labeled Factor 
Two). The one outlier, working with caucuses, appears to fall in between these two underlying 
dimensions.  
In the following models, I have chosen to employ hierarchical level modeling for several 
reasons. First, while the dependent variables of interest all occur at the individual level of 
analysis, the independent variables I include exist at multiple levels of analysis. For instance, 
while variables such as ideology or progressive ambition measure concepts at the level of the 
individual, variables such as term limits and professionalism reside at a state level of analysis. 
Therefore, observations include individuals nested within states. Second, simply glancing at the 
raw data demonstrates each state appears to have its own norms about service unrelated to 
the level of legislative professionalism. In other words, professionalism alone does not appear 
to account for the amount of self-reported time legislators devote to particular activities. As a 
result, grouping respondents by their states allows me to better account for these varying 
norms. 
In these analyses, I coded the independent variables as follows: gender (0 = male, 1 = 
female); race (0 = white, 1 = non-white); party affiliation (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican); years 
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in office (continuous variable); first term dummy (0 = not first term, 1 = first term); majority (0 = 
minority member, 1 = majority member); chamber (0 = lower chamber, 1 = upper chamber); 
party leader (0 = not a party leader, 1 = party leader); committee leader (0 = not a committee 
leader, 1 = committee leader); progressive ambition (0 = will definitely not run for higher office, 
1 = not currently interested in running for higher office; 2 = would run for higher office if 
opportunity presented, 3 = will definitely run for higher office); and, competitive (0 = not a 
competitive race in the last election; 1 = competitive race in the last election, defined as 
winning by less than 20% of the vote). In addition, the models include several higher-level 
variables including a dummy variable about whether the state in which the individual serves 
employs term limits (0 = no term limits, 1 = term-limited) and a continuous variable of 
professionalism ranging from zero to one (taken from Squire 2007). Finally, I rescaled the 
personality variables to range from zero to one to make interpretation simpler. 
Before running any models including my independent variables of interest, I first ran the 
intercept-only (unconditional) models to establish how much of the variance in the data occurs 
at the individual level and how much occurs at the state level. As several of the original 
dependent variables of interest lie on the border of conventional acceptability for inclusion in 
the factor-analyzed variables (namely participation in caucuses, coalitions, and oversight), I 
have created two versions of the Factor One model. The first version (labeled “Minimal Factor 
One” in Table 3.7) includes the variables concerning time spent with citizens and constituents, 
fundraising, and giving speeches. The second version (labeled “Full Factor One”) includes 
participating in coalition-building and oversight in addition to the four component measures of 
the Minimal Factor One model. For the Minimal Factor One model, 15.9% of the variance 
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occurs at the state level, leaving the remaining 84.1% of the variance at the individual level. In 
the Full Factor One model, 10.4% of the variance occurs at the state level, leaving 89.6% of the 
variance at the individual level. For the Factor Two model, 5.1% of the variance occurs at the 
state level, while 94.9% of the variance occurs at the individual level.  
Next, to ensure the usefulness of my models, I compared the variance explained by the 
intercept-only models and the variance explained by the models including my variables of 
interest (both extrinsic and intrinsic). In all cases, the conditional models explain a much greater 
amount of the variance. For the Minimal Factor One model, my model explains 27.1% of the 
variance at the state level (level 2) and 25.8% at the individual level (level 1). The Full Factor 
One model explains 34.0% of the variance at the state level and 20.1% of the variance at the 
individual level. Finally, the Factor Two model explains 26.6% of the variance at the state level 
and 16.4% of the variance at the individual level. 
Results 
 As previously mentioned, I ran a variety of models employing different statistical 
approaches. In the first set of models (Table. 3.3), I employed ordinal logistic regression and 
regressed each of the eleven original dependent variables on the respondents’ scores on the 
Big Five and a set of independent variables theoretically likely to influence legislative behavior. 
In the second set of models (Table 3.4), I conducted restricted maximum likelihood regressions 
within hierarchical-level modeling and regressed each of my factor-analyzed scales on the 
independent variables employed in Table 3.3. First, I will discuss the models involving the 
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eleven original dependent variables included in the survey, and then I will move onto the 
results of the models employing the factor-analyzed variables.11 
 As expected, personality appears to significantly impact the amount of time 
respondents indicate they spend engaging in myriad legislative activities (see Table 3.3). In 
particular, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and extraversion seem to do the bulk of 
personality’s work in terms of participation in those activities. First, openness to experience 
appears to influence the amount of a time a legislator engages in institutional activities. For 
instance, open legislators report spending a substantial amount of their time attending 
committee hearings and studying pending legislation. As openness correlates with information-
seeking behavior, open individuals participating in activities in which they can gain additional 
knowledge comes as no surprise.  
Second, the amount of time a legislator reports spending on more purely legislative 
activities also positively correlates with conscientiousness. Therefore, the highly conscientious 
likely view attending committee meetings, studying pending legislation, and attending floor 
debate as routine parts of the job and feel duty-bound to fulfill their perceived job descriptions. 
Third, extraversion positively impacts the amount of time legislators report engaging in 
activities in which they can work with or be around others. For example, extraverted legislators 
spend more time meeting with citizens, engaging in fundraising activities, and giving speeches 
than their more introverted counterparts. 
                                                          
11
 In hierarchical-level modeling, the estimated coefficients provided by the ordinal logistic regression tell us about 
the probability of the respondent placing himself within the first category of the dependent variable of interest 
(e.g. engaging in almost no contact with constituents) as opposed to the other response option categories. In 
practice, positive coefficients relate to a higher likelihood of falling in the first (or lowest) category, which means 
coefficients appear in reverse of what one would expect. Therefore, negative coefficients indicate that as the 
independent variable increases, the amount of time in which a legislator reports engaging in a particular activity 
also increases. 
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 While agreeableness and emotional stability prove less consistent as statistically-
significant predictors of behavior, they do impact the amount of time legislators spend 
engaging in certain activities. For instance, the agreeable spend more time working with 
constituents than the less agreeable. Because agreeableness relates to a desire for social 
harmony, agreeable legislators likely seek to appease their constituents beyond pandering for 
reelection. Rather, agreeable legislators may simply want to keep the individuals back home 
happy. 
Additionally, the emotionally stable report spending more time working with 
constituents than their more neurotic counterparts. As working with the mass public could 
prove a mentally taxing activity, neurotic legislators might try to avoid the stress they could feel 
by minimizing their engagement with constituents. Conversely, emotionally-stable legislators 
may have a greater ability to more easily cope with the mental strain of working with the mass 
public.  
Such results also hold true at a more aggregate level of analysis. Remember, the 
dependent variables composing the Factor One and Factor Two models deal with more 
extrainstitutional behaviors and more purely institutional behaviors, respectively. Least 
surprising, extraversion positively influences the amount of time members report engaging in 
behaviors largely occurring outside the institution itself, such as meeting with constituents, 
engaging in fundraising, and giving speeches (see Table 3.4). A move from least extraverted to 
most extraverted leads to an increase of 0.09 (from 0.45 to 0.54) for a legislator’s scalar score 
on both Bare Factor One and Full Factor One.  
79 
  
For comparability, let us consider a variable typically associated with variation in 
engagement of extrainstitutional activities: years in office.  As a legislator grows more 
entrenched within the institution, research typically finds legislators devote less time to 
activities outside the institution like meeting with constituents and more time engaging in the 
production of legislation. However, a change in tenure in office produces virtually no change in 
a legislator’s scalar score on either the bare or full factors (from 0.50 to 0.51 over the course of 
ten years in office). 
However, extraversion does not appear to play a significant role in the amount of time 
legislators devote to more purely legislative tasks (producing a change of 0.03 in the scalar 
score over the range of extraversion). This finding proves particularly interesting in light of 
extraversion’s positive effect on progressive ambition. In terms of the individuals interested in 
running for higher office, we find individuals who prefer socializing willing to run, but these 
individuals do not display a great amount of interest in actually doing the work of legislators. In 
addition, agreeableness also influences engagement in legislative tasks involving working with 
others. Finally, conscientiousness plays a role in engagement in both extrainstitutional and 
intrainstitutional behaviors. The conscientious likely view these activities as duties they must 
perform as part of the job. However, this effect proves especially pronounced for activities 
occurring within legislatures. 
Certainly, several variables commonly used within more traditional legislative behavior 
also impact time spent participating in these activities. For instance, the amount of time in 
office negatively correlates with the amount of time a member spends meeting with citizens 
back in the district but positively correlates with the amount of time a member spends working 
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on oversight or in meetings in the capital. As expected, more entrenched legislators devote less 
time to working with those voting them into office and more time to actually accomplishing 
legislation. Additionally, members serving in more professionalized legislatures report spending 
more time studying potential legislation and meeting about legislative issues. Finally, gender 
appears to impact the amount of time legislators report engaging in more purely legislative 
tasks. These findings comport with existing literature suggesting female legislators feel a desire 
to prove themselves within the institution.  
Conclusion 
 For decades, scholars have indicated the possible significance of personality in studying 
political attitudes and behaviors. However, although researchers have sporadically undertaken 
studies concerning personality and politics, such studies remain unfortunately rare. While 
political scientists have steadily increased the use of personality as an explanatory variable in 
their works, most work has neglected to address large-N studies of personality and political 
elites. However, the rise of the Big Five framework within psychological literature now provides 
political scientists a well-validated and reliable method of studying potential links between 
personality and elite political behavior.  
 In this chapter, I have argued psychology’s Big Five framework offers scholars an 
opportunity to satisfy the desire to include personality in studies while maintaining 
methodological rigor. Certainly, the five-factor approach has grown into the dominant 
perspective in personality over recent decades. In the previous chapter, I sought to replicate at 
the elite level findings concerning personality and politics from studies at the level of the mass 
public. Conducting such replicative work proves necessary to ensure personality-related 
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hypotheses derived from the mass level have logical underpinnings. However, in this chapter, I 
have moved beyond purely replicative work. By applying the Big Five framework in this chapter, 
I have argued personality affects engagement in a variety of legislative behaviors.  And, indeed, 
personality appears to influence the behaviors of political elites in logical ways. 
Overall, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and extraversion appear to act as 
the personality dimensions driving engagement in various types of legislative activity. Yet, we 
must remember each of the legislative activities under investigation matters for whether and 
which personality trait dimensions rise to the foreground.  Certainly, not all activities provide an 
opportunity for individuals’ personality traits to play a role. For instance, nothing intrinsic in 
studying pending legislation or conducting oversight inherently appeals to an individual’s 
susceptibility to stress (emotional stability).  
However, certain legislative activities do have logical connections with certain 
personality trait dimensions. In an effort to understand the influence of personality on 
engagement in individual activities and broader groupings of activity, I conducted the analyses 
in this chapter in two ways. First, I investigated personality’s effects on self-reported 
engagement in the eleven activities included in the survey. Second, using factor analysis, I 
studied personality’s effects on self-reported engagement in two broad types of legislative 
activities: those activities with some kind of extrainstitutional and/or social component and 
those activities occurring within the institution. Again, three personality trait dimensions – 
openness to experience, conscientiousness, and extraversion – stand out as contributing factors 
and a fourth, agreeableness, appears to play a somewhat secondary role, as well.  
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First, openness to experience appears to play a role whether the activity occurs within 
or outside the legislature. As openness to experience relates to information-seeking behavior, it 
comes as no surprise those scoring high in openness report spending a greater amount of time 
engaged in purely legislative tasks, such as attending committee hearings or studying pending 
legislation wherein they can learn new things. However, because those open to experience also 
enjoy trying new things and have an interest in many different areas, it also makes sense open 
individuals enjoy the more social aspects of legislative activity, such as meeting with 
constituents or fundraising.  
Second, conscientiousness and extraversion both play roles in determining the amount 
of time legislators report spending on particular legislative activities. However, these roles 
occur in opposing arenas. While the conscientious display similar patterns to those high in 
openness in that they participate in both extrainstitutional and intrainstitutional activities, it 
appears the more purely legislative tasks do hold more appeal to the conscientious, and they 
choose to spend more of their time engaged in these activities. Perhaps the highly 
conscientious see their first duty as legislators as creating public policy. Therefore, they may 
prioritize working on the formulation and implementation of policy over ancillary legislative 
activities such as fundraising. In contrast, extraverts enjoy the more purely social aspects of a 
legislator’s job, such as meeting with constituents or working to form coalitions with others. 
Rather than engaging in activities failing to provide a social outlet such as engaging in oversight 
activities, extraverts will prioritize working on the activities the conscientious seem to see as 
somewhat more secondary. This same pattern occurs for the more agreeable, wherein they 
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prioritize engaging in more social aspects of the representative role rather than working on 
purely legislative tasks. 
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Chapter 4: Personality and Introductions, Cosponsorship, and Legislative Effectiveness 
 
Introduction 
 Studies involving the intersection of personality and politics have focused mostly on the 
mass public. While scholars have recently undertaken studying personality and politics at the 
more elite level (see Caprara, Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo 2002; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Consiglio, 
Picconi, and Zimbardo. 2003; and, Best 2011 as examples), these studies still largely concern 
the personality connections between the mass public and their representatives. However, this 
chapter seeks to move beyond studying elites in conjunction with the mass public to studying 
how personality affects legislative behavior more directly. Certainly, the connections between 
elites and those they represent have profound implications for representation and quality of 
governance. However, once those elites gain office, how do their personality characteristics 
influence their behaviors?  
 In the previous chapter, I demonstrated personality does indeed have an impact on the 
time legislators report devoting to the various duties required of their offices. For instance, 
while state legislators undoubtedly meet with their constituents to provide representation and 
to ensure their reelection efforts, meeting with constituents serves another purpose. Indeed, 
for some legislators, particularly the extraverted, meeting with constituents appears to provide 
a kind of psychological satisfaction by providing the legislator with the opportunity to engage 
with others.  
 Unfortunately, although the survey I employed in the previous chapter does ask 
legislators how much time they devote to a variety of legislative behaviors within the 
institution, the responses rely on self-reports. While the respondents do demonstrate 
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variability in the reported amount of time they devote to various activities, the measures are 
largely subjective. To solidify the findings in the previous chapter, this chapter explores a more 
objective realm of legislative behavior by investigating introductions and cosponsorship 
patterns and legislative effectiveness. Therefore, not only does this chapter demonstrate 
personality has effects on objective measures of legislative behavior, it does so for behaviors 
many legislative scholars find important as mechanisms of representation and functioning of 
government. 
Legislative Activity – Introductions and Cosponsorship 
Within the body of literature concerning American state legislatures, scholars have 
focused largely on issues of representation. In doing so, they have concentrated on how well 
state legislatures represent women and minorities, respond to constituents, and operate under 
varying levels of term lengths, election schemes, and/or campaign finance restrictions. 
Unfortunately, however, not many scholars have studied legislative behavior at the state level 
in ways similar to scholars investigating behavior at the congressional level (see Ray 1982; 
Francis 1985; Browne 1985; Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991; and, Wright and Schaffner 2002 as 
exceptions). For instance, few state-level works concern topics such as the introduction of 
measures or cosponsorship.  
However, state legislative studies scholars have found a number of similarities between 
state legislatures and Congress and those serving within those institutions, including feelings of 
electoral insecurity despite wide margins of victory, committee autonomy within the 
institution, and the importance of legislative casework (see Cohen 1984; Browne 1985; Francis 
1985; Jewel and Breaux 1988; Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991; Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991; 
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and, Freeman and Richardson, Jr. 1996 for examples). Therefore, when reviewing existing 
literature on activities such as introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness, I turn 
to research conducted at the congressional level for guidance and make the explicit assumption 
state legislators will act similarly to members of Congress. Therefore, this chapter should 
provide direct insight about personality’s effects on legislative behavior at the state level and 
indirect insight about its effects at the congressional level. 
According to Fenno (1978), legislators have three goals. First, they seek reelection. 
Second, they hope to gain power within the institution. Third, they seek to further public policy. 
In pursuing reelection, legislators must appeal to and appease their constituents by engaging in 
meetings with them and working to further a district’s interests. By gaining the trust of their 
constituents, legislators can more easily pursue the second and third goals (Bianco 1994). In 
achieving power within the institution, members can serve as committee and subcommittee 
chairs or within the party leadership. Finally, to create good public policy, members can 
introduce or cosponsor measures, among other activities. In serving as the introducer, 
legislators dedicate a portion of their resources to crafting legislation. In serving as a cosponsor, 
legislators signal their intentions to others within the chamber. 
In the past, legislative studies scholars have conducted a great deal of research on 
legislative roll-call voting behavior. Undoubtedly, roll-call voting behavior matters because it 
determines the final outcomes of measures. However, while data on roll-call voting proves 
rather easy to obtain, particularly in comparison to other legislative behaviors, roll-call votes 
represent neither the majority of votes cast by legislators nor the majority of policy issues 
addressed within legislation. Rather than relying simply on roll-call voting to understand 
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legislative behavior, I have chosen to investigate personality’s effects on introductions and 
cosponsorship. 
Indeed, studying introductions and cosponsorship provides a dynamic understanding of 
legislative behavior. Studying roll-call voting focuses on a reactive behavior where virtually all 
members participate; studying behaviors such as introductions and cosponsorship serves to 
help us understand a proactive behavior in which legislators must make conscious decisions 
whether or not to participate (Burden 2007, 9). Indeed, whereas roll-call voting represents a 
group behavior undertaken by the entirety of the chamber, introductions (and to a lesser 
extent cosponsorship) allow legislators to highlight their unique contributions (Schiller 1995; 
Wilson and Young 1997). Therefore, the use of introductions and cosponsorship as dependent 
variables allows for a greater breadth and depth of understanding of how legislators interact 
with the institution than simply relying on roll-call votes. 
But what motivates members to engage in these activities? Some may argue introducing 
and cosponsoring legislation have only symbolic meaning. However, each legislator introduces 
or cosponsors only a fraction of the total number of bills introduced each session (Sulkin 2011; 
Sulkin 2005). If solely symbolic, legislators would likely engage in these activities at higher rates. 
However, because members selectively engage in these activities even in spite of constraints on 
their time and resources, we can assume legislators spend time and energy on these activities 
because they have significance beyond mere symbolism (Hall 1996, 26). Indeed, by sponsoring 
and cosponsoring legislation, members can address a number of concerns: communicating the 
concerns of their constituencies, following through on their campaign promises and increasing 
their chances of reelection, and addressing policy and institutional goals (Sulkin 2011).  
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First, members can respond to the concerns of their constituencies and attempt to fulfill 
their campaign promises by introducing and cosponsoring measures. For instance, by attaching 
one’s name to a measure, the legislator can address constituency concerns and even pander to 
new constituencies (Schiller 1995; Koger 2003; Harward and Moffett 2010; Hayes, Hibbing, and 
Sulkin 2010).  Not only can members directly address the concerns of their constituencies, but 
they can then use these efforts as concrete and tangible vehicles through which they can claim 
credit (Arnold 1990). For instance, vulnerable first-term members cosponsor more than secure 
first-term members (Koger 2003), likely in an effort to increase their credit-claiming ability by 
associating themselves with a variety of measures.  
Second, legislators can employ introductions and cosponsorship in an effort to fulfill 
their campaign promises and shore up their next election bids. For instance, members with a 
moderate number of introductions find more legislative success than those who introduce “too 
much” or “too little”, demonstrating a level of balance in their efforts and providing them an 
opportunity to point to their efforts in later campaigns (Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and 
Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Box-Steffensmeier, Kimball, Meinke, and Tate 2003).  By engaging in 
introductions and cosponsorship, legislators can demonstrate to their constituencies they made 
an effort at fulfilling promises and addressing concerns raised in previous elections even when 
the proposed legislation does not succeed (Sulkin 2011, 31-32; Sulkin 2005). Related to the 
above considerations for introducing and cosponsoring legislation, engaging in these activities 
can have financial rewards, as well. By taking clear positions on legislation and having the ability 
to point to their contributions within the legislature, members can attract increased campaign 
contributions from donors (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999; Rocca and Gordon 2010).  
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Third, introductions and cosponsorship can serve as ways to take positions on issues; 
express those stances to constituents, others within the institution, interest groups, and 
potential campaign donors (Rocca and Gordon 2010; Highton and Rocca 2005); and, affect the 
resulting policy. For example, Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) show policy extremists on the 
political spectrum sign on as cosponsors before moderates. As time goes on, moderates take 
the cue of the initial more extremist cosponsors and also sign on as cosponsors.  Members also 
introduce more when in the majority and their party controls the chamber (Garand and Burke 
2006) and cosponsor more when in the minority party because they cannot successfully signal 
their preferences on legislation as often as members in the majority (Koger 2003). In addition, 
attaching one’s name to a bill can provide different types of signals, and these different signals 
can play out in a variety of ways, particularly in committee (Wilson and Young 1997). While 
introductions entail a somewhat higher degree of commitment to a piece of legislation, 
cosponsorship is viewed as a low-cost position-taking measure (Campbell 1982).  
Additionally, introductions and cosponsorship can also have policy implications even 
when the measures do not necessarily survive very far into the legislative process. Kingdon 
(1984) describes how policies often go through a “softening up” period, where what might 
appear as wasted effort on a measure might lead to success on that measure in the future. In 
addition, one must remember the demise of a measure does not indicate failure. As Koger 
(2003) points out, another bill can co-opt the previously introduced or cosponsored measure, 
stop a different bill, or send a signal to the executive branch (230). Indeed, engaging in 
sponsorship and cosponsorship provides signals about the content and quality of a measure; 
helps vulnerable politicians in reelection bids; and, furthers or alters public policy. 
90 
  
Finally, proactive participatory behaviors such as introductions and cosponsorship can 
affect a legislator’s standing within the institution. Rather than looking at introductions or 
cosponsorship in isolation, Wawro (2001) attempts to account for a variety of non-roll-call 
voting behaviors by investigating why members of Congress engage in legislative 
entrepreneurship rather than free-riding on the efforts of others. He defines legislative 
entrepreneurship as “…a set of activities that a legislator engages in, which involves working to 
form coalitions of other members for the purpose of passing legislation by combining various 
legislative inputs and issues in order to affect legislative outcomes” (4).  
Wawro also measures four types of effort expended by members: coalition building 
(cosponsorship); issue grouping; complexity of legislation; and, knowledge of policy. He finds a 
consistent relationship between political parties and committees and entrepreneurship; party 
leaders turn to members who have demonstrated entrepreneurship when filling leadership 
positions. Essentially, rewards come to legislative entrepreneurs, providing an additional 
incentive for the increased workload. 
However, the above authors focus on largely exogenous factors in studying the 
sponsorship and cosponsorship patterns of legislators. In these models, factors independent of 
the legislator, such as potential financial reward, “…the receptiveness of the political and policy 
environment, institutional position, potential administration support, financial cost, [and] 
another [legislator]’s role in the issue and opportunities for publicity” (Schiller 1995, 190) 
largely determine whether a legislator does or does not introduce a measure. These models do 
not account for the internal motivations of legislators or how those internal motivations might 
influence how legislators perceive external pressures. In other words, we have focused on the 
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behavior but not all its root causes. Rather, the above works deal solely with the situational 
factors influencing behavior. But how individuals respond to these situational factors may also 
vary according to dispositional factors. Currently, we have a firmer understanding concerning 
how situational factors influence behavior than how dispositional factors influence reaction to 
those later situational factors.  
Legislative Effectiveness 
 While introductions and cosponsoring measures prove important for a variety of 
reasons, one must also consider whether those measures become law. Indeed, although 
introductions or cosponsored measures may influence resulting policy indirectly, they most 
directly influence policy when they become the policy. Therefore, studying legislative 
effectiveness has importance for several reasons. First, passing legislation represents one of 
legislators’ most important job responsibilities. Indeed, Frantzich (1979) states, “Despite 
variations in job expectations, all enumerations of the congressional task, whether posited by 
academics, congressmen, or the general public, include the writing and passing of legislation” 
(409). Second, as Fenno (1973) states, making good public policy constitutes one of legislators’ 
three primary goals, and to make good public policy, one must work to pass legislation. Third, 
according to Mayhew (1974), passing legislation provides members the opportunity to claim 
credit to constituents, which helps in reelection efforts. 
  Since at least Matthews (1960), scholars have demonstrated an interest in which 
legislators prove the most successful. Research has demonstrated the importance of both 
institutional-level variables and the individual-level characteristics of the legislators. At the level 
of the institution, work has demonstrated the importance of residing within the majority party 
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of the chamber (Frantzich 1979; Meyer 1980; Weissert 1991a; Ellickson 1992; Anderson, Box-
Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Volden and Wiseman 2009; and, Cox and Terry 
2011). These works posit institutional rules make pushing legislation through the chamber 
simpler for those in the majority party. While majority status does appear to prove critical for 
legislative success, other work has conditioned its importance by considering interactions of 
majority/minority status with variables such as legislative expertise, issue salience, party 
loyalty, and leadership status (see Meyer 1980; Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1983; Weissert 
1991b; Hasecke and Mycoff 2007; and Cox and Terry 2011). In other words, these other 
variables, when interacted with majority/minority status, may, in fact, make success more 
difficult to attain for majority members or easier to attain for minority members. 
 Additionally, holding a leadership position on a committee or within the party also plays 
an important role in legislative success, though often in contradictory ways. For instance, the 
most successful legislators reside within the majority party while also holding leadership 
positions (Frantzich 1979; Adler and Wilkerson 2008; Kypriotis 2009; Cox and Terry 2011). 
Conversely, holding a leadership position but residing in the minority party negatively affects 
legislative success (Box-Steffensmeier and Sinclair-Chapman 1996; Volden and Wiseman 2008; 
but also see Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1983). Essentially, leaders within the majority party 
enjoy the institutional conveniences provided to members of the majority and the prestige and 
respect afforded by holding a leadership position. On the other hand, leaders within the 
minority party, as the most visible and vocal opponents of majority party legislation, may face 
punishment from the majority and not get their measures out of committee. 
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 Other characteristics of where a member resides within the institution may also affect 
levels of legislative effectiveness. For instance, seniority plays an important role. Whether due 
to policy expertise, the respect of others within the institution, or having acquired the political 
know-how to pass their desired legislation, research has consistently demonstrated more 
senior members have greater legislative success than more junior members (Frantzich 1979; 
Moore and Thomas 1991; Ellickson 1992; Pedro i Miquel and Snyder 2006; Volden and 
Wiseman 2009; Cox and Terry 2011).  
Additionally, moderation in terms of both political ideology and the number of 
measures with which a member involves himself also proves key. In terms of ideology, more 
moderate members may have higher levels of legislative success because they can appeal to a 
greater number of their colleagues on both sides of the aisle (Frantzich 1979; Kirkland 2010; but 
see also Hasecke and Mycoff 2007). Concerning introductions and cosponsorship, proving one’s 
ability to balance the variety of legislative activities for which members are responsible also 
positively influences legislative effectiveness (Moore and Thomas 1991; Anderson et al. 2003). 
 Finally, gender and race may affect the success of legislators. On the whole, female 
legislators have higher success rates than their male colleagues (Saint-Germaine 1989; Thomas 
and Welch 1991; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Jeydel and Taylor 2003; Bratton 2005; and Volden 
and Wiseman 2008). Contrary to the consistent findings concerning the influence of gender on 
legislative success, studies have indicated mixed results for the legislative effectiveness of 
legislators of ethnic or racial minority groups, with some studies indicating minorities having 
lower levels of legislative success (Ellickson 1992; Volden and Wiseman 2008) and others 
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indicating ethnic and racial minorities having success rates no different than their white 
counterparts (Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1983; Rocca and Sanchez 2011). 
More recently, scholars have moved past determining the characteristics of the most 
successful legislators and begun investigating the effects of legislative success. For instance, 
members who successfully push more of their preferred legislation through the legislative 
process receive more campaign contributions (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999). In addition, 
legislative success may have a positive impact on the probability of moving on to a higher office 
(Pedro i Miquel and Snyder 2006). 
Descriptive Statistics of Data 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the survey received 835 responses. However, state 
legislatures display a variety of openness and record-keeping capabilities. Some states have 
fully-functioning websites providing individuals the capability to search by member for 
measures introduced, cosponsored, and passed over time; some states only have this 
information available for the most recent legislative sessions. Other states provide this 
information, but gathering that information requires a bit more creativity in terms of searching 
through the legislative records. Some states maintain records concerning introductions but not 
cosponsorship (e.g. Louisiana, Nevada, and New Mexico). Unfortunately, other states do not 
maintain any public records concerning introductions and cosponsorship. These states include 
Idaho, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Because legislative activity varies over the course of a 
legislator’s career, I have chosen to study the legislators who serve in 29 states12 providing the 
                                                          
12
 The states included in the analysis are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
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capability of searching introductions and cosponsorship over time. This reduction in states 
under investigation leaves me with 459 legislators. However, not all of these legislators 
provided answers to the ten personality questions or to questions serving as the basis for 
important control variables (particularly progressive ambition). After removing legislators who 
did not answer these questions13, the sample then contains 365 legislators.  
To study the patterns of introductions and cosponsorship over time, I have employed 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). The following models contain data from three levels. The 
first-level dataset contains information on the legislators varying from legislative session to 
legislative session. These variables include tenure in office; a dummy concerning whether the 
member was serving in his or her first term; competitive status of the previous election; 
majority/minority status; party leadership positions; full committee leadership positions; 
chamber; the number of measures introduced; the number of measures cosponsored; the 
number of measures introduced and codified; and, the number of measures introduced or 
cosponsored and codified. Because each unit of analysis is a legislator-session year, the sample 
contains 1,157 observations at the first level.  
 The second-level dataset contains variables unique to the legislator but relatively stable 
over time. These variables include: the scores on the Big Five trait dimensions; race; gender; 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, and West Virginia. 
13
 As a robustness check, I also ran the models in this chapter with the dataset using all 459 legislators and 
imputing the means on the personality and progressive ambition questions for those observations missing answers 
to the relevant questions. Furthermore, I ran the models while including those who answered at least one of the 
two personality items per trait dimension. The models do not substantially differ from the models simply removing 
the missing observations in terms of substantive effects. 
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ideology; partisan affiliation; and, attitude toward running for higher office14. This level contains 
365 observations. The third-level dataset contains variables unique to the legislatures in which 
the legislators serve. These variables include level of legislative professionalism and a dummy 
variable concerning whether the state has term limits for legislators. The third-level dataset 
contains the 29 states. 
At the first level, the legislators have served anywhere from 0 to 32 years in their 
positions (mean = 4.21; sd = 5.27). These legislators faced competitive elections (defined as 
winning by less than 20% of the vote) only a third of the time. Few legislator-session units have 
a legislator serving as a party leader (N = 98). In contrast, far more legislator-session units have 
a legislator serving as either the chair or ranking member of a full committee (N = 298). Over 
time, approximately 60% of the legislators resided within the majority party of the chamber. 
Finally, 79% of legislator-session observations occurred inside the lower chamber of the state 
legislature. 
The first level also contains data on the number of measures introduced and/or 
cosponsored by a legislator. Keep in mind, each state appears to possess a distinct culture in 
terms of the amount of legislation members introduce and cosponsor. However, I provide the 
following descriptive statistics to give a general sense of the amount of legislation introduced 
by the legislators in my sample. The remaining legislators in the sample introduced anywhere 
from 0 to 238 measures during a legislative session (mean = 26.20; sd = 24.47). They also 
                                                          
14
 I recognize progressive ambition may not be a stable attribute over time. However, the survey data I employ 
only asked the legislators how they currently felt about running for higher political office. While the question did 
allow respondents to indicate their interest levels in both concrete and contextual terms, I cannot say progressive 
ambition does not vary over the course of a legislative career. Unfortunately, determining the level of progressive 
ambition for a legislator (particularly at the state level) over time proves a surely impossible challenge. Therefore, I 
treat progressive ambition as a stable attribute of the legislators. 
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cosponsored 0 to 619 measures during a legislative session (mean = 106.44; sd = 99.54). Of the 
bills they introduced over the course of a single session, the legislators saw up to 59 of their 
measures turned into law (mean = 5.29; sd = 6.94). Of the bills they either introduced or 
cosponsored over the course of a session, the legislators saw anywhere from 0 to 437 measures 
codified (mean = 28.44; sd = 34.27). On average, the legislators saw 22.1% of the bills for which 
they served as introducers signed into law (sd = 21.87%). Of all the bills to which the legislators 
signed on as introducers or cosponsors, the legislators successfully saw an average of 24.12% of 
the measures signed into law (sd = 19.38%). 
The second level contains data concerning characteristics of the legislators with relative 
stability over time, including race, gender, attitude toward running for higher office, and scores 
on the Big Five trait dimensions. The legislators are overwhelming white. Indeed, only 7.4% (N = 
27) identify as non-white. Furthermore, the majority of legislators in the remaining sample are 
male (N = 249 or 68.2%). The vast majority of respondents indicated they do not have definite 
preferences on running for higher office as they chose one of the middle categories on the 
progressive ambition question (N = 274). 
In chapter 2, I demonstrated the patterns of variance concerning personality and state 
legislators. Critics of applying personality trait psychology to politicians could argue the 
respondents will not truthfully describe themselves and/or will cluster at the extreme (and 
positive) end of each dimensions. While state legislators do describe themselves as possessing 
relatively high levels of openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and emotional stability, these descriptions also have relatively high standard 
deviations, indicating a certain degree of variance.  
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To calculate overall personality trait dimension scores, one flips the original measure to 
run from one (high score on a trait) to seven and then takes the natural log of the result. Then, 
the researcher adds together the two measures for each personality trait dimension and 
reverses the score to make the low score indicate a lower level of the trait. To make 
interpreting these scores simpler, I then rescaled the results to range from zero to one. The 
legislators in the sample possess a mean score of 0.71 on openness to experience (sd = 0.22). 
The average conscientiousness score falls just below that of openness to experience at 0.70 (sd 
= 0.23). The mean score on extraversion is 0.63 (sd = 0.25). With the lowest mean score of the 
Big Five dimensions, agreeableness averages 0.60 (sd = 0.22). Finally, the emotional stability of 
the legislators displays a mean of 0.61 (sd = 0.23). As demonstrated in chapter 2, though the 
data concerning personality do display a somewhat limited amount of variance, that variance 
has sensible, theory-consistent effects on political attitudes and behaviors. Therefore, I feel 
comfortable employing these measures as explanatory variables15. 
Finally, the third level contains data on legislative professionalism and a dummy variable 
to control for whether or not a state employs term limits. The mean level of legislative 
professionalism for all 835 legislators in the original dataset is 0.165; the mean score of 
legislative professionalism of the legislatures under investigation in this chapter is almost 
identical at 0.169. Both of these scores indicate relatively nonprofessional legislatures. In 
addition, the majority of states in both datasets do not employ term limits. 
                                                          
15
 There exists the possibility the election process whittles down the diversity of the personalities of legislators 
leading to greater homogeneity over time. To ensure the reelection process did not affect the personality profiles 
of legislators who win reelection, I conducted t-tests comparing: those who served only a single term in office 
against those who served more than one term in office; those who had served two or fewer years and those who 
had served more than two years; those who had served four or fewer years and those who had served more than 
four years; and, those who served ten or fewer years and those who served more than 10 years. I found no 
statistically-significant differences in any of the groups. 
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Analysis 
I approach the analysis of data from two perspectives. First, I investigate whether any of 
the personality variables alone influence patterns of introductions, cosponsorship, and 
legislative effectiveness. In these efforts, I essentially test personality in opposition to existing 
explanations of legislative behavior. Such models test the most difficult case in which 
personality might have an influence because they take a more deterministic view of how 
personality impacts behavior by essentially assuming personality directly impacts behavior 
regardless of environmental constraints. 
However, the effects of personality could express themselves in a number of different 
scenarios. First, personality’s potential effects on introduction and cosponsorship activity could 
occur linearly (Figure 4.1), with personality producing a relatively constant rate of change in the 
dependent variables of introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness. Second, 
personality could have a hyperbolic relationship where changes in personality trait dimensions 
produce a large amount of change at lower levels of the independent variables but taper off as 
the independent variables approach their maximum levels (Figure 4.2). Third, personality’s 
effects on introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness could occur parabolically. 
In this case, graphing the independent and dependent variables of interest would produce an 
upside-down U shape, with the midpoint indicating personality’s greatest effects (Figure 4.3). 
All of these varied statistical relationships have meaning for how personality possibly 
affects legislative activity. For instance, if the relationship between personality and 
introductions occurs linearly, then scoring high in a trait will indicate an individual engages in a 
correspondingly high level of activity. If the relationship takes on a hyperbolic shape, then 
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personality has some type of ceiling effect on legislative activity; once a person reaches a 
certain score on the trait dimension, any further activity will stagnate. If the data display a 
parabolic relationship, then personality has some ideal score wherein moving that score any 
higher of lower will reduce activity. 
 However, an individual’s personality characteristics do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, 
they grow more pronounced or suppressed by varying environmental factors. Therefore, I also 
investigate the potential effects of interactions of personality variables and environmental 
variables. Rather than juxtaposing personality and exogenous variables, these models seek to 
understand how personality operates in conjunction with exogenous variables. In particular, I 
will demonstrate how various personality trait dimensions interact with tenure in office and 
levels of legislative professionalism. 
To begin, I start with models including no interaction terms. First, I investigate whether 
personality affects the raw number of measures for which legislators serve as introducers and 
as cosponsors. Serving as the introducer of a measure entails expending valuable legislative 
time and resources. Indeed, the legislator must devote his own time to studying the legislation 
to know it well enough to convince both constituents and other legislators. Furthermore, 
because many of the legislators in the sample do not have access to permanent staff, their 
actual involvement could be quite high.16 However, should the legislator have permanent staff, 
he must direct his staff members to dedicate their time and effort on the legislation. 
                                                          
16
 This lack of permanent staff for members serving in less professional legislatures also bodes well concerning the 
question of whether the legislators themselves answered the personality inventories. If the legislators lack 
permanent staff, such a dearth indicates the legislators actually completed the survey. 
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Additionally, a legislator’s reputation, both within the institution and with constituents, may 
ride on the passage of the measure for which the member serves as an introducer. 
In light of these considerations, I view serving as an introducer as a risk-taking activity. 
Therefore, a positive relationship between openness to experience and introductions may exist 
because those high in openness to experience tend to engage in risky behaviors. In addition, 
while serving as a legislator does not necessarily require members to actually introduce 
legislation, both legislators and constituents likely view the creation of legislation as a part of 
the job description of a legislator. As a result, conscientiousness may impact levels of 
introduction. However, such influence could take one of two forms. Conscientious individuals 
may view introductions as one of the principal mechanisms by which they perform their 
legislative duties. As a result, they may introduce more measures than their less conscientious 
peers. Conversely, because the conscientious prioritize responsibility, they may introduce fewer 
measures than the less conscientious in an attempt to focus their efforts on a handful of 
measures. In sum, the conscientious may work to achieve a breadth of legislation or they may 
seek to achieve a depth of legislation. 
 Additionally, personality may affect the number of measures to which legislators attach 
their names as cosponsors. While cosponsorship involves little in terms of time or resources 
from the legislator, serving as a cosponsor can serve as a signal to other legislators. Because 
legislators do not exist in isolation from one another, I assume they speak with one another and 
ask their peers to sign onto legislation as cosponsors. As individuals who enjoy social activity 
and engaging with others, extraverts may cosponsor more legislation than their introverted 
counterparts because they hear about such opportunities by interacting with those who know 
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of pending legislation. In addition, those high in agreeableness seek to maintain social harmony 
and may potentially sign on as cosponsors more frequently because they acquiesce to others’ 
requests. 
In the following tables, the primary independent variables of interest – openness to 
experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability – run from 
zero to one. Other independent variables include gender (0 = male, 1 = female); race (0 = white, 
1 = non-white); party affiliation (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican); majority status (0 = minority 
member, 1 = majority member); tenure in office (continuous variable measured in whole 
years); first term dummy (0 = not the member’s first time, 1 = member’s first term in office); 
competitive prior election (0 = not a competitive race in the last election; 1 = competitive race 
in the last election, defined as winning by less than 20% of the vote); party leader (0 = not a 
party leader, 1 = party leader); committee leader (0 = not a committee leader, 1 = committee 
leader); progressive ambition (0 = will definitely not run for higher office, 1 = not currently 
interested in running for higher office, 2 = would run for higher office if opportunity presented, 
3 = will definitely run for higher office); chamber (0 = lower house; 1 = upper house); and, a 
continuous variable of professionalism concerning ranging from zero to one (taken from Squire 
2007). 
Results of Linear Relationships 
The results of these models prove less than overwhelming concerning the direct impact 
of personality on introductions and cosponsorship activity (see Table 4.1). None of the 
personality variables reaches statistical significance for introductions and cosponsorship. While 
the trait dimensions move in logical directions, they do not produce statistically significant or 
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substantively significant results. Remember, I hypothesized a positive relationship between 
openness to experience and introductions. Indeed, openness to experience does positively 
correlate with introducing more measures, though increasing a legislator’s openness score from 
zero to one increases introductions by only a single measure. 
 Conversely, increasing the legislature’s level of professionalism in which a legislator 
serves creates a much greater impact. For the least professional legislature, the model predicts 
a member with mean scores for all the other included variables would introduce approximately 
16.5 measures. A legislator serving in a legislature of average professionalism should introduce 
nearly 27 measures, and a legislator serving in a highly professionalized legislature will likely 
introduce almost 67 measures.  Aside from legislative professionalism, however, other 
conventional explanations for introduction activity, while statistically significant, also do not 
prove substantively impactful. For instance, residing in the majority party in the chamber only 
leads a legislator to introduce an additional 4.5 measures, and acting as a committee leader 
only leads to an increase of 4 additional introductions. 
The same types of patterns occur for cosponsorship. None of the personality variables 
reaches statistical significance. And although some of the variables produce substantively 
nontrivial results (for example, the model predicts an increase in openness from zero to one will 
lead to additional 17 cosponsored measures), other personality variables I hypothesized as 
positively correlating with cosponsorship, such as extraversion, produce virtually no change. 
Furthermore, while I hypothesized a positive relationship between agreeableness and 
cosponsorship activity, the model produces a negative coefficient. Such a finding could mean 
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those high in agreeableness engage in less cosponsorship because they do not wish to alienate 
their colleagues.  
Next, I move to measures of legislative success. Legislative success certainly proves 
important to legislators because it allows them to achieve all of Fenno’s goals (1978). It lets 
them to point to their effectiveness to both constituents and donors when running for 
reelection. It also builds a member’s reputation as an efficacious counterpart and could help 
build the legislator’s reputation within the institution. Finally, getting legislation signed into law 
allows members to satisfy their own personal policy interests.  
Certain personality traits may predispose some legislators toward getting more of their 
proposed legislation signed into law. Primarily, emotional stability may positively influence 
legislative success. Turning a measure into a law is a long process with obstacles along the way. 
Therefore, the emotionally stable, with their low reactivity to stressors, may have greater 
success in getting their proposed legislation turned into chaptered law.  On the other hand, the 
emotionally stable might be so laid back as to not care whether their desired measures become 
law, while the less emotionally stable may display a hyper vigilance about seeing their measures 
codified. 
Unlike the results of models testing the potential impact of personality and 
introductions and cosponsorship, personality does have substantive effects on legislative 
effectiveness. First, openness to experience positively influences the number of measures a 
legislator successfully introduces or cosponsors and sees passed into law (see Table 4.2). 
Indeed, an increase from the lowest score of openness to experience to the highest score 
secures an additional 11.5 measures passed. This change proves more substantively meaningful 
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than other conventional explanations for legislative success. For instance, residents of the 
majority party of the chamber only see an additional seven measures passed in comparison to 
their minority-member counterparts. 
Such a relationship between openness to experience and legislative effectiveness could 
exist for several reasons. First, highly open individuals crave knowledge and information. As a 
result, they may view introductions and cosponsorship as ways to gather information on policy 
arenas. Second, highly open individuals enjoy taking risks. Although introductions prove 
potentially more costly than cosponsored measures, signing one’s name to a measure indicates 
a certain degree of commitment. Highly open individuals may enjoy the challenge of trying to 
see measures to which they attached their names passed. Moreover, open legislators may craft 
better legislation and attract the votes of their colleagues because of the quality of the 
measure. 
Second, agreeableness positively correlates with seeing introductions codified, the 
percentage of introductions codified, and the percentage of introductions or cosponsored 
measures codified. For raw number of introductions passed, highly agreeable legislators will see 
an additional 3.5 measures codified over their most disagreeable counterparts. Those 3.5 
measures translate into an increase of over 6% in legislative success for introductions and a 4% 
increase in overall legislative effectiveness. These results move in logical directions. The highly 
agreeable value getting along with others and working toward compromise. As other legislators 
likely view these individuals as easy to work with, those other legislators may vote for 
agreeable individuals’ measures because that agreeableness allowed the individuals involved to 
work out a suitable compromise. 
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Third, emotional stability does produce both statistically and substantively significant 
results. However, those results work in the opposite direction from the one I hypothesized. For 
measures introduced, the model predicts the least emotionally stable legislators will see fewer 
than 8.5 of their measures passed into law; conversely, the most emotionally stable legislators 
will see fewer than five of their introductions codified. This decline in successful introductions 
corresponds to a decrease of 7% for percentage of introduced measures passed and 4% for 
percentage of all introductions and cosponsored measures passed. While contrary to 
hypothesized expectations, logical explanations exist for why emotional stability might 
negatively correspond with legislative effectiveness. For instance, the worry and anxiety felt by 
the less emotionally stable could act to propel them to work harder to pass their preferred 
measures. These findings could serve as an example of a time when the less normatively 
desirable aspects of a personality trait dimension serve useful purposes. 
Results of Hyperbolic Relationships 
Remember, the above models simply test the potential influence of personality on 
legislative activity. However, in studying personality traits in isolation, any hypotheses and 
results assume personality will have a relatively linear effect on introductions and 
cosponsorship; as a person’s score in a personality trait increases, the number of measures 
introduced or cosponsored will either increase or decrease at a relatively constant rate. 
However, the Big Five trait dimensions do not assume a “perfect” personality. High or low 
scores on the five trait dimensions have both advantages and disadvantages. For example, 
scoring high on conscientiousness signifies high levels of personal responsibility; however, it 
also reflects rigidity and stubbornness. Therefore, I next estimate models wherein I square the 
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legislators’ scores on the Big Five trait dimensions. By squaring these variables, I hope to 
account for a potential parabolic effect where low scores on a personality trait dimension 
increase activity up to a point and then only act to inhibit engagement in that activity. 
Indeed, the results of these models indicate personality does indeed play a role in 
affecting legislative activity (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). However, that relationship can have 
diminishing returns after a certain point (see Figure 4.4). For example, increasing an individual’s 
score on agreeableness from 0 to 0.5 leads that individual to cosponsor 16 additional measures. 
However, moving that score from 0.5 to 1 decreases the number of measures a legislator 
cosponsors by about the same number. Furthermore, this same parabolic relationship occurs 
for both conscientiousness and extraversion when studying the number of measures a member 
cosponsors. For instance, a move from 0 to 0.7 on conscientiousness increases the number of 
measures an individual cosponsors by thirty; however, a move from 0.7 to 1 decreases the 
number of measures a member cosponsors by seven. For extraversion, a move from 0 to 0.6 
increases the number of measures a member cosponsors by 37; yet, a move from 0.6 to 1 leads 
to a decrease of 16 cosponsored measures. 
This same pattern occurs when investigating personality’s effects on the number of 
measures introduced or cosponsored by a member and passed (see Figure 4.5). As individuals’ 
scores on openness increases from 0 to 0.9, the number of measures to which they attached 
their names that successfully passed increases from just under 11 measures to over 28 
measures. However, the gains taper off as scores on openness reach 0.9 and even decline at 
the highest level of openness. Again, this parabolic effect occurs with extraversion and the 
number of measures a legislator introduced or cosponsored and passed. By increasing a 
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legislator’s score on extraversion from 0 to 0.5, the number of successful measures introduced 
or cosponsored by that member increases from just fewer than 22 measures to 27.5 measures.  
However, after 0.6, increased levels of extraversion negatively affect legislative success, with a 
legislator scoring a one in extraversion seeing around 23.5 measures passed.  
 In other words, personality may have a limiting effect. The positive characteristics 
associated with any trait only take a legislator so far. After a certain point, personality may no 
longer positively contribute to legislative productivity and could, in fact, inhibit it. This finding 
receives additional support in models combining the squared personality terms. For instance, 
including both the squared extraversion and squared agreeableness terms in one model and 
including the squared conscientiousness term, the squared extraversion term, and the squared 
agreeableness term in another model for predicting cosponsorship all demonstrate this same 
relationship (models not shown).  Furthermore, although the extraversion term only 
approaches statistical significance, including both the squared openness term and the squared 
extraversion term produces this same parabolic effect for the number of measures a member 
introduced or cosponsored and passed. While not all of the squared terms achieve statistical 
significance in these models, the same parabolic pattern continues.   
Results of Personality and Environment Interactions 
Conscientiousness and Tenure in Office 
In table 4.3 and figure 4.4, conscientiousness demonstrates the highest point before a 
legislator begins to see diminishing returns. This finding proves especially interesting because 
conscientiousness has always played the spoiler in hypotheses of political behavior and 
personality. At first glance, one would assume an increase in conscientiousness would lead to 
109 
  
an increase in political behavior. However, initial results from studies at the mass level proved 
this relationship false (Bekkers 2005; see Mondak 2010, 55 and 164-165 for more information). 
More recent works (see Bloeser, McCurley, and Mondak 2012; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, 
Dowling, Raso, and Ha 2011; and, Mondak 2010 as examples) have demonstrated the 
conditionality of conscientiousness. Essentially, conscientiousness only works as a predictor of 
political behavior when the individual already views political behavior as important. If the highly 
conscientious individual views other aspects of his life as more important, he will then prioritize 
his engagement in those areas over politics. 
However, one can make a reasonable assumption that conscientiousness may work as 
initially predicted for legislators. These individuals chose to run for office, which demonstrates a 
commitment to political engagement. Nevertheless, conscientiousness may be enhanced by 
tenure in office. Essentially, as a conscientious individual learns his way through the institution, 
he will establish his own list of important legislative activities. Therefore, interacting 
conscientiousness and tenure in office seems like a potentially fruitful pursuit. 
Indeed, the interaction of tenure in office and conscientiousness appears particularly 
useful as a predictor of legislative effectiveness (see Table 4.5). Furthermore, tenure in office 
may help counteract some of the negative attributes of scoring low on conscientiousness. For 
example, consider the number of measures a legislator successfully introduces. When a 
legislator has the lowest score on conscientiousness, the model predicts he will successfully 
introduce about five measures during his first time in office. By his tenth year in the position, 
the model predicts he will successfully introduce nearly nine measures. However, tenure 
produces less steep gains to those of middling and high levels of conscientiousness. A legislator 
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with a score of 0.5 on conscientiousness will successfully introduce just over five measures 
during his freshman term; that same legislator will only successfully introduce seven measures 
during his tenth year in office. Finally, being highly conscientious leads a legislator to 
successfully introduce about 5.5 measures his first term; but, that legislator’s high level of 
conscientiousness has virtually no impact on his number of successful introductions during his 
tenth year in office, with the model predicting just over six introductions passed.   
However, this relationship reverses itself when considering the effect of interacting 
tenure in office and conscientiousness and other measures of legislative effectiveness. Overall, 
tenure in office has a negative effect on legislative effectiveness, contrary to conventional 
expectations. Conscientiousness appears to attenuate that effect. For example, a legislator with 
a score of 0 on conscientiousness will see approximately 31 measures to which he attached his 
name signed into law; that success rate drops to 28 measures after ten years in office. At 
moderate levels of conscientiousness, legislators increase the number of measures they 
introduced or cosponsored and passed from 26 measures at year 0 to over 29 measures at year 
10. However, the highest levels of conscientiousness completely counteract the negative 
effects of tenure. For instance, a highly conscientious freshman member will successfully 
introduce or cosponsor 22 measures during his first term and almost 30 measures during his 
tenth year (see Figure 4.6). 
In some ways, one could view tenure in office as a coping mechanism for the less 
conscientious. These individuals, characterized by a lack of personal responsibility and duty, 
learn the legislative process during their years in office, and that learning contributes to them 
successfully introducing more of their own legislation. However, the already highly 
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conscientious do not change in their behaviors to the same extent; they already viewed passing 
their own legislation as important, and that does not change over time.  
In other ways, tenure in office does not alleviate some of the negative characteristics of 
conscientiousness. While it may lead to more successful introductions over time, it does not 
always improve a legislator’s effectiveness, and may, in fact, decrease it. The highly 
conscientious, however, have the tenacity, stubbornness, and even unbending nature 
necessary to see more legislation codified as law, even legislation to which they served only as 
cosponsors, and spending more years in office only emphasizes that aspect. However, it 
appears the less conscientious do not work as hard to see their cosponsored measures also 
pass, and spending more time in office does not change that fact. 
However, it is important to understand not only how different levels of personality and 
tenure impact successful introductions but also to understand how environmental variables act 
in comparison. Scholarship has demonstrated women have higher levels of legislative 
effectiveness, and the present data only confirm that finding. However, female legislators only 
successfully introduce one more measure than their male counterparts. Furthermore, residing 
in the majority party of the chamber only increases legislative success by two measures. 
Therefore, personality interacted with tenure proves just as fruitful an explanation for 
legislative effectiveness as other exogenous explanations. 
Conscientiousness and Legislative Professionalism 
Certainly, studying the influence of conscientiousness at different stages of legislators’ 
careers proves useful. As a result, I believe conscientiousness might also interact with other 
institutional characteristics in meaningful ways. Therefore, I also ran models concerning 
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interactions between conscientiousness and legislative professionalism. Remember, scholars 
measure legislative professionalism primarily by determining how many days a legislature is in 
session, the pay provided to legislators, and the availability of permanent staff dedicated to an 
individual legislator. If an individual serves in a more citizen legislature, he or she also likely has 
a job outside of working in the legislature. Having two jobs could lead a legislator to prioritize 
activities outside the legislature over his duties as a lawmaker. If an individual serves in a more 
professional legislature, that individual likely only works as a legislator and does not engage in 
another profession to make ends meet. As a result, the conscientious could focus their energies 
on their duties as lawmakers because they do not need to divide their lives into as many 
separate spheres. 
Indeed, an interaction of conscientiousness and professionalism appears to play a role in 
determining the number of measures a legislator introduced or signed on as a cosponsor. And 
again, the effect proves most pronounced for the highly conscientiousness (see Table 4.6).  
While an increase in legislative professionalism always leads to an increase in the number of 
measures a member introduces, combining that professionalism with an increase in 
conscientiousness proves even more influential. For instance, a legislator with a score of zero 
on conscientiousness will introduce approximately 21.5 measures in the least professional 
legislature. That same individual serving in a state legislature with an average level of 
professionalism will introduce about 26 measures. However, a legislator with a score of 0.5 on 
conscientiousness will see a rise from just under 18 measures to 25.5 measures as he moves 
from the least professional legislature to one of average professionalism. Finally, a highly 
conscientious legislator will introduce approximately 14.5 measures in the least professional 
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legislature; however, he will introduce almost 25 measures in a legislature of average 
professionalism (see Figure 4.7).  
While somewhat less pronounced this same pattern continues for the number of 
measures a member cosponsors (see Figure 4.8). In this figure, one can see how 
conscientiousness positively affects the number of measures to which a member signs on a 
cosponsor. However, as those individuals begin serving in more professionalized legislatures, 
conscientiousness can play a role of varying magnitude. Indeed, the highly conscientious see 
the most pronounced rise in the number of measures they cosponsor as professionalism varies 
followed by those of average conscientiousness. Those with low levels of conscientiousness do 
not change their behavior as drastically as legislative professionalism increases.  
In other words, by operating within more professional legislatures wherein they can 
prioritize legislative activity as their jobs, the highly conscientious engage in greater levels of 
legislative activity. As legislators serving in citizen legislatures have to divide their time between 
working as legislators and earning a living through some other venture, the highly conscientious 
do not involve themselves with as many measures. Conversely, those low in conscientiousness 
do not face such a decision to split their energies. As a result, moving them from citizen 
legislatures to professional legislatures does not produce as large a change in behavior. 
Other Personality and Environment Interactions 
While conscientiousness certainly plays a role concerning individuals’ engagement in 
introductions and cosponsorship, other Big Five trait dimensions could also play an influential 
part. For instance, agreeableness may prove an important trait for legislators. Despite the 
increased political polarization of elites in recent decades, the ability to work with others 
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undoubtedly serves as a fundamental characteristic of a legislator’s job description. However, 
interacting agreeableness with tenure may prove particularly important. As a legislator spends 
more time in his position, he will learn when to fight (e.g. act disagreeably) and when to 
cooperate (e.g. act agreeably).  
As mentioned earlier, I hypothesized agreeableness might demonstrate a positive 
relationship with cosponsorship. Yet, agreeableness does not reach statistical significance as a 
predictor of cosponsorship behavior, and it actually works to decrease cosponsorship. However, 
an interaction of tenure in office and agreeableness does indeed produce a statistically-
significant and substantive effect on the number of measures an individual cosponsors (see 
Table 4.9). Overall, tenure negatively impacts cosponsorship behavior. This result could occur 
for a variety of reasons. For instance, as tenure increases, legislators tend to engage more with 
the lawmaking process itself and devote less time to extrainstitutional behaviors such as 
meeting with constituents. Therefore, rather than simply attaching their names to others’ 
measures, more senior members may choose to introduce measures on their own. Or, as 
members spend more time in office, they often face less electoral competition and have also 
established reputations within the institution. As a result, they might not feel the need to credit 
claim or signal their preferences to others as much.  
 However, agreeableness appears to counteract the negative impact of tenure on 
cosponsorship behavior (see Figure 4.9). Indeed, while the least agreeable individuals will sign 
onto fewer measures as they spend more time in office, this pattern reverses at the highest 
levels of agreeableness. For instance, individuals with low and middling levels of agreeableness 
still cosponsor fewer measures over time (a decline of 24 and 6 measures from the first to tenth 
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years in office, respectively).  However, the model predicts those with high levels of 
agreeableness will cosponsor an additional twelve measures from their first year in office to 
their tenth year in office.  
These effects prove to be just as substantively influential as more conventional 
explanations for cosponsorship behavior, such as facing a competitive election. For instance, 
Koger (2003) argues competitive elections lead legislators to cosponsor more in an effort to 
attach their names to more measures to provide them more opportunities for credit-claiming. 
However, while the result proves statistically significant, a legislator having faced a competitive 
race in the election in the prior legislative session actually proves less amenable to 
cosponsoring legislation, with legislators who faced a serious campaign challenge in the 
previous election cosponsoring almost eight fewer measures than those who did not face a 
competitive election. 
This same relationship concerning agreeableness and tenure appears when considering 
the number of measures a legislator successfully introduces or cosponsors. The least agreeable 
legislator sees approximately 27 measures to which he attached his name passed into law 
during his first term in office. That same disagreeable legislator sees 24.5 measures passed by 
his tenth year in office. However, middle and high levels of agreeableness increase legislative 
success over time, with those of moderate agreeableness seeing an additional 2.5 measures 
signed into law from their first to tenth years in office and a highly agreeable legislator seeing 
an additional eight measures signed into law. For comparison, a legislator residing in the 
chamber’s majority party sees 6.5 additional measures passed into law under these same 
conditions. It appears as though agreeable individuals may have a greater potential to win the 
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support of fellow lawmakers by not engaging in disputes and simply “going with the flow”; in 
doing so, they gain an increase in their general success rates. 
As discussed with agreeableness, tenure in office allows for on-the-job learning. That 
learning also appears to impact legislative effectiveness for not only the agreeable but also for 
extraverts. Indeed, an interaction term of tenure in office and extraversion increases both the 
number of measures a legislator introduces or cosponsors and passes and the percentage of 
measures introduced or cosponsored and passed.  
Tenure negligibly impacts legislative success (see Table 4.8). However, just as with 
conscientiousness, increasing levels of extraversion have varying effects at different stages of 
the legislative career. For instance, introverted legislators see no increase in legislative success 
as they spend more time in office. Perhaps their introversion precludes them from forming the 
social networks necessary to build coalitions of support for the measures they introduce and/or 
cosponsor.  However, those with moderate and high levels of extraversion can counteract 
tenure in office’s negative influence on legislative success. The model predicts those of 
moderate extraversion (scoring 0.5) will see an additional 3.5 measures pass after spending ten 
years in office. Furthermore, the highly extraverted will successfully introduce or cosponsor just 
under23 measures during their first term in office; that number approaches 28 measures after 
ten years office. Again, to place these gains in perspective, comparing these values to the 
models’ predicted values for more institutional-level explanations for legislative success proves 
useful. For instance, female legislators, typically seen as more effective than male legislators, 
see 6.5 more measures passed than their male counterparts, and racial minorities see 3.5 fewer 
measures become law than their white colleagues. 
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Conclusion 
 An individual’s personality characteristics not only help define his identity for himself 
and to those around them, they also help determine how an individual responds within a 
variety of environmental contexts. Recent works by political scientists have sought to 
understand how personality affects political behavior. In its preliminary stages, this work 
studied personality in isolation from environmental variables. Perhaps these efforts occurred 
because the researchers believed in personality acting in a deterministic manner. Or, these 
scholars were simply taking a first stab at understanding personality and politics. Regardless, 
the work in this area has more recently begun moving toward understanding personality in 
context by interacting personality with factors outside the individual. 
 However, these efforts have focused almost exclusively at the mass level. To my 
knowledge, this chapter serves as one of the first explorations of personality and legislative 
behavior. In following the footsteps of those performing political personality research at the 
mass level, I have undertaken two separate efforts in this chapter. First, I directly tested the Big 
Five trait dimensions as predictors of introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative 
effectiveness. In structuring the models this way, the Big Five do not appear to impact the 
number of measures legislators introduce and/or cosponsor, but three of them (openness to 
experience, agreeableness, and emotional stability) may impact legislative effectiveness.  
 However, we must also remember one of the key features of the Big Five framework. 
While scoring high on a trait dimension brings with it a variety of positive attributes, scoring 
high also indicates negative characteristics. For instance, those high in openness to experience 
enjoy learning and trying new things. However, they may have an interest in too many things 
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and subsequently fail to focus their energies. As such, employing squared personality terms 
allows us to investigate whether personality demonstrates a Goldilocks-type effect on 
legislative behavior. Perhaps scoring too low or too high on a trait dimension proves 
detrimental while scoring in some ideal middle range leads to the preferred outcome. Indeed, 
these squared terms indicate increasing levels of the Big Five lead legislators to engage in more 
legislative activity. However, the results also demonstrate personality only carries a legislator so 
far; after a certain point, the gains brought about by the positive characteristics of the trait 
dimensions level off and may even negatively impact productivity. 
 Beyond understanding how personality directly impacts legislative behavior, we must 
also study legislators in context.  Lawmakers exist and operate within institutions, and these 
institutions place a variety of external constraints on how legislators behave. Therefore, I also 
investigated the Big Five trait dimensions as they interacted with several of these external 
influences, including tenure in office and legislative professionalism. Indeed, these models 
prove fruitful in revealing how personality influences introductions, cosponsorship, and 
legislative effectiveness.  
First, tenure in office may offset some of the negative characteristics associated with 
particular Big Five trait dimensions and enhance some of the positive characteristics. For 
instance, the least conscientious legislators begin to produce more in terms of introductions 
and cosponsoring the longer they serve within the institution. Yet, these gains do not 
necessarily translate into increased legislative effectiveness for the least conscientious. Rather, 
tenure in office positively impacts the legislative effectiveness of the most conscientious. 
Although years of service do not affect their introduction and cosponsorship levels to the same 
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extent as the less conscientious, those years do provide the highly conscientious with the skills 
necessary to pass their preferred measures. In addition, tenure in office also increases the 
productivity and success of the extraverted and the agreeable, very possibly because this 
increased time in office allows these outgoing and friendly legislators to build the social 
networks necessary to successfully pass legislation. 
Second, legislative professionalism also plays an important role in how legislators’ 
personalities express themselves within the institution. For example, while all legislators 
introduce more measures as they serve in more professional legislatures, the effects of moving 
from citizen legislatures to professional legislatures proves more pronounced for the highly 
conscientious. I argue the highly conscientious who serve in citizen legislatures, necessitating 
outside employment, must divide their efforts to their lives both inside and outside the 
institution and consequently do not focus as much energy on legislative productivity. However, 
as legislative professionalism (and pay) increases, these conscientious legislators do not need to 
prioritize other obligations to the same extent and can devote their time to engaging with the 
lawmaking process. 
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Chapter 5: How Personality and Gender Interact to Affect Legislative Behavior 
Introduction 
In the preceding pages, I have demonstrated personality does have an impact on the 
behavior of political elites. In recent decades, legislative scholars have often focused on the 
institution to the exclusion of the individual. However, in exploring the relationships between 
personality and legislative behavior, I have attempted to study the individual within the context 
of larger, highly-constrained institutions. Likewise, scholars interested in the impact of gender 
on politics have demonstrated an interest in studying men and women within the context of 
the environments and institutions in which they reside through the study of gendered 
institutions, where “…gender is present in the processes, practices, images and ideologies, and 
distribution of power…” in the institution (Acker 1992, 567). Yet, these works attribute 
differences between men and women to something inherent in gender itself. However, in this 
chapter, I will argue personality may drive some of the differences found between the genders. 
In other words, rather than attributing potential causality to something inherent in gender, I 
argue the personalities of the men and women who choose to run and serve in political office  
lead to some of the observed  differences between the sexes. 
As with a great deal of the research on elite political behavior, much of the work on the 
topic of gender and legislative behavior has occurred through studies of the U.S. Congress. 
However, scholars have increasingly investigated the differences between the genders and the 
impact of gender at the state level. Studying women at the state level proves particularly 
fruitful because, although still underrepresented as a proportion of the legislature, far more 
women serve as state legislators than in state-wide executive positions or as members of 
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Congress. Therefore, scholars not only have a greater number of cases to examine at the state 
level, but they can also examine the women most likely to run for Congress. Nevertheless, the 
works at both levels tend to examine the personal characteristics, behavior, and impact of 
female state legislators. In these studies, scholars have highlighted the differences between 
men and women, oftentimes in an effort to make arguments for the benefits of descriptive and 
substantive representation provided by female representatives.  
Women as Candidates 
With the rise of the feminist movement in the 1960s and the dramatic increase in the 
number of women serving as legislators at both the state and national levels, scholars have 
increasingly explored the differences between men and women, both at the mass and elite 
levels. A major strain of literature concerns the proportion of female legislators in both 
Congress and state legislatures. Therefore, a number of researchers have investigated women 
as candidates.  
When women do choose to enter the political arena, they win. Indeed, studies 
comparing male and female candidates in open-seat races, as challengers, and as incumbents 
find women win as often as men (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 
1994; Darcy and Schramm 1977). Indeed, some scholars have gone so far as to say, “A 
candidate's sex does not affect his or her chances of winning an election… Winning elections 
has nothing to do with the sex of the candidate" (Seltzer, et al. 1997, 79). Given the fact women 
do indeed win political office when they choose to enter a contest, researchers have expended 
a great deal of effort trying to determine why legislatures suffer from a lack of women. Several 
competing arguments have thus emerged. 
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One theory concerns the paucity of the pool of candidates. Essentially, advocates of this 
theory assert the barrier to women’s entrance into the political arena arises from the lack of 
women considered “eligible” for political office (Duerst-Lahti 1998; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 
1994). However, the eligibility argument assumes men and women employ the same 
considerations when contemplating running for political office. Yet, recent works have 
demonstrated this assumption false. Scholars have demonstrated women reflect upon a 
greater number of considerations than male candidates (Fox, Lawless, and Feeley 2001). 
Furthermore, these considerations often involve roles reinforced by sex-role socialization (Elder 
2004; Fox and Lawless 2004; Fox, Lawless, and Feeley 2001). In addition, women often feel less 
qualified to run for office (Fox and Lawless 2011; Fox and Lawless 2004), which may also be a 
consequence of socialization.  
Finally, the institutional constraints imposed by the existing party and legislative 
structures may also contribute to the lack of female legislators. First, legislative professionalism 
negatively correlates with female representation (Maddox 2004; Squire 1992). Second, existing 
party elites may view women as an “outgroup” and discriminate against female candidates 
because of their lack of “surface similarity” (Fox and Lawless 2004; Niven 1998; Niven 2006). 
Therefore, even if a woman did choose to run for office, the structures she encounters might 
act as an additional barrier to entry.  
In light of research concerning the decision to run for office, scholars have also 
investigated possible differences in levels of ambition. On the whole, these investigations do 
not bode well for a rise in the number of women serving as legislators at any level of 
government. Initially, scholars found female legislators expressed lower levels of ambition 
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(Diamond 1977).  Another wave of work demonstrated a decrease in the difference of ambition 
expressed by male and female politicians (Thomas 1994; Stanley and Blair 1991; Costantini 
1990). Yet, this research occurred around the so-called “Year of the Woman” (1992) and likely 
represents a historical blip as the most recent works demonstrate women still possess 
significantly less ambition to hold office in the first place (Lawless and Fox 2010; Fox and 
Lawless 2004), run for Congress after serving in state legislatures (Mariani 2008; Fulton, 
Maestas, Maisel, and Stone 2006), or remain in office once they have reached Congress 
(Lawless and Theriault 2005). Yet, this lack of ambition may be mediated by the expected 
benefit of office (Fulton et al. 2006). 
Women as Legislators 
Studies concerning women as legislators take two main paths: analyzing their social, 
economic, and political characteristics and their roles within the legislatures (Cammisa and 
Reingold 2004). Concerning the first path, women tend to enter legislatures at a later age, with 
fewer children, as divorcees or widows, and come from different backgrounds than their male 
counterparts (Dolan and Ford 1998; Mezey 1978; Diamond 1977; Stoper 1977; Werner 1968). 
These characteristics largely relate to the social conceptualizations of women’s roles in society: 
"It was more difficult for women to maintain a demanding professional career at the same time 
they fulfilled the role of wife. It was apparently even harder to maintain careers as well as the 
responsibilities for children" (Thomas 1994, 32).  
However, many of these differences in demographic backgrounds have diminished over 
time (Whistler and Ellickson 1999). Furthermore, other differences between male and female 
legislators have diminished, as well. For instance, with an increase in the education levels of 
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women, female legislators have increasingly come from professional backgrounds not 
traditionally ascribed to women such as business (Thomas 1994). Furthermore, the political 
experiences of female legislators mirror those of their male counterparts (Dolan and Ford 1998; 
Thomas 1994). As a result, men and women’s personal backgrounds may not have as profound 
an impact on differences in their behaviors as in previous generations. 
For those interested in the potential policy impact of women, scholars must face the 
question of whether descriptive representation (electing women) leads to substantive 
representation (legislation on behalf of women). So, even if men and women arrive at the state 
house differently, do they also behave differently once in office? Beyond the demographic 
differences discussed above, scholars have investigated differences in the legislative priorities 
and activity of legislators of different genders. Female legislators do tend to differ from male 
legislators concerning ideology and the policy issues in which they choose to involve 
themselves. Female legislators often express more liberal positions from their male colleagues; 
these differences prove particularly pronounced for female Republican legislators (Poggione 
2004; Swers 1998; Vega and Firestone 1995; but, see Hogan 2008).  
Furthermore, female legislators tend to involve themselves in issues often described as 
feminine, such as education, healthcare, issues facing the elderly, and abortion politics, and 
they vote in support of legislation involving these policy areas at higher rates than men (Giles-
Sims, Green, and Lockhart 2012; Frederick 2011; Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 2007; Orey, 
Smooth, Adams, and Harris-Clark 2006; Bratton 2005; Levy, Tien, and Aved 2001; Little, Dunn, 
and Deen 2001; Swers 1998; Barrett 1995;Thomas and Welch 1991; Saint-Germain 1989; 
Githens and Prestage 1978; see Barnello 2001 as an exception). In addition, women may 
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conceive of their roles as legislators differently than men by describing themselves as feminists 
and seeing themselves as representatives of women more broadly (Thomas 1994; Reingold 
1992). Therefore, it should come as no surprise female legislators devote more attention to 
constituency service and report lower levels of activity in committee, on the floor, and working 
with colleagues and lobbyists (Thomas 1994; Diamond 1977; Kirkpatrick 1974).  
However, the pronounced differences between male and female legislators have greatly 
diminished over time. As a result, rather than studying the descriptive differences between the 
sexes, more recent work has focused on the impact of the institution on women and women’s 
impacts on the institution. Essentially, these works address a normative question: should 
women adapt to the existing structure, or should they attempt to alter the structure to better 
suit their unique perspectives (Thomas 1994)? Therefore, a great deal of this literature falls 
along two lines: how women integrate into the institution and how they transform the 
institution.  
The integrationist approach seeks to diffuse arguments about an inherent “otherness” 
of women (Githens and Prestage 1978). Early works in this tradition demonstrated female 
legislators did not deviate from female non-legislators and possessed important similarities to 
male legislators. In essence, Kirkpatrick (1974) argued women were not so different from men 
as to preclude them from working as legislators and operating similarly to men within the 
institution. On the other hand, those advocating the transformationist perspective argue the 
existing institution contains a bias against women (the so-called gendered institution), and 
female legislators can transform the institution so as to make the institution more hospitable to 
women. Examples of the transformationist literature include works concerning the policy 
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preferences and roll-call voting behavior of women lawmakers. Remember, female legislators 
tend to focus on issues largely considered part of the domain of women and hold more liberal 
stances on a variety of policy issues. In addition, they may frame debate of those issues 
differently from men (Levy, Tien, and Aved 2001). As a result, female legislators may magnify 
gender gaps in public opinion but also bring light to issues otherwise relegated to the periphery. 
However, just as conventional research into legislative behavior has moved on from 
studies of roll-call voting, so, too, have studies involving gender and legislatures. Such next-
generation works investigate behaviors including introductions, cosponsorship, and fundraising. 
Undoubtedly, women legislators tend to introduce and cosponsor more legislation than men 
(Anzia and Berry 2011). Nevertheless, the patterns of those introductions and cosponsorship 
still remain murky. For instance, several authors have investigated the cosponsorship behavior  
of women and come to opposite conclusions: Cook (2012) finds no support for the assertion 
that female legislators will be more inclined to support “women-friendly” legislation, while 
Swers (2005) finds women cosponsor “women-friendly” legislation more than men. However, 
Cook’s study takes place in a single state legislature, and Swers’ study uses data from the U.S. 
Congress, which could help account for the discrepant findings.  
In addition to cosponsorship behavior, several scholars have investigated campaign 
fundraising for female candidates (Jenkins 2007; Green 1998; Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986; 
Burrell 1985). These works demonstrate two important findings. Female candidates do feel 
more concerned about fundraising than male candidates and engage in the behavior at higher 
rates and among a greater variety of potential contributors. But, those feelings of concern may, 
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in fact, be misplaced, as women tend to raise the same, or even more, money than male 
candidates after accounting for political characteristics such as incumbency.  
As more women have gained office, more women serve in leadership positions, both 
presiding over the chamber and over committees (Bratton 2005). Consequently, researchers 
have investigated what conditions have contributed to women achieving positions of authority 
and how those female leaders have acted in those positions. Jewell and Whicker (1993) 
attribute the rise in female leadership to fundamental shifts in society such as the permanent 
entry of women into the labor force, the shift away from focusing on the nuclear family, and 
the growth of women’s groups dedicated to electing women. In a more systematic fashion, 
Deen and Little (1999) studied the factors contributing to the rise in female leadership and 
attribute that rise to institutional variables such as membership turnover and whether the state 
has had past female leaders and discount state-level variables such as state-wide education 
levels and geographic location. 
 Furthermore, how these leaders “rule” appears to differ between men and women. 
One could argue the institution and political considerations of leadership so constrain all 
leaders as to diminish any differences between male and female leaders (Little, Dunn, and Deen 
2001). Yet, research has largely discredited such an argument. Female leaders do prioritize 
different issues for their agendas in comparison to male leaders (Little, Dunn, and Deen 2001; 
Bratton and Haynie 1999). Furthermore, female leaders tend to employ a more conciliatory and 
integrative style (Weikart, Chen, Williams, and Hromic 2006; Rosenthal 2000; Lyn 1994; Jewell 
and Whicker 1993; but, see Reingold 1996 and Costantini and Craik 1972), while men use a 
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more confrontational leadership style, and both genders are viewed in such terms from the 
outside (Fridkin and Kenney 2009).  
Beyond stylistic differences, however, Lyn (1994) demonstrates that because male and 
female committee chairs behave differently, how committee members and witnesses behave 
also varies accordingly. While some of this variation takes on negative characteristics (for 
instance, men behave more aggressively when women constitute a greater proportion of the 
committee), this variation might also allow for greater policy enactment for issues of special 
concern to women because if a policy survives such a tough committee environment, it has a 
greater chance of success.  
Researchers have also conducted a great deal of work concerning the effectiveness of 
women once they achieve office. The work undertaken on the effectiveness of female 
legislators involves two competing hypotheses. The first assumed female lawmakers would 
have lower rates of legislative effectiveness than men because women are fundamentally 
different, and those differences make them ineffectual in an environment such as a legislature 
(Ellickson 1992). As described above, if female legislators operate within so-called gendered 
institutions, institutional design will reward typically “male” behaviors and fail to reward 
typically “female” behaviors.  
The second hypothesis has developed as the number of women legislators has 
increased. Because women have gained leadership positions and employ a more conciliatory 
legislative style, they may work more effectively with others from across the aisle to produce 
successes. Indeed, recent empirical analyses demonstrate the initial hypothesis false and the 
more recent hypothesis correct. Women fare no worse than their counterparts (Orey et al. 
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2006; Jeydel and Taylor 2003; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Ellickson 1992). Indeed, women often 
have higher success rates than men (Bratton 2005; Saint-Germain 1989), though factors such as 
majority-minority party status may condition that increased rate of effectiveness (Volden, 
Wiseman, and Wittmer 2011). 
In addition to studying the demographic characteristics, ideologies, behaviors, and styles 
of female legislators, other scholars have, indeed, taken a more psychological approach similar 
to the one I advocate. For instance, works have investigated the stereotyping of legislators 
(Fridkin and Kenney 2009; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993) by voters and come to interesting and 
contradictory conclusions; voters perceive female legislators as more honest and caring but 
express a preference for stereotypically male characteristics in candidates. In addition, scholars 
have investigated the perceptions of the legislators and come to contradictory findings 
concerning whether or not women perceive themselves as separate or considered as “less” 
than men (Weikart et al. 2006; Thomas 1996; Freeman and Lyons 1991).  
However, for my purposes, very few scholars have employed personality itself as an 
explanatory variable or only briefly allude to the possible influences of personality when 
studying gender and elite political behavior (Diamond 1977, 55, 150). Moreover, the few 
existing works exploring personality, gender, and political elites both conceptualize and 
operationalize personality differently from the Big Five framework I employ and often conflate 
personality with other concepts such as “…basic values, life goals, and conception of self or ‘ego 
identity’” (Diamond 1977, 65). For instance, both Barth and Ferguson (2002) and Blair and 
Stanley (1991) discuss personality as it relates to orientations toward power, not as general and 
enduring attitudinal or behavioral orientations.  
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However, Costantini and Craik (1972) and Werner and Bachtold (1974) discuss 
personality in ways more similar to current understandings of personality and reach interesting 
conclusions. Costantini and Craik find the personality characteristics of female leaders appear 
similar no matter the partisan affiliation of those leaders; they “…try harder and worry more” 
(226). However, they find male Republican leaders differ from male Democratic leaders in that 
the male Republican leaders attain higher scores on endurance and emotional control while 
their Democratic counterparts score higher on exhibition and lability. Furthermore, Werner and 
Bachtold find female legislators score high “…on intelligence, dominance, adventuresomeness, 
unconventionality, and radicalism…” (83). While neither of these studies employs the Big Five 
framework, their findings are consistent with aspects of the Big Five. Remember, conservatives 
(and Republicans) tend to score higher on conscientiousness and emotional stability (e.g. 
endurance and emotional control) while liberals (and Democrats) tend to score higher on 
openness to experience (similar to exhibition and lability). In addition, concepts such as 
intelligence and unconventionality as employed by Werner and Bachtold fall under the 
umbrella of openness to experience. 
Descriptive Statistics 
In the subsequent analyses, I coded the independent variables as follows: gender (0 = 
male, 1 = female); race (0 = white, 1 = non-white); party affiliation (0 = Democrat, 1 = 
Republican); years in office (continuous variable); first term dummy (0 = not first term, 1 = first 
term); majority (0 = minority member, 1 = majority member); chamber (0 = lower chamber, 1 = 
upper chamber);  party leader (0 = not a party leader, 1 = party leader); committee leader (0 = 
not a committee leader, 1 = committee leader); progressive ambition (0 = will definitely not run 
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for higher office, 1 = not currently interested in running for higher office; 2 = would run for 
higher office if opportunity presented, 3 = will definitely run for higher office); and, competitive 
(0 = not a competitive race in the last election; 1 = competitive race in the last election, defined 
as winning by less than 20% of the vote). In addition, the models include several higher-level 
variables including a dummy variable about whether the state in which the individual serves 
employs term limits (0 = no term limits, 1 = term-limited) and a continuous variable of 
professionalism ranging from zero to one (taken from Squire 2007). Finally, I rescaled the 
personality variables to range from zero to one to make interpretation simpler. 
 This chapter contains analyses employing two different sets of data and dependent 
variables. First, I present findings concerning how personality and gender interact to influence 
the self-reported amount of time legislators dedicate to the eleven activities discussed in 
chapter three. Second, I present findings concerning how personality and gender and 
personality, gender, and either legislative professionalism or tenure in office interact to 
influence the number of measures introduced or cosponsored by legislators and their resulting 
legislative success. Recall, chapters three and four discuss these different datasets. The data I 
employ for the discussion of the self-reported time legislators spend on legislative activities 
involves the whole sample while the data for the discussion on introductions, cosponsorship, 
and legislative success employs the subset of data containing the legislators from the 29 states 
with navigable records of those activities. 
 To have a general sense of the distributions of personality between the genders, I 
present descriptive statistics on the two samples: the full dataset and the subsetted dataset.17 
                                                          
17
 Recall, I have rescaled all personality variables to range from zero to one 
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For the full dataset, the legislators average 0.72on openness (N = 717; sd = 0.22); 0.68 on 
conscientiousness (N = 713; sd = 0.23); 0.63 on extraversion (N = 722; sd = 0.25); 0.60 on 
agreeableness (N = 715; sd = 0.21), and 0.63 (N = 718; sd = 0.23) on emotional stability.  
However, because this chapter focuses on differences in the gender, I also present the 
descriptive statistics for personality for each gender. The male legislators in the sample average 
0.71 on openness (N = 488; sd = 0.22); 0.67 on conscientiousness (N = 490; sd = 0.23); 0.62 on 
extraversion (N = 495; sd = 0.25); 0.59 on agreeableness (N = 489; sd = 0.21); and, 0.62 on 
emotional stability (N = 493; sd = 0.23). The female legislators average 0.75 on openness (N = 
229; sd  =0.22); 0.73 on conscientiousness (N = 223; sd = 0.22); 0.65 on extraversion (N = 227; 
sd = 0.25); 0.62 on agreeableness (N = 226; sd = 0.21); and, 0.64 on emotional stability (N = 225; 
sd =0 .22). I also analyzed the variance of means for men and women. Within the full sample, 
the legislators significantly differ on openness and conscientiousness; those differences also 
approach statistical significance for agreeableness and emotional stability18.  
 Furthermore, I present descriptive statistics concerning the self-reported amount of 
time the legislators dedicate to a variety of legislative activities.  Recall, the survey  I employ 
asked legislators to describe how much time they spent on eleven activities: (1) meeting with 
citizens back in the district; (2) meeting with constituents in the capital; (3) fundraising; (4) 
participating in committee matters; (5) working on legislative issues; (6) studying legislation; (7) 
working with caucuses; (8) attending floor debate; (9) working with party leaders to build 
coalitions; (10) engaging in oversight; and, (11) giving speeches about legislation outside the 
                                                          
18
 Please see table A.1 for full t-test results. 
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district. These questions employed a four-category response format, with response options of 
“almost none” (0), “a little” (1), “a moderate amount” (2), and “a great deal” (3). 
Certainly, men and women demonstrate differences in the amount of time they report 
spending on different aspects of their jobs as legislators (see Table 5.1). By simply glancing at 
the distribution of responses, it appears as though male and female legislators differ most 
strikingly concerning the amounts of time they spend attending committee hearings and bill 
markup sessions, meeting in the capital on legislative issues, and studying legislation. However, 
to test whether these differences have any statistical significance, I conducted additional t-tests 
(see table A.2 for full results). Indeed, the t-tests indicate male and female legislators do 
significantly differ on the amounts of time they report attending committee hearings, meeting 
on legislative issues, and studying legislation. Recall, all of those behaviors loaded onto a single 
factor (Factor Two); and, male and female legislators do statistically differ when considering the 
purely legislative tasks taken together as a scale. 
I next present the descriptive statistics for the personality variables for the legislators in 
the subset of legislators from the 29 states with accessible information on introductions and 
cosponsorship. Overall, the legislators average 0.71 on openness (N = 365; sd = 0.22); 0.70 on 
conscientiousness (N = 365; sd =0 .23); 0.63 on extraversion (N = 365; sd = 0.25); 0.57 on 
agreeableness (N = 365; sd = 0.22); and, 0.61 on emotional stability (N = 365; 0.23).  The male 
legislators average 0.69 on openness (N = 249; sd = 0.22); 0.64 on conscientiousness (N = 249; 
sd = 0.23); 0.61 on extraversion (N = 249; sd = 0.25); 0.56 on agreeableness (N = 249; 0.22); and, 
0.60 on emotional stability (N = 249; sd = 0.23). The female legislators average 0.76 on 
openness (N = 116; sd = 0.22); 0.75 on conscientiousness (N = 116; sd = 0.22); 0.65 on 
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extraversion (N = 116; sd = 0.26); 0.59 on agreeableness (N = 116; sd = 0.22); and, 0.62 on 
emotional stability (N = 116; sd = 0.21). Again, I analyzed the variance of means of the two 
genders. Within the subsetted data, the legislators significantly differ on openness and 
conscientiousness but do not significantly differ on extraversion, agreeableness, or emotional 
stability.19 
I also provide descriptive statistics on the numbers of measures introduced, 
cosponsored, and passed by the legislators broken down by gender. On average, male 
legislators introduced 26.11 measures (N = 1,050; sd = 24.78) and cosponsored 98.67 measures 
(N = 978; sd = 91.57). They had 5.11 introductions codified (N=1,050, sd = 6.74) and saw 25.08 
measures introduced or cosponsored passed. Those passages constitute a 21.5% success rate 
for introductions (N = 1,037; sd = 21.3%) and a 23.8% success rate for introductions and 
cosponsored measures (N = 1,046; sd = 18.8%). Female legislators introduced an average of 
26.45 measures (N = 373; sd = 23.57) and cosponsored an average of 129.03 measures (N = 
336; sd = 116.99). In addition, female legislators successfully passed an average of 5.78 
introductions (N = 372; sd = 7.48) and 38.21 introductions and cosponsored measures (N = 336; 
sd = 52.22). Those passages translate to an introduction success rate of 23.8% (N = 336; sd = 
23.3%) and a total success rate of 25.1% (N = 373; sd = 20.9%).  
To better understand these averages, I conducted additional t-tests on introductions (t = 
-0.231; p = 0.82); cosponsored measures (t = -4.324, p = 0.00); codified introductions (t = -
1.514; p = 0.11); codified introductions and cosponsored measures ( t= -4.446; p = 0.00); 
percentage of introductions passed (t = -1.640; p = 0.10); and, percentage of all measures 
                                                          
19
 Please see table A.1 for full t-test results. 
135 
  
introduced or cosponsored passed (t = -1.042; p = 0.30). The two groups significantly differ on 
cosponsored measures and the total number of introductions or cosponsored measures 
passed; however, when taken as a proportion of all introductions or cosponsored measures, 
those successes no longer differ significantly. 
Analyses 
Engagement in Legislative Activities 
 Consistent with the previous chapters, I conducted a variety of analyses to test the 
potential effects of personality and gender interactions on legislative behavior.  Based on the 
extant literature concerning women and legislative behavior, I propose several hypotheses. 
First, the effects of conscientiousness and emotional stability will differ between the genders 
concerning the amounts of time they report dedicating to different legislative activities. 
Remember, Costantini and Craik (1972) stated women “…try harder and worry more” (226). 
Based on such a statement, I contend conscientiousness and emotional stability may have 
different effects on male and female legislators.  
Recall from chapter three that conscientiousness strongly correlates with engagement 
in more purely legislative tasks such as studying legislation and working on committees and 
weakly correlates with engagement in more social activities. I assert conscientiousness will 
negatively correlate with participation in the social aspects of representation for women while 
such a relationship will not exist for men. In addition, if, as Costantini and Craik argue, women 
“worry more”, emotional stability may negatively correlate with the amount of time they 
devote to purely legislative activities and positively correlate with the amount of time they 
spend on the more social aspects of serving as legislators. In other words, the less emotionally-
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stable female legislators may worry about the legislative aspects of serving as a legislator and 
devote more time to working on those aspects of the job related to creating policy and sacrifice 
time devoted to activities such as coalition-building, participating in caucuses, or meeting with 
constituents. 
Indeed, conscientiousness does have different effects on legislators of different genders 
(see Table 5.2). Overall, as conscientiousness increases in female legislators, their self-reported 
amount of time dedicated to more social legislative activities declines. However, to make these 
models more concrete, I calculated both predicted values and predicted probabilities. Recall, 
the Minimal Factor One consists of the variables concerning time spent with citizens and 
constituents, fundraising, and giving speeches; the second version (labeled Full Factor One) 
includes participating in coalition-building and oversight in addition to the four component 
measures of the Minimal Factor One model. As models involving these factors as dependent 
variables employ ordinary least squares regression, I calculated the predicted values of the 
dependent variables for varying levels of conscientiousness in men and women (see Figure 5.1). 
As female legislators increase from the lowest scores of conscientiousness to the 
highest scores of conscientiousness, their scalar scores concerning the more social aspects of 
legislative work decline from 0.547 to 0.503. Conversely, as male legislators increase from the 
lowest scores of conscientiousness to the highest scores of conscientiousness, their scalar 
scores for participation in the more social aspects of representation increase from 0.430 to 
0.540. Furthermore, the predicted probabilities of dedicating time to particular social activities 
for male and female legislators demonstrate this same pattern. Take, for instance, the variable 
concerning the amount of time legislators report dedicating to building coalitions with party 
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leaders (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). Overall, most legislators reported spending a “moderate 
amount” of time on this activity. However, the predicted probability of women falling in this 
category decreases as conscientiousness increases while for men the probability increases as 
conscientiousness increases.  
The least conscientious women have a 69.6% probability of placing themselves within 
the “moderate amount” category. That probability decreases to 64.4% for women with scores 
of 0.5 on conscientiousness. For the most conscientious women, the probability of reporting 
spending a “moderate amount” of time working to build coalitions decreases again to 57.9%.  
The least conscientious men have a 46.0% probability of placing themselves in the moderate 
category. As conscientiousness increases to 0.5, men have a 57.1% probability of placing 
themselves in the moderate category; the most conscientious men have a 66.3% probability of 
reporting a “moderate amount”. 
While less consistent than the findings for conscientiousness, emotional stability also 
demonstrates a similar pattern concerning the amount of time legislators of different genders 
report spending on more social legislative activities (see Table 5.3). Certainly, for the model 
employing the Minimal Factor One variable, emotional stability negatively correlates with 
female participation in social legislative activities but positively correlates with male 
participation in the same activities. As women’s scores on emotional stability increase from 
zero to one, the predicted value for the Minimal Factor One declines from 0.580 to 0.500.    
However, as men’s scores on emotional stability increase from zero to one, the 
predicted value for the Minimal Factor One increases from 0.500 to 0.525. Although failing to 
achieve statistical significance, the Full Factor One model also demonstrates the same pattern, 
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with the predicted value for female legislators decreasing from 0.538 to 0.496 as emotional 
stability increases from zero to one and the predicted value for male legislators increasing from 
0.476 to 0.520 as emotional stability increases from zero to one.  
Remember, previous scholarship has demonstrated female legislators participate in 
behaviors like working with constituents at higher rates than male legislators. Those results 
hold true here, as well. Even the least conscientious female legislators engage in these social 
legislative activities at higher rates than the most conscientious male legislators. Unfortunately, 
I can only offer a possible explanation as to why conscientiousness works differently between 
the genders. Any potential increase we could have seen conscientiousness having for women 
and social legislative behaviors would simply signify going above and beyond their standard 
levels. Yet, perhaps these highly conscientious women know they will still perform a great deal 
of these activities even if they divert some of their attention to more purely legislative activities 
while highly conscientious men supplement their previous levels by engaging in more of these 
behaviors.  
An explanation similar to the one for conscientiousness could describe the pattern 
concerning social legislative activity, gender, and emotional stability. Again, the least 
emotionally stable female legislator engages in social legislative activities at a higher rate than 
the most emotionally stable male legislator. Society expects its female legislators to engage in 
these social legislative activities. Less emotionally stable female legislators may engage in these 
social legislative activities even more as overcompensation to assuage anxiety about 
performing their expected duties. Those societal expectations may differ for men, leading the 
least emotionally stable male legislators to also devote attention to activities seen as less 
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masculine to lower their own stress levels about things like reelection while their emotionally 
stable counterparts may not feel that same anxiety. 
Introductions, Cosponsorship, and Legislative Effectiveness 
 Next, I move to models concerning the potential effects of interactions of personality 
and gender on introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness. In chapter four, I 
proposed a hypothesis concerning emotional stability and legislative effectiveness. I argued the 
more emotionally stable would have greater legislative success because they would have a 
greater capacity to weather the ups and downs of pushing legislation through the multiple 
stages of the legislative process. However, models indicated emotional stability significantly and 
negatively correlated with legislative effectiveness. Yet, I propose investigating the effect of 
emotional stability and gender on legislative effectiveness. Does emotional stability negatively 
impact the effectiveness of all legislators, or do some benefit from emotional stability (see 
Table 5.4)? 
 As seen in the models, emotional stability does, indeed, positively correlate with 
legislative effectiveness for some legislators – women. Conversely, emotionally-stable men see 
a decline in their levels of legislative effectiveness. While emotional stability only negligibly 
increases the percentage of introductions a female legislator sees codified overall, a move from 
zero to one on emotional stability corresponds to an almost 10%  drop in success for male 
legislators (from 26.6% to 17.0%). Concerning the percentage of introductions and cosponsored 
measures codified, an increase in women’s emotional stability scores from zero to one 
translates to a 7% increase (from 21.5% to 28.5%) in the proportion of introductions and 
cosponsored measures codified, while a similar move in emotional stability for men equates to 
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an 8.5% drop (from 29.1% to 20.6%) in the proportion of introductions and cosponsored 
measures codified.  
The pattern reverses itself concerning the number of introductions legislators make. 
Again, Table 4.1 in chapter four demonstrates a negative, though statistically-insignificant, 
relationship between emotional stability and the number of introductions made by legislators. 
However, when accounting for possible interactions of gender and emotional stability and 
introductions, male legislators see a negligible increase in introductions as their scores on 
emotional stability increase from zero to one (from 26.1% to 26.8%). However, female 
legislators see a large drop in the number of introductions they make as emotional stability 
increases from zero to one. The model predicts a female legislator with a score of zero on 
emotional stability will introduce approximately 39.5 measures; a female legislator with a score 
of one on emotional stability will introduce fewer than 22 measures. 
By considering the results of the above models alongside the results of the regression 
analysis in Table 4.1, it is clear the model lacking a personality-gender interaction does not tell 
the whole story. Without testing the possible separate effects of emotional stability on men 
and women, we would likely believe emotional stability either has no impact (e.g. 
introductions) or a negative effect (e.g. legislative effectiveness) on legislative behavior. 
However, these more nuanced models demonstrate how the results from one group of 
individuals can overwhelm the results for another. For introductions, it appears the negative 
effect of emotional stability proves so strong for women as to overwhelm the men in the 
sample. For legislative effectiveness, the negative effect of emotional stability on male 
legislators’ success completely overwhelms the female legislators in the sample. By including a 
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gender-emotional stability interaction, we can see emotional stability does not perform 
identically for all individuals. 
Because emotional stability appears to operate in distinct ways for male and female 
legislators, I investigated the hypotheses I presented in chapter four concerning the possible 
direct effects of personality on introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness by 
including a gender-personality term. Overall, the initial findings from chapter four regarding the 
potential direct effects of personality on introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative 
effectiveness hold even after including a personality-gender interaction. 
However, several gender-personality interactions do prove statistically and 
substantively significant.  For instance, the model concerning the percentage of introductions 
codified returns a negative coefficient for conscientiousness in chapter four (see Table 4.2). 
However, it seems reasonable to argue conscientiousness should positively correlate with 
legislative effectiveness; the highly conscientious should view it as their responsibility to ensure 
the measures they introduce survive the legislative process. When accounting for differences in 
gender, conscientiousness does play a different role for male and female legislators (see Table 
5.5).  
As female legislators’ scores on conscientiousness increase from zero to one, their 
predicted rate of success for introductions rises from 20.3% to 24.2%. Conversely, as male 
legislators’ scores on conscientiousness increase from zero to one, their predicted rate of 
success for introductions falls from 24.8% to 18.7%. As with emotional stability, the negative 
effect on men overwhelms the positive effect on women when considering all legislators 
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together. By considering the interaction of personality and gender, we find another example 
wherein we should consider the variety of ways personality could affect behavior. 
Beyond simple gender-personality interactions, I also ran a variety of models concerning 
potential three-way interactions between gender, personality, and either tenure in office or 
legislative professionalism. If the personalities of the men and women who choose to run for 
office differ, it stands to reason the time they spend in office accentuates or diminishes aspects 
of those personalities accordingly. In addition, it seems reasonable to argue legislative 
professionalism may impact male and female legislators differently. Even today, women report 
spending more time taking care of children and engaging in household maintenance than men 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012). If a female legislator with outside employment worked in a 
citizen legislature, she could face additional demands on her attention than a male legislator. 
Overall, tenure in office does not significantly interact with gender and personality to 
affect the number of introductions or cosponsored measures to which a legislator attaches his 
or her name. For only one model does an interaction between gender, personality, and tenure 
in office produce statistically-significant results. When considering the number of introductions 
made by a legislator, an interaction of gender, conscientiousness, and tenure in office produces 
different patterns for male and female legislators.  
The model predicts the least conscientious male legislators will introduce just over 25 
measures during their first year in office; by their tenth years, they will introduce fewer than 24 
measures. For men of middling conscientiousness, they will introduce 25.5 measures during 
their first year and 26.5 measures in their tenth years. The most conscientious male legislators 
will introduce just over 26 measures in their first year and 29 measures in their tenth years. 
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However, the opposite occurs for female legislators. The least conscientious female legislator 
will introduce fewer than 25 measures during her first term but will introduce nearly 52 
measures by her tenth year in office. Female legislators with conscientiousness scores of 0.5 
will introduce nearly 25 measures during their first year in office but over 36 measures in their 
tenth years. The most conscientious women see only a negligible increase in the number of 
introductions they make. 
 While tenure in office does not appear to consistently interact with personality 
differently in male and female legislators, legislative professionalism does. Legislative 
professionalism benefits the “less” women – less agreeable, less extraverted, and less open. For 
men, legislative professionalism benefits the “more” men – more agreeable, more extraverted, 
and more open. 
Recall from chapter four that I hypothesized both extraversion and agreeableness would 
positively correlate with cosponsorship. For extraversion, I argued the extraverted, by virtue of 
their social nature, would speak with other legislators and staffers and learn of opportunities to 
cosponsor. For agreeableness, I argued the agreeable would want to maintain social harmony 
and would cosponsor legislation to foster that harmony. However, Table 4.1 demonstrated no 
statistically-significant relationships between extraversion or agreeableness and cosponsorship 
activity. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, agreeableness negatively correlated with 
cosponsorship. 
Table 5.6 presents the results of interactions between gender, professionalism, and 
either extraversion or agreeableness on cosponsorship activity. The results of these interactions 
prove both statistically and substantively significant. While the genders see an increase in 
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cosponsored measures as both legislative professionalism and either extraversion or 
agreeableness increases, the magnitudes of those effects differ at various levels of extraversion 
or agreeableness for each gender (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). 
For male legislators, the model predicts the least agreeable and least extraverted men 
will see the smallest increase in the number of cosponsored measures as legislative 
professionalism increases, while the most agreeable and most extraverted men will see the 
greatest increase in the number of cosponsored measures as legislative professionalism 
increases. This pattern reverses itself for female legislators. The model predicts the most 
agreeable and most extraverted women will see the smallest increase in the number of 
cosponsored measures as legislative professionalism increases, while the least agreeable and 
least extraverted women will see the greatest increase in the number of cosponsored 
measures. 
 This same contradictory pattern occurs when considering gender, openness to 
experience, legislative professionalism, and the proportion of introductions and cosponsored 
measures codified (see Table 5.7). All male legislators see a decline in success as 
professionalism and openness increase. However, the declines prove greatest for the least 
open men; the model predicts the least open men in the least professional legislatures will see 
29.1% of their introductions and cosponsored measures codified but only 6.0% in the most 
professional legislatures. The model predicts the most open men will enjoy a 28.3% success 
rate in the least professional legislatures but only a 20.2% success rate in the most professional 
legislatures.  
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Women demonstrate an opposite pattern. Both highly- and moderately-open female 
legislators will see a decline in legislative success in more professional legislatures. Yet, the least 
open women will actually see an increase in legislative success in more professional 
legislatures; the model predicts these women will encounter a 17.7% success rate in the least 
professional legislatures but a 23.6% success rate in the most professional legislatures. 
 These findings prove consistent with previous research into gender and legislative 
behavior, and I concur with previous explanations for these findings. For women, 
agreeableness, extraversion, and, to some extent, openness signal weakness to others – both 
inside and outside the institution. In states with less professional legislatures, where voters 
have less incentive to expect their representatives to behave in ways similar to members of 
Congress, agreeableness, extraversion, and openness do not necessarily act as negative 
characteristics. However, female legislators behave in more stereotypically male ways when 
serving in more professional legislatures. They behave more assertively in an effort to 
counteract potential negative associations with simply being female in society. Conversely, the 
more agreeable, extraverted, and open men prove both more active and more successful. 
Unlike women, where these traits potentially demonstrate weakness, behaving in an agreeable, 
friendly, and open manner signals willingness to compromise for men.  
Essentially, because professional legislatures more closely resemble Congress, and these 
trait patterns are more prized in our national representatives, male and female legislators 
behave differently based on societal expectations. In other words, we as constituents want our 
female members of Congress to behave more like men and our male members of Congress to 
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behave more like women, and personality interacts with the environment of more professional 
legislatures to benefit those who fulfill societal gender norms. 
Conclusion 
 According to the Center for American Women and Politics, females hold 97, or 18.1%, of 
the 535 seats in Congress. Similarly, the National Conference of State Legislatures states 
females comprise approximately 24.2% of the seats in state legislatures. Certainly, pundits, 
activists, and feminists argue the election of women to public office will bring greater attention 
to the concerns of women, children, families, and the elderly. If women constitute half of the 
American population but only one-fifth of the legislatures in America, half the population lacks 
descriptive and, very possibly, substantive representation. Therefore, the study of women in 
political office holds great potential for remedying such inequities.  
 In recent decades, scholars have greatly expanded our knowledge of female legislators 
by examining their personal characteristics, behavior, and impact on both the institutions in 
which they serve and on the policy outputs of those institutions. These works often focus on 
the many ways in which female legislators differ from their male counterparts. While it may 
once have been necessary to identify and categorize female legislators, we should broaden our 
examinations to understand the differences between female legislators as a group rather than 
juxtaposing them against male legislators (Cammisa and Reingold 2004).  Such an approach 
provides us a greater understanding of female legislators and how they operate in particular 
institutional contexts. 
 The analyses in this chapter serve several purposes. First, they seek to provide a 
preliminary exploration of not only the effects of the personality differences of men and 
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women on legislative behavior but also the effects of personality differences within the group 
of female legislators on legislative behavior. Certainly, the analyses demonstrate personality 
sometimes operates differently in the genders. For instance, both conscientiousness and 
emotional stability operate differently in male and female legislators concerning the self-
reported amount of time they dedicate to the more social aspects of their jobs. In women, 
conscientiousness and emotional stability negatively correlate with dedicating a substantial 
portion of time to activities such as fundraising, coalition-building, and meeting with 
constituents. In men, conscientiousness and emotional stability positively correlate with those 
same activities. 
 Furthermore, emotional stability also has opposing effects on male and female 
legislators when considering legislative effectiveness. For women, emotional stability positively 
correlates with levels of legislative effectiveness. Calm and laid-back women see a greater 
proportion of their introductions and cosponsored measures codified. Conversely, emotional 
stability negatively correlates with the legislative effectiveness of male legislators. Easily-
stressed men appear to dedicate a greater deal of effort to ensuring their introductions and 
cosponsored measures survive the legislative process.  
 In addition to studying how personality operates differently between and within the 
genders, this chapter also sought to further studies of trait-environmental interactions in three 
ways. First, because scholars often consider gender a socially-constructed artifact, gender can 
essentially operate as an environmental factor. If gender truly is socially-constructed, then 
studying the two-way interactions of gender and personality provides us a greater 
understanding of how personality operates under different societal expectations. Second, 
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studying gender-personality interactions provides finer granularity and allows us to observe the 
influence of personality on subgroups of legislators. Throughout this dissertation, I have argued 
we need to not only focus on the institution but the individuals within the institution. By 
decomposing those individuals into distinct groups, we can better observe patterns of 
influence.  
Finally, by including three-way interactions of gender, personality, and tenure in office 
or legislative professionalism, we have additional evidence of the importance of studying how 
biological predispositions and environmental context interact to influence observed behavior.  
Such knowledge may allow us to fine-tune the institutions to suit the dispositions of the 
legislators serving within them to help ensure more normatively ideal outcomes. 
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Chapter 6: The Consequences of Personality in State Legislatures 
 
Introduction 
I began this dissertation with a comparison of two members of Congress, Bruce Braley 
and David Loebsack. These two congressmen possess a number of resemblances. Concerning 
their extrainstitutional similarities, they were both born and raised in the state they now 
represent (Iowa), possess postgraduate degrees, and have wives and children. Furthermore, 
they represent fairly similar districts. Within the institution, they have taken similar paths by 
serving on committees related to military and veterans’ affairs, but neither holds any leadership 
positions on those committees or within the chamber. However, while Congressman Loebsack 
has sponsored 54 measures during his three full terms in Congress, Congressman Braley has 
introduced nearly twice as many (93 measures).  
 Conventional explanations found in legislative behavior literature would argue these 
two men should introduce a comparable number of measures. However, if conventional 
explanations –factors such as personal history, constituency preferences, party pressures, or 
institutional constraints – fail to explain why these two men have behave differently, what 
could? I have argued personality, as conceptualized and operationalized by the Big Five 
framework, provides us additional insight into variations in legislative behavior. Employing 
personality as an explanatory variable allows us to take into consideration how individuals’ core 
psychological predispositions affect how they respond to their environments. By doing so, we 
gain a more complete understanding of individuals within political institutions. 
How Personality Might Matter for Legislative Behavior 
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 In chapters one and four, I argued personality could affect behavior in several ways. 
First, rather than employing only environmental factors as explanatory variables for legislative 
behavior, we should also include personality variables to determine if and when they also 
directly impact behavior. Furthermore, how personality might directly influence behavior could 
take on several forms. First, personality’s potential effects on legislative behavior could take on 
a linear form wherein a change in personality produces a relatively constant rate of change in 
the legislative behavior in question.  
But remember, the personality dimensions lack an ideal. For example, scoring high in 
openness to experience has advantages, such as a willingness to listen to new ideas and try new 
things. However, that openness to new ideas and experiences means these individuals may 
partake in behaviors hazardous to their health like smoking. As a result, we must also consider 
other ways in which personality could affect behavior. Therefore, a second way personality 
might have a direct impact on behavior could be via a hyperbolic relationship wherein changes 
in personality produce a great deal of change in legislative behavior at lower levels of the 
independent variables but taper off as the personality variables approach their maximum 
levels. Or, third, personality’s effects on legislative behavior could occur parabolically wherein 
graphing the relationship of personality and legislative behavior produce an upside-down U 
shape, with the midpoint indicating personality’s greatest effects. 
However, only considering the variety of ways in which personality could directly impact 
legislative behavior takes a rather deterministic view of how personality affects behavior. The 
environment in which a person is located influences how that person behaves. Both the 
extraverted and introverted will likely appear introverted at a funeral. But at a party, the 
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environment no longer constrains the extraverted individual. There is no “good” or “bad” or 
“right” and “wrong” when studying personality. Nor are the dimensions of personality 
deterministic. Rather, these five overarching dimensions simply describe individuals’ 
psychological tendencies over a variety of times and situations.  
Therefore, just as studies involving personality and mass political behavior have begun 
to do, we must also consider how the environment in which an individual legislator operates 
affects how his or her overarching psychological tendencies express themselves. Because there 
exists a variety of environmental factors that could act as constraints on individual legislators, I 
have chosen to focus on two of the most prominent differences in state legislators – tenure in 
office and legislative professionalism. In addition to providing leverage due to variation across 
state legislatures, these two environmental constraints also have substantive effects on the 
politics of states. Therefore, I believe studying personality’s effects on behavior in light of these 
constraints could have some of the most substantive and normatively important impacts on 
states and their citizens. 
Simply put, personality matters. Undoubtedly, genetics exert a substantial influence on 
individuals’ personality traits. Additionally, personality has meaningful and intuitive impacts on 
behavior. Furthermore, personality influences the environments in which we place ourselves 
and how we behave inside those environments. In other words, we choose to go different 
places and do different things in part because of our personalities, and personality impacts how 
we behave once we go to those places or do those things.  
However, in spite of its intuitive appeal, research on political behavior has only recently 
begun to include personality as an explanatory variable. This lack of inclusion largely rested on 
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the failure to develop an agreed-up conceptualization or operationalization of personality 
within personality’s home field of psychology. However, with the rise and acceptance of the Big 
Five framework within psychology, scholars have been able to integrate valid and reliable 
measures of personality within political science. Initially, political scientists investigated the 
direct effects of personality on political behavior. More recently, they have moved away from 
investigating only the immediate impacts of personality on behavior by studying how 
individuals’ personalities interact with their environments to influence behavior. And in doing 
so, scholars of political behavior have added to the plethora of evidence concerning 
personality’s impacts on human behavior with a greater degree of nuance. 
While personality has undergone resurgence in literature investigating mass political 
behavior, a similar resurrection has not occurred in studies of elite political behavior. Certainly, 
there are several reasons for this divergence from studies of mass political behavior. First, 
gathering from politicians the information necessary to employ personality as an explanatory 
variable proves more challenging than gathering that same information from everyday people. 
Second, historical works including personality in investigations of elite political behavior proved 
both conceptually and operationally unsound leading more recent scholars to approach 
personality with trepidation.  
Third, current perspectives on legislative behavior often take a game theoretic, rational-
actor perspective, sometimes to the exclusion of consideration of the inherent individuality of 
politicians. While works including gender, race, or personal backgrounds allow scholars to 
understand how more individual-level characteristics influence political behavior, I argue these 
efforts do not go back far enough along the causal chain to truly count as efforts accounting for 
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the inherent differences between individuals. Undoubtedly, existing explanations of legislative 
behavior matter. Indeed, the models found in this dissertation continue to demonstrate how 
factors such as electoral vulnerability, party and committee leadership, gender, legislative 
professionalism, and tenure in office affect how legislators behave, oftentimes reaffirming 
previous findings. Yet, personality traits also matter, both as standalone variables and as part of 
interactions with environmental constraints such as legislative professionalism.  
Summary of Findings 
In chapter 2, I set out to further the preliminary findings of Dietrich et al. (2012) by 
demonstrating three things. First, while politicians do not respond to surveys at the same levels 
as individuals in the mass public, when they do respond to surveys, they will likely answer 
personality-related measures. Critics might assert that politicians who complete surveys will 
selectively choose to which questions they will respond. And while that may be the case, when 
elites do choose to respond to a survey, they do not avoid answering personality questions at 
any higher rate than they choose not to respond to less provocative items. Second, political 
elites do display variance in personality. Again, critics might assert that politicians will respond 
to personality items in similar ways, likely to paint themselves in the best light. And although 
politicians display less variance than a random sample of the public, variance still exists, and 
that variance does not appear so concentrated as to prove useless for analysis.  
Third, I conducted several tests to ensure findings from research on personality and 
political behavior at the mass level have validity at the elite level, as well. Indeed, if basic 
findings from the mass level did not replicate themselves at the elite level, we would have little 
foundation on which to base our theoretical expectations and would weaken the usefulness of 
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the Big Five framework. Yet, these validity tests yielded encouraging results. The basic 
relationships between the Big Five and ideology and partisan identification found at the mass 
level also exist at the elite level. For example, conservatives tend to possess higher levels of 
conscientiousness, extraversion, and emotional stability, while liberals tend to possess higher 
levels of openness to experience and agreeableness. The same patterns also appear for 
partisanship with Republicans demonstrating higher levels of extraversion, conscientiousness, 
and emotional stability and Democrats expressing higher levels of openness to experience and 
agreeableness. With this replication of findings, we can feel more assured the ways in which 
personality affect political behavior at the mass level should also operate similarly among elites.  
Chapter 3 set out to move beyond purely replicative work by arguing personality affects 
engagement in a variety of legislative behaviors. In general, openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, and extraversion appear to play the largest roles driving engagement in 
various types of legislative activity. Superficially, it may seem odd neither agreeableness nor 
emotional stability plays major roles in undertaking the eleven legislative behaviors in question. 
But, those legislative activities matter for whether a personality trait dimension rises to the 
foreground.  Certainly, not all activities provide an opportunity for individuals’ personality traits 
to play a role. For instance, nothing inherent in the less social aspects of legislative activities 
(i.e. studying legislation or conducting legislative oversight) would elicit different behavior 
patterns along the lines of agreeableness. 
Yet, legislative activities do have logical connections with certain personality trait 
dimensions. Again, I investigated how personality could influence engagement in each of the 
eleven surveyed activities and how personality might affect engagement in social legislative 
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activities and purely legislative activities more broadly. First, openness to experience has a 
robust influence on legislative behavior, whether that behavior occurs within or outside the 
legislature. Because increases in openness correlate with information-seeking, it makes sense 
those high in openness report spending a good deal of time engaging in intrainstitutional 
activities like attending committee hearings and studying legislation. But, openness also relates 
to a willingness to try new things, which makes the finding concerning increases in openness 
correlating with increased engagement in social legislative activities come as no surprise either.  
Second, conscientiousness corresponds with increased engagement in the more purely 
legislative activities. While I cannot say for certain given the current data, one could argue the 
highly conscientious view their first duty as legislators as representing their constituents and 
creating public policy; they ran for office to represent their constituents and ensure those views 
received adequate attention. Therefore, the highly conscientiousness may prioritize engaging in 
the activities most likely to achieve those goals.  
Third, and not surprisingly, extraverts enjoy the more purely social aspects of a 
legislator’s job, such as meeting with constituents or working to form coalitions with others. 
While they may also view their jobs as representing their constituents and creating public 
policy, extraverts seem to choose to engage in activities like meeting directly with constituents 
that could serve those goals while simultaneously providing the social outlet they crave. Rather 
than engaging in activities failing to provide a social outlet such as participating in oversight 
activities, extraverts will prioritize working on the activities the conscientious seem to see as 
somewhat more secondary.  
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Yet, the data from chapter 3 rely solely on individuals’ self-reports. Consequently, 
chapter 4 moved toward using a more objective data source – introductions, cosponsorship, 
and legislative effectiveness – to examine personality’s possible influence on legislative 
behavior. I chose to study these three particular legislative behaviors for two reasons. First, 
legislative scholars have demonstrated the importance of these activities. Introductions, 
cosponsorship, and legislative success can increase a legislator’s power within the institution, 
earn him more campaign contributions, and provide a platform for future campaigns. Second, 
although roll-call voting is certainly an important legislative behavior, it is a reactive behavior in 
which almost all legislators engage. Rather than focusing roll-call voting, introductions and 
cosponsorship allow us to investigate activities in which legislators choose to engage 
themselves more proactively.  
Similar to the trajectory of personality and political behavior research at the mass level, I 
undertook two separate paths to test how personality might impact introductions, 
cosponsorship, and legislative success. First, I directly tested the Big Five trait dimensions as 
predictors of introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness. Remember, 
personality could influence behavior in these activities in several ways – linearly, hyperbolically, 
or parabolically. In structuring the models to test a possible linear relationship, the Big Five do 
not appear to impact the number of measures legislators introduce and/or cosponsor, but 
three of them (openness to experience, agreeableness, and emotional stability) may impact 
legislative effectiveness.  
 Therefore, employing squared personality terms allows us to investigate whether 
personality demonstrates a Goldilocks-type effect on legislative behavior. Perhaps scoring too 
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low or too high on a trait dimension proves detrimental while scoring in some ideal middle 
range leads to the preferred outcome. And indeed, these squared terms indicate increasing 
levels of the Big Five lead legislators to engage in more legislative activity. However, the results 
also demonstrate personality only carries a legislator so far; after a certain point, the gains 
brought about by the positive characteristics of the trait dimensions level off and may even 
begin to negatively impact productivity. 
 Yet, while mass behavior scholars have begun studying personality in context, such an 
undertaking possibly proves even more important when investigating legislative behavior. Yes, 
individuals matter, but legislatures and political context place great constraints on how 
legislators might behave. In other words, lawmakers exist and operate within institutions, and 
these institutions place a variety of external constraints on how legislators behave. Therefore, I 
also investigated how personality might interact with several of these external influences – 
namely tenure in office and legislative professionalism – to demonstrate how personality 
influences introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness.  
Tenure in office may offset some of the normatively negative characteristics associated 
with different personality dimensions. For example, the least conscientious legislators 
introduce and cosponsor more measures the longer they serve within the institution. Yet, these 
gains do not translate into higher levels of legislative success. Conversely, while tenure in office 
does not necessarily change the introduction or cosponsorship patterns of the highly 
conscientious, that additional time in office does translate into increased legislative success. 
Additionally, tenure in office also increases the productivity and success of the extraverted and 
the agreeable. 
158 
  
Second, legislative professionalism plays an important role in how legislators’ 
personalities express themselves within the institution. For instance, while all legislators 
introduce more measures inside professional legislatures, the theoretical effects of moving 
legislators from citizen legislatures to professional legislatures impact various personalities 
differently. Moving a legislator low in conscientiousness from a citizen legislature to a 
professional legislature does not greatly alter the behavior of that legislator concerning 
introductions. Yet, moving a highly conscientious legislator from a citizen legislature to a 
professional legislature greatly increases the number of introductions that legislator makes.  
Finally, chapter 5 provides us another chance to examine a possible environmental 
constraint on legislative behavior. Research on gender and legislative behavior has examined 
the personal characteristics, behavior, and policy impact of female legislators. For the most 
part, these efforts have investigated ways in which female legislators differ from their male 
counterparts. And while studying the behavior of female legislators vis a vis male legislators is 
important, we must also consider how female legislators differ from one another. This 
additional perspective provides us a fuller understanding of how environmental constraints 
affect behavior.  
If we subscribe to the view of gender as a social construct and to so-called gendered 
institutions, then gender may influence how individuals express their personalities within 
legislatures. In other words, society has different expectations of the genders, and those 
differing expectations influence behavior. As a result, those societal expectations serve as an 
environmental constraint influencing how men and women express their underlying 
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psychological tendencies. In turn, these gendered institutions (in this case state legislatures) 
interpret, reward, and punish the expression of those tendencies in varying ways. 
 Again, I had several purposes in this chapter. I sought to provide a preliminary 
examination of how personality may drive male and female legislators to behave differently. 
Yet, I also set out to compare individuals within the group of female legislators. Indeed, the 
models demonstrate personality can operate differently in men and women. For example, I 
found both conscientiousness and emotional stability play different roles for men and women. 
For women, these trait dimensions negatively correlate with the more social legislative 
activities but positively correlate with the same in men. Emotional stability also affects the 
legislative success of male and female legislators differently. Emotional stability positively 
correlates with legislative success for women but negatively correlates with legislative success 
in men.  Finally, while interacting gender, personality, and tenure in office does not produce 
any statistically or substantively significant findings, interacting gender, personality, and 
legislative professionalism does.  
Normative Implications of Personality and Legislative Behavior 
 I believe these findings all have meaningful implications. Concerning the findings of 
chapter 3, current institutional rewards may advantage legislators with certain personality 
profiles over others. Remember, the more extraverted legislators report dedicating a greater 
deal of time involving themselves in social legislative activities to the exclusion of more purely 
legislative activities. To understand the potential consequences, let us consider a hypothetical. 
Suppose we have Legislator A, who scores high in extraversion but low in conscientiousness. 
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Given his personality characteristics, Legislator A likely dedicates far more time to the more 
social legislative activities than to more conventional legislative activities.  
Compare Legislator A to Legislator B, an individual who scores high in conscientiousness 
but low in extraversion. Because of his personality, Legislator B feels more comfortable working 
behind the scenes on legislation but does not spend a great deal of time engaging in the social 
legislative activities. Which legislator receives institutional rewards such as a prime committee 
assignment or a leadership position within the party? Legislator A acts as a show horse, while 
Legislator B acts as a workhorse. Ideally, the party would want Legislator C, someone high in 
both extraversion and conscientiousness. But lacking that ideal candidate, which legislator does 
the institution choose to reward? 
 Furthermore, the personality and environment interaction terms could also have 
meaningful normative consequences. Recall, agreeableness does not appear to affect legislative 
effectiveness at the beginning of legislators’ careers. However, as time goes on, the more 
agreeable legislators see increasing legislative success while the less agreeable legislators see 
declines in the same. Given the high levels of political polarization and perception of partisan 
bickering in legislatures, we would likely prefer more agreeable legislators to less agreeable 
legislators. And while agreeableness does not move the ideal points of the two parties closer to 
one another, agreeableness might lead to more efforts to cooperate with members of the other 
party. If we limit the amount of time legislators can serve in office through term limits, we may 
impair the ability of the agreeable to temper some of the negative effects of political 
polarization. 
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 Similarly, legislative professionalism affects the behavior of individuals along a 
conscientiousness dimension. In truly citizen legislatures, differing levels of conscientiousness 
do not impact legislative activity. Yet, as we move legislators into highly professionalized 
legislatures, we see how differences in conscientiousness impact how legislators behave. Again, 
although there are no ideal scores on personality traits, it seems reasonable to argue citizens 
would prefer to have more conscientious legislators representing them rather than less. Yet, 
most state legislatures fall on the less professionalized end of the spectrum. While citizen 
legislatures have their advantages, they inhibit the highly conscientious from engaging with the 
institution as they would if the legislature were more professional.  
Where Do We Go From Here? 
 Undoubtedly, legislative behavior is a complex phenomenon. But as I have shown, 
personality influences legislative behavior both in direct opposition to and in conjunction with 
conventional explanations of legislative behavior. Yet given these preliminary findings, where 
do we go from here? First, personality likely impacts the initial decision to run for office. 
Although their efforts consider decisions to run for the US House of Representatives, I believe 
replicating the efforts of Stone, Maestas, and Maisel at the state legislative level could shed 
light on whether and how personality influences individuals’ decisions to run for elective office. 
Furthermore, such an effort could move beyond the individual’s calculation and also investigate 
how local influentials interpret and employ personality when advocating for individuals to run. 
As such, we could gain greater understanding of how personality impacts individual- and group-
level behavior. 
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Second, personality likely impacts progressive ambition. Certainly, there exists a variety 
of factors impacting someone’s decision to run for higher office including the similarity of the 
new constituency to the old constituency, the availability of higher-level positions, and personal 
considerations. Yet, it seems logical personality dimensions like extraversion and openness to 
experience would also play a role in a legislators’ decision calculus. If a legislator scores high on 
openness to experience, he may enjoy taking the risk of leaving a current position to run for a 
higher office. Similarly, an extravert might enjoy the increased social opportunities of running 
for higher office.  
Furthermore, while some legislators seek to move to higher office, some are content 
remaining within their existing institutions but gaining increased power with those lower 
institutions. Therefore, personality may also serve as a predictor of intrainstitutional ambition. 
Although several more years need to pass to allow legislators time to move within the 
institution and for new election cycles to occur, the data as they exist now lend themselves to 
studying this possible relationship in the not-too-distant future. 
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Tables 
 
Table 2.1. Personality Self-Assessments of State Legislators by Percentage     
   
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Mildly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Sociable and Active           
(N = 728) 
35.0 42.9 14.8 4.0 1.7 0.6 1.5 
Quiet and Shy                    
(N =724) 
0.8 4.8 13.4 10.9 11.2 30.0 28.9 
Generous and Warm            
(N = 717) 
20.9 47.1 21.1 6.4 2.4 1.1 1.0 
Critical and 
Quarrelsome  (N = 
728) 
0.7 2.0 9.8 9.3 13.2 40.5 24.5 
Dependable and Self-
Disciplined (N = 724) 
36.1 47.8 11.9 2.1 0.8 0.4 1.0 
Disorganized and 
Careless  (N =718) 
1.4 1.4 5.4 8.6 12.1 38.3 32.7 
Calm and Emotionally 
Stable  (N = 720) 
23.3 49.2 15.3 7.6 1.9 1.5 1.1 
Anxious and Easily 
Upset    (N = 727) 
1.0 1.4 5.9 9.2 14.3 40.7 27.5 
Open to New 
Experiences and 
Intellectual  (N = 722) 
38.9 42.0 14.7 2.5 0.4 0.6 1.0 
Uncreative and 
Unimaginative (N = 
723) 
0.6 0.7 2.6 5.7 7.3 34.4 48.7 
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Table 2.2. The Influence of Personality on the Ideology and Partisan Affiliation of State Legislators 
              
  Ideology   Party Affiliation     
Openness to Experience 
-1.25***                         
(0.34)   
 -1.15**      
(0.41)       
Conscientiousness 
1.14***                         
(0.34)   
 1.25**       
(0.41)       
Extraversion 
0.84**                   
(0.30)   
 0.78*  
(0.36)       
Agreeableness 
-1.27**                   
(0.41)   
-1.48** 
(0.49)         
Emotional Stability 
1.10**                   
(0.36)   
 0.77#       
(0.43)       
Age 
0.00                    
(0.01)   
 0.01       
(0.01)       
Gender 
-1.34***                  
(0.16)   
 -1.05***      
(0.19)       
Race 
-1.14***                    
(0.26)   
 -1.95***      
(0.45)       
Education 
-0.24***                        
(0.06)   
 -0.14#     
(0.07)       
Constant   
0.03       
(0.67)    
  
          
Number of Cases 666   680        
χ2 153.10   
 
96.67       
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Table 2.3. The Influence of Personality on Types of Political Ambition   
                
     
    Progressive Ambition Committee Leader Party Leader 
Openness to 
Experience   
 0.16                                   
(0.38)   
-0.79  
(0.53)   
-1.52#   
(0.81) 
Conscientiousness 
  
 -0.20  
(0.38)   
-0.28  
(0.54)   
0.16       
(0.83) 
Extraversion 
  
1.48***  
 (0.34)    
-0.03  
(0.47)   
 -0.69 
(0.75) 
Agreeableness 
  
-0.43  
(0.44)   
-0.42  
(0.64)   
 -0.46 
(1.02) 
Emotional Stability 
  
0.30  
(0.40)   
0.12  
(0.57)   
1.73#  
(0.94) 
Age 
  
-0.07***  
(0.01)    
-0.02  
(0.01)   
0.01     
(0.02) 
Gender 
  
 -0.46**                                       
(0.17)   
 -0.55*  
(0.27)    
 0.06  
(0.38) 
Race 
  
 0.56#                                            
(0.30)   
 0.12  
(0.42)   
 0.13  
(0.59) 
Education 
0.04                                              
(0.07)   
 0.28*  
(0.11)    
 -0.19  
(0.13) 
Years in Office 
-0.03*                                          
(0.01)   
 0.07*** 
(0.02)   
 0.05*      
(0.02) 
First Term Dummy 
-0.12                                            
(0.21)   
 -0.43  
(0.35)   
 -2.08*      
(0.25) 
Competitive Prior 
Election 
-0.22                                            
(0.16)   
 0.38# 
(0.23)   
 -0.08  
(0.37) 
Party Affiliation 
0.01                                            
(0.17)   
 -0.09  
(0.25)   
 -0.46      
 (0.38) 
Majority 2009-2010 
0.05                                            
(0.16)   
 0.64*  
(0.25)   
 -0.05       
(0.37) 
Term-limited 
0.47*                                             
(0.19)   
 0.18  
(0.30)   
 0.14  
(0.46) 
Party Leader 
-0.03                                              
(0.31)         
Committee Leader 
0.53**                                         
(0.21)           
Constant 
 
 
 
-1.52#  
(0.20)  
-2.09     
(1.48) 
Number of Cases 
    
623                                                         630    630 
X2 
  
 
149.045      54.63    30.48 
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Table 3.1. Self-Reported Measures of Time Spent Engaging in Various Legislative Activities 
  
  Almost None A Little 
A Moderate 
Amount 
A Great Deal 
Meeting with Citizens in the District 
(N=745) 
 0.8 10.5  43.0  45.8  
Meeting with Constituents at the Capital 
(N=744) 
 7.3 30.9  46.0  15.9  
Engaging in Fundraising (N=739) 23.8  40.9  29.5  5.8  
Attending Committee Meetings, Markups, 
and Other Meetings (N=739) 
 0.5 4.2  34.6  60.6  
Meeting in the State Capital on Legislative 
Issues (N=745) 
 0.7 8.9  45.5 45.0 
Studying, Reading, or Discussing Pending 
Legislation (N=743) 
 0.1 2.3  34.7  62.9  
Working with Informal Caucuses (N=743)  8.2 31.6  43.1  17.1  
Attending Floor Debate (N=741)  2.0 8.2 31.4 58.3  
Working with Party Leaders to Build 
Coalitions (N=736) 
 10.2 26.1  44.7  19.0  
Overseeing how Agencies Carry Out Policies 
and Programs (N=739) 
 7.7  32.1  42.1  18.1  
Giving Speeches Outside the District about 
Legislation (N=740) 
 25.5 42.2  26.5  5.8  
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Table 3.2. Factor Analysis of Legislative Activities included in Survey 
      
  Factor One Factor Two 
Citizens  0.681 -0.003  
Constituents  0.644 0.142  
Fundraising  0.595 0.015  
Committees  -0.046 0.759  
Legislative Issues  -0.021 0.755  
Studying  0.267 0.522  
Caucuses  0.324 0.365  
Coalitions  0.481 0.388  
Floor Debate  0.122 0.590  
Oversight  0.406 0.310  
Speeches  0.659 0.072  
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Table 3.3. Personality and Time Spent Engaging in Various Legislative Behaviors     
                
  Citizens  Constituents Fundraising  Speeches Coalitions Oversight    
Constant 
-2.75** 
(0.79) 
-0.74   
 (0.55) 
0.28    
(0.57) 
1.40** 
(0.47) 
-0.70      
(0.44) 
-0.59 
(0.46) 
 
Openness to 
Experience 
-0.38 
(0.40) 
 -1.01*  
(0.39) 
-1.15***    
(0.40) 
 -0.63 
(0.52) 
-0.53               
(0.38) 
 -0.69* 
(0.32) 
  
Conscientiousness 
-1.15*** 
(0.29) 
 -0.19    
(0.37) 
-0.21  
(0.37) 
 -0.73* 
(0.32) 
-0.48               
(0.35) 
 -0.22 
(0.36) 
  
Extraversion 
-0.81* 
(0.33) 
 -0.41   
 (0.28) 
-0.57*  
(0.28) 
 -0.96* 
(0.39) 
-0.90**               
(0.32) 
 -0.19 
(0.28) 
  
Agreeableness 
-0.59 
(0.52) 
 -1.01*  
(0.48) 
-1.17* 
(0.49) 
 -0.11 
(0.47) 
-0.17              
(0.46) 
 -0.46 
(0.36) 
  
Emotional Stability 
-0.13 
(0.40) 
 -0.86*  
(0.39) 
0.74#    
(0.41) 
 0.25  
(0.30) 
-0.30      
 (0.44) 
 -0.33 
(0.34) 
  
Gender 
0.13 
(0.15) 
 -0.01    
(0.18) 
-0.27#  
(0.16) 
 -0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.03      
(0.15) 
 0.09 
(0.19) 
  
Race 
0.02 
(0.30) 
 -0.73#  
(0.42) 
0.20     
(0.36) 
 -0.26 
(0.30) 
0.35          
(0.25) 
 -0.08 
(0.36) 
  
Party Affiliation 
-0.21 
(0.18) 
 -0.27  
 (0.19) 
0.13    
(0.18) 
 -0.31# 
(0.17) 
0.08       
(0.19) 
 -0.28 
(0.18) 
  
Majority 
-0.15 
(0.18) 
 0.18    
(0.17) 
0.17   
 (0.17) 
0.00  
(0.17) 
0.10        
(0.18) 
 -0.50** 
(0.18) 
  
Years in Office 
0.02 
(0.01) 
 -0.02    
(0.02) 
0.03*   
(0.01) 
 -0.03* 
(0.01) 
-0.03#       
(0.01) 
 -0.03* 
(0.01) 
  
First Term Dummy 
0.06 
(0.17) 
-0.25              
(0.20) 
-0.23 
 (0.23) 
0.08  
(0.16) 
-0.13       
(0.16) 
0.10 
(0.21) 
 
Competitive 
Election 
0.07 
(0.16) 
 0.34     
(0.23) 
-0.12  
(0.22) 
 0.30* 
(0.15) 
0.16         
(0.17) 
 0.19 
(0.13) 
  
Party Leader  
-0.07 
(0.29) 
 0.15    
 (0.44) 
-1.02** 
(0.38) 
 -0.70* 
(0.30) 
-0.68*      
(0.27) 
 -0.42 
(0.29) 
  
Committee Leader  
-0.15 
(0.22) 
 -0.01     
(0.23) 
-0.46#  
(0.25) 
 -0.34 
(0.21) 
-0.30        
(0.24) 
 -0.01 
(0.25) 
  
Progressive 
Ambition 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
 0.03     
(0.11) 
-0.06  
(0.09) 
 -0.42** 
(0.13) 
-0.13      
 (0.14) 
 -0.11 
(0.11) 
  
Chamber 
0.20 
(0.23) 
-0.37#   
(0.19) 
0.19   
(0.18) 
-0.16  
(0.17) 
0.22        
(0.22) 
-0.12 
(0.20) 
 
Term Limits  
0.41# 
(0.22) 
 0.25     
(0.28) 
0.02     
(0.34) 
 -0.04 
(0.21) 
-0.04      
(0.16) 
 -0.32 
(0.20) 
  
Professionalism 
-3.48** 
(1.18) 
 -0.47     
(1.35) 
-2.38  
(1.52) 
 -1.29 
(0.80) 
1.22              
(0.77) 
 0.46 
(0.56) 
  
Number of Cases 
L1: 600   
L2: 45 
L1: 599 
L2: 45 
L1: 595 
L2: 45 
L1: 596 
L2: 45 
L1: 594 
L2: 45 
L1: 596 
L2: 45 
  
Note: cell entries employ ordinal logistic regression.  
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 3.3. Personality and Time Spent Engaging in Various Legislative Behaviors (cont.)     
                
  Committees  Legislative Issues Studying Debate Caucuses     
Constant 
-3.61***         
(0.63) 
-3.21***               
(0.74) 
-4.08**      
(1.18) 
-1.80 **   
(0.60) 
-1.60** 
(0.46) 
  
Openness to 
Experience 
-0.94*               
(0.41) 
-0.23                       
(0.41) 
-1.94***       
(0.48) 
 -0.28    
(0.34) 
-0.53 
 (0.38) 
    
Conscientiousness 
-1.39**               
(0.48) 
-0.68#                      
(0.41) 
-1.01*       
(0.44) 
 -1.01*    
(0.40) 
0.09  
(0.29) 
    
Extraversion 
-0.13                  
(0.50) 
-0.33                     
(0.35) 
0.18  
(0.37) 
 -0.80*      
(0.34) 
-0.27  
(0.32) 
    
Agreeableness 
0.00                 
(0.40) 
-0.32                        
(0.46) 
0.79  
(0.52) 
 -1.08*    
(0.45) 
-0.89#  
(0.48) 
    
Emotional 
Stability 
0.24                     
(0.40) 
0.13                        
(0.39) 
-0.71                
(0.46) 
 -0.05               
(0.30) 
0.43 
(0.46) 
    
Gender 
-0.39*               
(0.17) 
-0.53***               
(0.13) 
-0.55**      
(0.18) 
 -0.12    
(0.15) 
-0.17  
(0.15) 
    
Race 
0.11                    
(0.32) 
-0.12               
 (0.25) 
0.00  
(0.30) 
 0.25     
(0.30) 
-0.50  
(0.36) 
    
Party Affiliation 
0.21                   
(0.16) 
-0.06                 
(0.18) 
-0.21       
 (0.16) 
 -0.01     
(0.22) 
-0.08 
(0.17) 
    
Majority 
-0.19                  
(0.15) 
-0.46**               
(0.17) 
-0.22       
(0.17) 
 -0.26    
(0.19) 
0.30# 
(0.16) 
    
Years in Office 
0.00                   
(0.02) 
-0.03                
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 0.00      
(0.02) 
0.00  
(0.02) 
    
First Term 
Dummy 
-0.08           
(0.25) 
0.01                
 (0.21) 
0.04          
(0.21) 
0.44*              
(0.21) 
-0.16 
(0.21) 
  
Competitive 
Election 
-0.02                 
(0.18) 
-0.08                       
(0.14) 
-0.02        
(0.17) 
 -0.03      
(0.21) 
-0.09  
(0.16) 
    
Party Leader  
0.70#                     
(0.38) 
-0.33                      
(0.36) 
0.06  
(0.35) 
 -0.43    
(0.38) 
0.07                           
(0.31) 
    
Committee 
Leader  
0.17                   
(0.25) 
0.19                       
(0.27) 
0.26  
(0.22) 
 -0.23    
(0.21) 
0.48* 
(0.21) 
    
Progressive 
Ambition 
-0.05                    
(0.11) 
-0.12                       
(0.09) 
-0.07       
(0.10) 
 -0.03      
(0.11) 
-0.10  
(0.10) 
    
Chamber 
-0.14                   
(0.18) 
-0.25                       
(0.18) 
0.32#  
(0.19) 
-0.08      
(0.22) 
0.27 
(0.22) 
  
Term Limits  
0.07                   
(0.22) 
-0.16                       
(0.33) 
0.05  
(0.14) 
 0.23     
(0.36) 
0.14  
(0.21) 
    
Professionalism 
-0.80                  
(0.97) 
-2.55*                    
(1.15) 
-2.18*      
 (0.86) 
 -1.56     
(1.22) 
-1.11  
(1.14) 
    
Number of Cases 
L1:  594 
L2: 45 
L1: 601 
L2: 45 
L1: 599 
L2: 45 
L1: 596 
L2: 45 
L1: 599 
L2: 45  
  
Note: cell entries employ ordinal logistic regression.  
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 3.4. Personality and Time Spent Engaging in Various Legislative Behaviors     
                
  
Minimal 
Factor One 
  
Full Factor 
One  
  Factor Two     
Constant 
0.20***     
(0.04) 
 
0.22***   
(0.04) 
 
0.56***       
(0.04) 
  
Openness to Experience 
 0.10**     
(0.04) 
  
 0.10**   
(0.03) 
  
0.08**       
(0.03) 
    
Conscientiousness 
 0.05*     
(0.03) 
  
 0.06*   
(0.03) 
  
0.10**      
(0.03) 
    
Extraversion 
0.08**     
(0.03) 
  
 0.09***   
(0.02) 
  
0.03       
(0.03) 
    
Agreeableness 
0.09*      
(0.04) 
  
0.07*   
(0.04) 
  
0.01       
(0.04) 
    
Emotional Stability 
 -0.01    
(0.03) 
  
 0.02           
(0.03) 
  
0.02        
(0.03) 
    
Gender 
 0.01     
(0.01) 
  
 0.01   
(0.01) 
  
0.04***      
(0.01) 
    
Race 
 0.02     
(0.02) 
  
0.01   
(0.03) 
  
-0.01      
(0.02) 
    
Party Affiliation 
 0.02     
(0.01) 
  
 0.02  
(0.01) 
  
0.00       
(0.01) 
    
Majority 
 -0.01    
(0.01) 
  
 0.01  
(0.01) 
  
0.03***      
(0.01) 
    
Years in Office 
0.00     
(0.00) 
  
0.00   
(0.00) 
  
0.00         
(0.00) 
    
First Term Dummy 
0.01                
(0.01) 
 
0.01     
(0.02) 
 
-0.01      
(0.02) 
  
Competitive Election 
 -0.02    
(0.02) 
  
 -0.02 
(0.02) 
  
0.01       
(0.01) 
    
Party Leader  
 0.06*     
(0.03) 
  
0.08**   
(0.02) 
  
0.00       
(0.02) 
    
Committee Leader  
 0.03#     
(0.02) 
  
 0.04#   
(0.02) 
  
-0.01      
(0.02) 
    
Progressive Ambition 
 0.02*     
(0.01) 
  
 0.02   
(0.01) 
  
0.01       
(0.01) 
    
Chamber 
0.01      
(0.01) 
 
0.00   
(0.02) 
 
0.00       
(0.02) 
  
Term Limits  
-0.02     
(0.02) 
  
-0.01   
(0.02) 
  
0.00       
(0.02) 
    
Professionalism 
0.22#      
(0.11) 
  
0.11    
(0.10) 
  
0.19*       
(0.08) 
    
Number of Cases 
L1: 590 
L2: 45 
  
L1: 581 
L2: 45 
  
L1: 625  
L2: 45 
    
Note: cell entries employ restricted maximum likelihood regression. 
 *** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 4.1 Personality, Introductions, and Cosponsorship 
  Measures Introduced Measures Cosponsored  
Constant 
2.45***  
(0.24) 
3.90*** 
(0.37) 
Openness to Experience 
0.04  
(0.17) 
0.15  
(0.17) 
Conscientiousness 
0.00 
(0.11) 
0.00  
(0.11) 
Extraversion 
0.04  
(0.13) 
0.01  
(0.09) 
Agreeableness  
0.12 
(0.14) 
-0.11  
(0.10) 
Emotional Stability 
-0.12  
(0.13) 
0.03  
(0.11) 
Party Affiliation 
-0.10                     
(0.11) 
-0.06  
(0.05) 
Majority 
0.19**  
(0.06) 
-0.06#  
(0.03) 
Years in Office 
0.01# 
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
First Term Dummy  
-0.34*** 
(0.07) 
-0.05  
(0.06) 
Competitive Election 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.06*  
(0.03) 
Party Leader 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.16*  
(0.07) 
Committee Leader 
0.14** 
(0.05) 
-0.01  
(0.03) 
Progressive Ambition 
0.07# 
(0.04) 
0.03  
(0.03) 
Chamber 
0.42*** 
(0.08) 
-0.01  
(0.12) 
Professionalism 
2.80*  
(1.07) 
4.82**  
(1.34) 
N 
L1: 846; L2: 356;      
L3: 27 
L1: 789; L2: 356 
L3: 27 
Note: cell entries employ Poisson regression with overdispersion. 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 4.2 Personality and Legislative Effectiveness   
  
Measures 
Introduced and 
Passed 
Measures 
Introduced or 
Cosponsored and 
Passed  
% Measures 
Introduced 
and Passed 
% Measures Introduced 
or Cosponsored and 
Passed 
Constant 
0.69*  
(0.31) 
1.97*** 
(0.35) 
0.23***  
(0.06) 
0.18*  
(0.08) 
Openness to 
Experience 
0.29#  
(0.18) 
0.49**  
(0.18) 
0.03  
(0.03) 
0.06***  
(0.02) 
Conscientiousness 
-0.09  
(0.15) 
-0.21  
(0.25) 
-0.03  
(0.04) 
-0.03  
(0.02) 
Extraversion 
-0.30  
(0.20) 
-0.10  
(0.09) 
-0.02  
(0.03) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
Agreeableness  
0.63***  
(0.15) 
0.05  
(0.17) 
0.07*  
(0.03) 
0.04**  
(0.02) 
Emotional Stability 
-0.53** 
(0.17) 
-0.04  
(0.30) 
-0.07# 
(0.04) 
-0.04#  
(0.02) 
Gender 
0.15**  
(0.06) 
0.23*  
(0.11) 
0.03#  
(0.01) 
0.02#  
(0.01) 
Race 
-0.42***  
(0.11) 
-0.15** 
(0.05) 
-0.06**  
(0.02) 
-0.02  
(0.01) 
Party Affiliation 
0.02  
(0.11) 
-0.04  
(0.07) 
0.02  
(0.02) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
Majority 
0.47***  
(0.12) 
0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0.08**  
(0.03) 
0.04**  
(0.01) 
Years in Office 
0.02**  
(0.01) 
0.01#  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
First Term Dummy 
-0.23**  
(0.08) 
0.00  
(0.07) 
0.01  
(0.02) 
0.02*  
(0.01) 
Competitive Election  
-0.06  
(0.06) 
0.00  
(0.05) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
Party Leader 
0.01  
(0.25) 
-0.04  
(0.17) 
-0.01  
(0.03) 
0.02  
(0.03) 
Committee Leader 
0.34*** 
(0.07) 
0.20***  
(0.06) 
0.04*  
(0.02) 
0.02#  
(0.01) 
Majority*Party 
Leader 
-0.06                     
(0.24) 
-0.23                     
(0.21) 
0.04            
(0.05) 
-0.03                                    
(0.04) 
Majority*Committee 
Leader 
-0.01                              
(0.14) 
-0.22*                              
(0.06) 
-0.01            
(0.02) 
-0.01                                       
(0.02) 
Majority*Tenure 
0.06                                 
(0.07) 
-0.02                             
(0.05) 
0.00                    
(0.02) 
0.01                                         
(0.01) 
Progressive 
Ambition 
0.14**  
(0.05) 
0.11#  
(0.06) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
0.01*  
(0.01) 
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Table 4.2 Personality and Legislative Effectiveness (cont.)   
Chamber 
0.73***  
(0.10) 
0.25**  
(0.08) 
0.05*  
(0.02) 
0.03**  
(0.01) 
Professionalism 
0.98  
(1.64) 
4.48**  
(1.43) 
-0.62* 
(0.29) 
-0.23  
(0.36) 
Note: cell entries for measures introduced and passed and all measures introduced or cosponsored and passed 
employ Poisson regression with overdispersion, while cell entries for percent measures introduced and passed and 
percent all measures introduced or cosponsored and passed employ ordinary least squares regression. 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 4.3 Personality and Cosponsorship  
  Conscientiousness2 Extraversion2 Agreeableness2 
Constant 
3.63***  
(0.37) 
3.57***  
(0.35) 
3.74***  
(0.33) 
Openness to 
Experience 
0.14  
(0.17) 
0.17 
(0.17) 
0.16                                       
(0.17) 
Conscientiousness 
0.86*  
(0.34) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.01                                 
(0.11) 
Extraversion 
0.01  
(0.09) 
1.17* 
(0.46) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
Agreeableness  
-0.11  
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
0.54  
(0.37) 
Emotional 
Stability 
0.03  
(0.11) 
0.00  
(0.11) 
0.02  
(0.11) 
Personality Term
2
 
-0.62*  
(0.31) 
-0.95*  
(0.37) 
-0.56# 
(0.31) 
Party Affiliation 
-0.06  
(0.05) 
-0.05  
(0.05) 
-0.05  
(0.05) 
Majority 
-0.06#  
(0.03) 
-0.06*  
(0.03) 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
Years in Office 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
First Term 
Dummy  
-0.06*  
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
Competitive 
Election 
-0.06*  
(0.03) 
-0.06*  
(0.03) 
-0.06*  
(0.03) 
Party Leader 
-0.16*  
(0.07) 
-0.16*  
(0.07) 
-0.16*  
(0.07) 
Committee 
Leader 
-0.01  
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Progressive 
Ambition 
0.02  
(0.03) 
0.03  
(0.03) 
0.03  
(0.03) 
Chamber 
-0.01  
(0.12) 
-0.01  
(0.11) 
-0.01  
(0.12) 
Professionalism 
4.81** 
(1.34) 
4.79** 
(1.37) 
4.82**  
(1.34) 
Note: cell entries employ Poisson regression with overdisperson. 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 4.4 Personality and Total Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed 
  Openness to Experience2 Extraversion2 
Constant 
1.42*  1.70*** 
-0.58 -0.41 
Openness to Experience 
2.24*  0.50** 
-0.95 -0.18 
Conscientiousness 
-0.24 -0.19 
-0.26 -0.25 
Extraversion 
-0.07 0.87 
-0.09 -0.54 
Agreeableness  
0.08 0.08 
-0.16 -0.17 
Emotional Stability 
-0.04 -0.07 
-0.30 -0.3 
Personality Term
2
 
-1.30* -0.80*  
-0.61 -0.4 
Gender 
0.25*  0.24*  
-0.11 -0.11 
Race 
-0.13**  -0.14**  
-0.05 -0.05 
Party Affiliation 
-0.03 -0.04 
-0.07 -0.07 
Majority 
0.30***  0.29*** 
-0.09 -0.09 
Years in Office 
0.02*  0.01#  
-0.01 -0.01 
First Term Dummy 
0.00 0.01# 
-0.07 -0.07 
Competitive Election  
0.01 0.00 
-0.05 -0.05 
Party Leader 
-0.04 -0.03 
-0.17 -0.17 
Committee Leader 
0.20***  0.21*** 
-0.05 -0.05 
Majority*Party Leader 
-0.23 -0.24  
-0.21 -0.22 
Majority*Committee Leader 
-0.22# -0.22# 
-0.08 -0.08 
Majority*Tenure 
-0.02  -0.01  
-0.05 -0.05 
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Table 4.4 Personality and Total Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed (cont.) 
  Openness to Experience2 Extraversion2 
Progressive Ambition 
0.12#  0.11# 
-0.06 -0.06 
Chamber 
0.25*** 0.24**  
-0.08 -0.07 
Professionalism 
4.40** 4.45**  
-1.4 -1.44 
 Note: cell entries employ Poisson regression with overdispersion. 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 4.5 The Interaction of Tenure and Conscientiousness and Legislative Effectiveness 
  
Measures 
Introduced and 
Passed 
All Measures Introduced 
or Cosponsored and 
Passed  
Percent All Measures 
Introduced or Cosponsored 
and Passed 
Constant 
0.60# 2.06***  0.21*  
-0.33 -0.34 -0.08 
Openness to Experience 
0.28 0.49**  0.06***  
-0.17 -0.17 -0.02 
Conscientiousness 
0.04 -0.33 -0.06**  
-0.16 -0.28 -0.02 
Extraversion 
-0.29 -0.12 -0.02# 
-0.21 -0.09 -0.01 
Agreeableness  
0.65***  0.04 0.04*  
-0.15 -0.17 -0.02 
Emotional Stability 
-0.54**  -0.03 -0.04# 
-0.17 -0.3 -0.02 
Gender 
0.14*  0.23*  0.02#  
-0.05 -0.11 -0.01 
Race 
-0.43***  -0.14** -0.02 
-0.11 -0.05 -0.01 
Years in Office 
0.05*** -0.01 -0.01 
-0.02 -0.01 0 
Years in 
Office*Conscientiousness 
-0.04*  0.04*  0.01*  
-0.02 -0.02 0 
First Term Dummy 
-0.23**  0 0.02#  
-0.07 -0.07 -0.01 
Party Affiliation 
0.02 -0.04 0.01 
-0.11 -0.07 -0.01 
Majority  
0.46***  0.30*** 0.04** 
-0.12 -0.09 -0.01 
Competitive Election 
-0.06 0 0.01 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.01 
Party Leader 
0.02 -0.05 0.02 
-0.24 -0.18 -0.03 
Committee Leader 
0.35*** 0.20***  0.02*  
-0.07 -0.05 -0.01 
Progressive Ambition 
0.14** 0.11#  0.01*  
-0.05 -0.06 -0.01 
Majority*Party Leader 
-0.07 -0.23 -0.03 
-0.23 -0.22 -0.04 
Majority*Committee Leader 
-0.01 -0.22* -0.01 
-0.14 -0.09 -0.04 
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Table 4.5 The Interaction of Tenure and Conscientiousness and Legislative Effectiveness (cont.) 
  
Measures Introduced 
and Passed 
All Measures Introduced 
or Cosponsored and 
Passed  
Percent All Measures 
Introduced or 
Cosponsored and Passed 
Majority*Tenure 
0.06 -0.02 0.01 
-0.07 -0.05 -0.01 
Chamber 
0.74***  0.24**  0.03*  
-0.1 -0.08 -0.01 
Professionalism 
0.9 4.53**  -0.23 
-1.62 -1.45 -0.36 
Note: cell entries for measures introduced and passed and all measures introduced or cosponsored and passed 
employ Poisson regression with overdispersion, while cell entries for percent all measures introduced or 
cosponsored and passed employ ordinary least squares regression. 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 4.6 The Interaction of Conscientiousness and Professionalism 
  Introductions Cosponsorship 
Constant 
2.69***  
(0.29) 
4.18*** 
(0.38) 
Openness to Experience 
0.04 
(0.18) 
0.16  
(0.17) 
Conscientiousness 
-0.38*  
(0.19) 
-0.44** 
(0.14) 
Extraversion 
0.06  
(0.13) 
0.02                   
(0.08) 
Agreeableness  
0.10                            
(0.14) 
-0.12  
(0.10) 
Emotional Stability 
-0.09  
(0.14) 
0.05  
(0.11) 
Professionalism 
1.31  
(1.37) 
3.06*  
(1.43) 
Conscientiousness*Professionalism 
2.20* 
(0.85)  
2.58**  
(0.89) 
Party Affiliation 
-0.10  
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
Majority 
0.19**  
(0.07) 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
Years in Office  
0.01# 
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
First Term Dummy 
-0.34***  
(0.07) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
Competitive Election 
-0.07*  
(0.04) 
-0.06*  
(0.03) 
Party Leader 
-0.03  
(0.09) 
-0.16*  
(0.07) 
Committee Leader 
0.14**  
(0.05) 
-0.01  
(0.03) 
Progressive Ambition 
0.07#  
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Chamber 
0.43***  
(0.08) 
-0.01  
(0.12) 
Note: cell entries employ Poisson regression with overdispersion. 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 4.7 The Interaction of Tenure and Agreeableness on Legislative Behavior 
  Measures Cosponsored 
All Measures Introduced or 
Cosponsored and Passed  
Constant 
3.97*** 2.06*** 
-0.38 -0.33 
Openness to Experience 
0.16 0.49**  
-0.17 -0.17 
Conscientiousness 
0 -0.21 
-0.11 -0.24 
Extraversion 
0.01 -0.09 
-0.09 -0.09 
Agreeableness  
-0.24*  -0.1 
-0.11 -0.19 
Emotional Stability 
0.03 -0.04 
-0.11 -0.3 
Years in Office 
-0.02 -0.01 
-0.01 -0.01 
Years in Office*Agreeableness 
0.03** 0.04**  
-0.01 -0.01 
First Term Dummy 
-0.05 0 
-0.06 -0.07 
Party Affiliation 
-0.05 -0.04 
-0.05 -0.07 
Majority 
-0.06#  0.29***  
-0.03 -0.09 
Competitive Election  
-0.07*  0 
-0.03 -0.06 
Party Leader 
-0.16*  -0.05 
-0.07 -0.17 
Committee Leader 
-0.01 0.20***  
-0.03 -0.06 
Progressive Ambition 
0.02 0.11#  
-0.03 -0.06 
Chamber 
-0.01 0.25*** 
-0.12 -0.08 
Professionalism 
4.85***  4.50**  
-1.34 -1.43 
Gender   
0.23*  
-0.1 
Race   
-0.15**  
-0.05 
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Table 4.7 The Interaction of Tenure and Agreeableness on Legislative Behavior (cont.) 
  Measures Cosponsored 
All Measures Introduced or 
Cosponsored and Passed  
Majority*Party Leader   
-0.22 
-0.21 
Majority*Committee Leader   
 -0.22* 
-0.09 
Majority*Tenure   
-0.01 
-0.05 
Note: cell entries employ Poisson regression with overdispersion. 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 4.8 The Interaction of Tenure and Extraversion on Legislative Effectiveness 
  
All Measures Introduced or 
Cosponsored and Passed 
Percent All Measures 
Introduced or Cosponsored 
and Passed  
Constant 
2.02*** 0.19*  
-0.33 -0.08 
Openness to Experience 
0.49**  0.06***  
-0.18 -0.02 
Conscientiousness 
-0.22 -0.03 
-0.25 -0.02 
Extraversion 
-0.17#  -0.03*  
-0.09 -0.01 
Agreeableness  
0.06 0.04**  
-0.17 -0.02 
Emotional Stability 
-0.05 -0.04#  
-0.29 -0.02 
Years in Office 
0.00 0.00 
-0.01 0.00 
Years in Office*Extraversion 
0.02#  0.00#  
-0.01 0.00 
First Term Dummy 
0.00 0.02#  
-0.07 -0.01 
Party Affiliation 
-0.04 0.01 
-0.07 -0.01 
Majority 
0.29***  0.04**  
-0.09 -0.01 
Competitive Election  
0.00 0.01 
-0.05 -0.01 
Party Leader 
-0.05 0.02 
-0.18 -0.03 
Committee Leader 
0.20***  0.02#  
-0.06 -0.01 
Progressive Ambition 
0.11#  0.01*  
-0.06 -0.01 
Chamber 
0.24**  0.03* 
-0.08 -0.01 
Professionalism 
4.50** -0.23 
-1.44 -0.36 
Gender 
0.23*  0.02#  
-0.11 -0.01 
Race 
-0.15**  -0.02 
-0.05 -0.01 
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Table 4.8 The Interaction of Tenure and Extraversion on Legislative Effectiveness (cont.) 
  
All Measures Introduced or 
Cosponsored and Passed 
Percent All Measures 
Introduced or Cosponsored 
and Passed  
Majority*Party Leader 
-0.22 -0.03 
-0.22 -0.04 
Majority*Committee Leader 
-0.22* -0.01 
-0.09 -0.02 
Majority*Tenure 
-0.02 0.01 
-0.05 -0.01 
Note: cell entries for all measures introduced or cosponsored and passed employ Poisson regression with 
overdispersion, while cell entries for percent all measures introduced or cosponsored and passed employ ordinary 
least squares regression. 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 5.1. Self-Reported Measures of Time Spent Engaging in Various Legislative Activities 
  Almost None A Little 
A Moderate 
Amount 
A Great Deal 
Meeting with Citizens in the District 
(N=745) 
M: 0.8  
F:  0.9 
M: 11.5 
F:  8.3 
M: 38.6 
F:  53.0 
M: 49.1 
F:  37.8 
Meeting with Constituents at the 
Capital (N=744) 
M: 6.4           
F:  9.2 
M: 31.0 
F: 31.0 
M: 45.6 
F:  46.7 
M: 17.0 
F: 13.1 
Engaging in Fundraising (N=739) 
M: 24.0 
F: 23.1 
M: 41.1 
F:  40.6 
M: 30.9 
F:  26.6 
M: 3.9 
F:  9.6 
Attending Committee Meetings, 
Markups, and Other Meetings (N=739) 
M: 0.8 
F:  0.0 
M: 4.5 
F:  3.5 
M: 38.4 
F:  26.4 
M: 56.3 
F: 70.0 
Meeting in the State Capital on 
Legislative Issues (N=745) 
M: 1.0 
F: 0.0 
M: 9.2 
F: 8.3 
M: 48.1 
F: 39.6 
M: 41.7 
F: 52.2 
Studying, Reading, or Discussing 
Pending Legislation (N=743) 
M: 0.2 
F: 0.0 
M: 2.9 
F: 0.9 
M: 38.4 
F: 27.0 
M: 58.5 
F: 72.2 
Working with Informal Caucuses 
(N=743) 
M: 9.4 
F: 5.7 
M: 31.6 
F: 31.6 
M: 43.5 
F: 42.5 
M: 15.6 
F: 20.2 
Attending Floor Debate (N=741) 
M: 2.5 
F: 0.9 
M: 8.0 
F: 8.8  
M: 32.5 
F: 29.4 
M: 56.9 
F: 61.0 
Working with Party Leaders to Build 
Coalitions (N=736) 
M: 11.0 
F: 8.4 
M: 26.8 
F: 24.8 
M: 42.9 
F: 48.7 
M: 19.3 
F: 18.1 
Overseeing how Agencies Carry Out 
Policies and Programs (N=739) 
M: 7.6  
F: 8.0 
M: 31.1 
F: 34.5 
M: 43.2 
F: 39.4 
M: 18.0 
F: 18.1 
Giving Speeches Outside the District 
about Legislation (N=740) 
M: 25.1 
F: 26.3 
M: 39.6 
F: 48.2 
M: 28.2 
F: 22.8 
M: 7.1 
F: 2.6 
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Table 5.2 Conscientiousness, Gender, and Legislative Activities  
  
Bare Factor 
One 
Full Factor 
One 
Citizens Coalitions Caucuses Oversight 
Constant 
0.23*** 
(0.04) 
0.20***  
(0.04) 
-2.39** 
(0.79) 
-0.40 
(0.43) 
-1.29** 
(0.47) 
-0.32 
(0.50) 
Openness to Experience 
0.10**  
(0.04) 
0.10** 
(0.03) 
-0.39 
(0.41) 
-0.53 
(0.37) 
-0.53 
(0.38) 
-0.70* 
(0.33) 
Conscientiousness 
0.09**  
(0.11) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-1.75*** 
(0.33) 
-0.98* 
(0.40) 
-0.46 
(0.37) 
-0.68# 
(0.40) 
Extraversion 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.78* 
(0.33) 
-0.86** 
(0.33) 
-0.22 
(0.33) 
-0.15 
(0.29) 
Agreeableness  
0.09* 
(0.04) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
-0.60 
(0.53) 
-0.18 
(0.45) 
-0.89# 
(0.46) 
-0.47 
(0.35) 
Emotional Stability 
0.00  
(0.03) 
0.02  
(0.03) 
-0.16 
(0.40) 
-0.33 
(0.43) 
0.41 
(0.45) 
-0.34 
(0.34) 
Gender 
0.08* 
(0.03) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
-1.22** 
(0.46) 
-1.21* 
(0.53) 
-1.46* 
(0.59) 
-1.03* 
(0.50) 
Gender*Conscientiousness 
-0.09*                                                           
(0.04) 
-0.15***
(0.04) 
1.93** 
(0.62) 
1.66* 
(0.72) 
1.84* 
(0.80) 
1.57** 
(0.61) 
Race 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01  
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.30) 
0.40  
(0.26) 
-0.47 
(0.36) 
-0.06 
(0.36) 
Party Affiliation 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02  
(0.01) 
-0.20 
(0.18) 
0.09  
(0.19) 
-0.07 
(0.17) 
-0.27 
(0.18) 
Majority 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.14 
(0.18) 
0.12  
(0.18) 
0.31# 
(0.16) 
-0.49** 
(0.18) 
Chamber 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.21 
(0.23) 
0.22  
(0.22) 
0.26 
(0.23) 
-0.12 
(0.21) 
Years in Office 
0.00  
(0.00) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
0.02# 
(0.01) 
-0.02# 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.03* 
(0.01) 
First Term Dummy  
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.16) 
-0.12 
(0.15) 
-0.15 
(0.21) 
0.11  
(0.21) 
Competitive Election 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02  
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.16) 
0.16  
(0.16) 
-0.08 
(0.16) 
0.20  
(0.14) 
Party Leader 
0.06*  
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.30) 
-0.63* 
(0.27) 
0.11 
(0.30) 
-0.36 
(0.29) 
Committee Leader 
0.03# 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.16 
(0.21) 
-0.31 
(0.24) 
0.47* 
(0.21) 
-0.04 
(0.25) 
Progressive Ambition 
0.02*  
(0.01) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.15) 
-0.10 
(0.10) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
Term Limits 
-0.02  
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
0.42# 
(0.23) 
-0.05 
(0.16) 
0.14 
(0.21) 
-0.33 
(0.20) 
 
 
203 
  
Table 5.2 Conscientiousness, Gender, and Legislative Activities (cont.)   
  
Bare 
Factor 
One 
Full 
Factor 
One 
Citizens Coalitions Caucuses Oversight 
Professionalism 
0.22# 0.12 -3.58** 
(1.20) 
1.17 -1.22  
(1.13) 
0.46 
(-0.11) (-0.10) (-0.80) (-0.57) 
Note: cell entries for bare factor one and full factor one are ordinary least squares coefficients and cell entries for 
citizens, coalitions, caucuses, and oversight are ordered logistic regression coefficients. 
***p < .001 ** p < .01   *p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 5.3 Emotional Stability, Gender, and Legislative Activity 
  
Bare Factor 
One 
Full Factor One Constituents 
Constant 
0.23*** 0.20***  -0.44 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.54) 
Openness to Experience 
0.11**  0.10**  -1.05***  
(0.04) (0.03) (0.39) 
Conscientiousness 
0.06* 0.06*  -0.18 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.38) 
Extraversion 
0.08*** 0.09***  -0.44 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.28) 
Agreeableness  
0.09* 0.07*  -1.04*  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.47) 
Emotional Stability 
0.03 0.04 -1.24**  
(0.04) (0.03) (0.44) 
Gender 
0.08* 0.06 -0.90#  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.48) 
Gender*Emotional Stability 
-0.11  
(0.06) 
-0.09 1.41*  
(0.06) (0.65) 
Race 
0.02 0.01 -0.72#  
(0.02) (0.03) (0.42) 
Party Affiliation 
0.02 0.02 -0.26 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.19) 
Majority 
-0.01 0.01 0.19 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.17) 
Chamber 
0.01 0.00 -0.36#  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.20) 
Years in Office 
0.00 0.00 -0.02 
(0.00) (0.00 (0.02) 
First Term Dummy  
0.01 0.01 -0.24 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.20) 
Competitive Election 
-0.02 -0.02 0.33 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.24) 
Party Leader 
0.06*  0.08***  0.14 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.44) 
Committee Leader 
0.03# 0.04*  -0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.23) 
Progressive Ambition 
0.02*  0.02 0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.11) 
Term Limits 
-0.02 -0.01 0.26 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.28) 
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Table 5.3 Emotional Stability, Gender, and Legislative Activity (cont.) 
  Bare Factor One Full Factor One Constituents 
Professionalism 
0.22# 0.11 -0.44 
(0.11) (0.10) (1.34) 
Note: all entries for bare factor one and full factor one are ordinary least squares coefficients and cell entries for 
constituents are ordered logistic regression coefficients. 
***p < .001 ** p < .01   *p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 5.4 Emotional Stability, Gender, and Legislative Effectiveness 
  Introductions % Introductions Passed 
%All  Measures 
Passed 
Constant 
2.30***  0.26*** 0.22* 
(0.24) (0.06) (0.08) 
Openness to Experience 
0.08 0.02 0.05**  
(0.17) (0.03) (0.02) 
Conscientiousness 
0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
(0.12) (0.04) (0.02) 
Extraversion 
0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
(0.13) (0.03) (0.01) 
Agreeableness  
0.13 0.07* 0.04*** 
(0.14) (0.03) (0.01) 
Emotional Stability 
0.23 -0.10*  -0.08***  
(0.15) (0.04) (0.02) 
Gender 
0.42***  -0.04 -0.07** 
(0.10) -0.04 -0.03 
Gender*Emotional Stability 
-0.62***  0.10#                                                            
(0.05) 
0.15***                                                        
(0.04) (0.14) 
Party Affiliation 
-0.09 0.02 0.01 
(0.11) (0.02) (0.01) 
Chamber 
0.41*** 0.05**  0.04**  
(0.08) (0.02) (0.01) 
Majority 
0.20**  0.08**  0.04**  
(0.07) (0.03) (0.01) 
Years in Office 
0.01 0.00#  0.00 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
First Term Dummy 
-0.35***  0.01 0.02*  
(0.06) (0.02) (0.01) 
Competitive Election  
-0.08*  -0.01 0.01 
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Progressive Ambition 
0.08#  0.01 0.01*  
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Party Leader 
-0.02 -0.02 0.02 
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) 
Committee Leader 
0.14**  0.04**  0.02*  
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
Professionalism 
2.83*  -0.62*  -0.23 
(1.08) (0.29) (0.36) 
Race   
-0.06*** -0.02 
(0.02) (0.01) 
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Table 5.4 Emotional Stability, Gender, and Legislative Effectiveness (cont.) 
  Introductions 
% Introductions  
Passed 
%All  Measures  
Passed 
Majority*Party Leader   
0.04 -0.03 
(0.05) (0.04) 
Majority*Committee Leader   
-0.01 -0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Majority*Tenure   
0.00 0.01 
(0.02) (0.01) 
Note: cell entries for introductions are Poisson regression with overdispersion coefficients and cell entries for 
percentage introductions passed and percentage all measures passed are ordinary least squares coefficients. 
***p < .001 ** p < .01   *p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 5.5 Conscientiousness, Gender, and Legislative Effectiveness 
  % Introductions Passed 
Constant 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
Openness to Experience 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Conscientiousness 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
Extraversion 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Agreeableness  
0.07* 
(0.03) 
Emotional Stability 
-0.07 
(0.04) 
Gender 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Gender*Conscientiousness 
0.10#                                                           
(0.06) 
Party Affiliation 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Chamber 
0.05*  
(0.02) 
Majority 
0.08**  
(0.03) 
Years in Office 
0.00#  
(0.00) 
First Term Dummy 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Competitive Election  
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Progressive Ambition 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Party Leader 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Committee Leader 
0.03*  
(0.02) 
Professionalism 
-0.63*  
(0.29) 
Race 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
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Table 5.5 Conscientiousness, Gender, and Legislative Effectiveness (cont.) 
  % Introductions Passed 
Majority*Party Leader 
0.04 
(0.0)5 
Majority*Committee Leader 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Majority*Tenure 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Note: cell entries for percentage introductions passed are ordinary least squares coefficients. 
***p < .001 ** p < .01   *p < .05 # p<.10  
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Table 5.6 Personality, Gender, Professionalism, and Cosponsorship 
  Extraversion Agreeableness 
Constant 
4.06***  4.12***  
(0.39) (0.35) 
Openness to Experience 
0.13 0.12 
(0.15) (0.15) 
Conscientiousness 
-0.05 -0.03 
(0.11) (0.10) 
Extraversion 
-0.18 0.01 
(0.32) (0.09) 
Agreeableness  
-0.08 -0.42 
(0.10) (0.35) 
Emotional Stability 
0.02 0.03 
(0.11) (0.11) 
Personality Term*Professionalism 
1.21 2.16 
(1.41) (1.46) 
Gender*Professionalism 
3.44***                                                            
(1.08) 
3.38*  
-1.51 
Personality Term*Gender 
0.61 0.54 
(0.44) (0.51) 
Personality Term*Gender*Professionalism 
-4.04*  -4.46*  
(1.81) (2.25) 
Party Affiliation 
-0.03 -0.03 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Majority 
-0.07*  -0.07*  
-0.03 (0.03) 
Years in Office 
0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) 
First Term Dummy  
-0.06 -0.06 
(0.06) (0.06) 
Competitive Election 
-0.06# -0.06#  
(0.03) (0.03) 
Party Leader 
-0.15#  -0.15*  
(0.08) (0.08) 
Committee Leader 
-0.01 -0.01 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Progressive Ambition 
0.02 0.02 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Chamber 
-0.01 -0.02 
(0.12) (0.12) 
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Table 5.6 Personality, Gender, Professionalism, and Cosponsorship (cont.) 
  Extraversion Agreeableness 
Professionalism 
3.73*  3.28* 
(1.56) (1.49) 
Note: cell entries are Poisson regression with overdispersion coefficients. 
***p < .001 ** p < .01   *p < .05 # p<.10 
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Table 5.7 The Effect of Openness, Gender, and Professionalism on Legislative Effectiveness 
  Introductions 
Constant 
0.23** 
(0.08) 
Openness to Experience 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
Conscientiousness 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Extraversion 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Agreeableness  
0.04*  
(0.02) 
Emotional Stability 
-0.05#  
(0.15) 
Gender 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
Gender*Professionalism 
0.58 
(0.40) 
Gender*Openness 
0.17*  
(0.07) 
Openness*Professionalism 
0.30 
(0.33) 
Gender*Openness*Professionalism 
-0.71#  
(0.40) 
Party Affiliation 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Chamber 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
Majority 
0.04**  
(0.01) 
Years in Office 
0.00 
(0.00) 
First Term Dummy 
0.02*  
(0.01) 
Competitive Election  
0.01 
(0.01) 
Progressive Ambition 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Party Leader 
0.02 
(0.03) 
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Table 5.7 The Effect of Openness, Gender, and Professionalism on Legislative Effectiveness (cont.) 
  Introductions 
Committee Leader 
0.02#  
(0.01) 
Professionalism 
-0.46 
(0.36) 
Race 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Majority*Party Leader 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
Majority*Committee Leader 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Majority*Tenure 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Note: cell entries  are Poisson regression with overdispersion coefficients. 
***p < .001 ** p < .01   *p < .05 # p<.10 
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Figure 4.4 
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Figure 4.5 
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Figure 4.8 
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Appendix A: Survey Instrument 
 
1. Here are a series of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Using the scale 
below20, please tell me which answer indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, 
even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other. 
Sociable and active person  
Critical and quarrelsome person  
Dependable and self-disciplined person 
Anxious and easily upset person 
Open to new experiences and intellectual person 
Quiet and shy person 
Generous and warm person 
Disorganized and careless person 
Calm and emotionally stable person 
Uncreative and unimaginative person 
 
2. Which best describes your attitude toward seeking higher office in the future? 
I would definitely like to run for higher office in the future. 
I might run for higher office in the future if the opportunity presented itself, 
I would not completely rule out running for higher office in the future, but I am currently not 
interested. 
I would absolutely never run for higher office in the future. 
 
3. This year (2010), have Republicans and Democrats in your legislature been working 
together more to solve problems or have they been bickering and opposing one another 
more than usual? 
They have been working together more. 
They have been bickering and opposing one another more than usual. 
There has been no change from previous years. 
 
4. When it comes to politics, do you think of yourself as: 
Extremely Liberal 
Liberal 
Slightly liberal 
Moderate or Middle of the Road 
Slightly Conservative 
Conservative 
Extremely Conservative 
 
5. What about when it comes to economic issues – do you think of yourself as: 
                                                          
20
 Scale used consisted of the following response options: strongly agree; disagree; somewhat disagree; neither 
agree nor disagree; somewhat agree; agree; and, strongly agree. 
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Extremely Liberal 
Liberal 
Slightly liberal 
Moderate or Middle of the Road 
Slightly Conservative 
Conservative 
Extremely Conservative 
 
6. And what about when it comes to social issues – do you think of yourself as: 
Extremely Liberal 
Liberal 
Slightly liberal 
Moderate or Middle of the Road 
Slightly Conservative 
Conservative 
Extremely Conservative 
 
7. Think of the other members of your legislature. When it comes to politics, do you think the 
other members of your legislature are generally: 
Extremely Liberal 
Liberal 
Slightly liberal 
Moderate or Middle of the Road 
Slightly Conservative 
Conservative 
Extremely Conservative 
 
8. What is your party affiliation? 
Democrat 
Independent/Other 
Republican 
 
9. Do you believe that the compensation received by legislators in your state is too much, too 
little, or about right? 
Too much 
Too little 
About right 
 
10. Do you believe that the number of days your legislature spends in session is too much, 
too little, or about right? 
Too much 
Too little 
About right 
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11. Do you believe that the number of legislative staff working in your legislature is adequate, 
inadequate, or about right? 
Adequate 
Inadequate 
About right 
 
12. The following is a series of statements about your state’s legislature. Using the scale 
below21, please tell me the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement. 
Increasing legislator compensation would improve the quality of work done by legislators 
Increasing legislator compensation would improve the quality of legislator that serves in your 
state’s legislature 
Increasing the number of days in session would improve the quality of work done by legislators 
Increasing the number of days in session would improve the quality of legislator that serves in 
your state’s legislature 
Increasing the number of legislative staff would improve the quality of work done by legislators 
Increasing the number of staff would improve the quality of legislator that serves in your 
legislature 
 
13. How much time do you spend engaging in each of the following activities22: 
Meeting with citizens in your district  
Meeting with constituents in the state capital  
Engaging in fundraising activities  
Attending committee hearings, markups, and other meetings 
Meeting in state capital on legislative issues  
Studying, reading, or discussing pending legislation  
Working with informal caucuses  
Attending floor debate (a great deal, a moderate amount, a little, almost none) 
Working with party leaders to build coalitions  
Overseeing how agencies are carrying out policies and programs  
Giving speeches outside district about legislation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 Scale used consisted of the following response options: strongly agree; disagree; somewhat disagree; neither 
agree nor disagree; somewhat agree; agree; and, strongly agree. 
22
 Scale options included: a great deal; a moderate amount; a little; and, almost none. 
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14. Ideally, how much time would you like to spend engaging gin each of the following 
activities23: 
Meeting with citizens in your district  
Meeting with constituents in the state capital  
Engaging in fundraising activities  
Attending committee hearings, markups, and other meetings 
Meeting in state capital on legislative issues  
Studying, reading, or discussing pending legislation  
Working with informal caucuses  
Attending floor debate (a great deal, a moderate amount, a little, almost none) 
Working with party leaders to build coalitions  
Overseeing how agencies are carrying out policies and programs  
Giving speeches outside district about legislation  
 
15. How would you evaluate the quality of legislator that serves in your state’s legislature? 
Very good 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
Very Poor 
 
16. How would you evaluate the overall performance of your state’s legislature? 
Very good 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
Very poor 
 
17. Overall, how professionalized would you say your legislature is? 
Professionalized 
Substantially professionalized 
Marginally professionalized 
Not professionalized 
 
18. Do you believe your state leiglsature is adequately professionalized, or would your state 
benefit from having a more professionalized legislature? 
Adequately professionalized 
Would benefit from having a more professional legislature 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Scale options included: a great deal; a moderate amount; a little; and, almost none. 
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19. Thinking generally, please rank each of the following issues in terms of how you think 
they should be prioritized by the state legislature. Choose 1 for the issue you think should be 
the legislature’s top priority, 2 for the issue that should be the second priority, and so on. 
Taxes 
Same-sex marriage 
Abortion 
Transportation 
Higher Education 
Secondary Education 
Crime 
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Appendix B: Results of T-Tests for Personality and Control Variables  
          
  Full Sample Subset       
Openness 
t=-2.409     
p=0.02 
t=-2.694  
p=0.01       
Conscientiousness 
t=-3.367           
p=0.00 
t=-2.969            
p=0.00       
Extraversion 
t=-1.387       
p=0.17 
t=-1.287 
p=0.20       
Agreeableness 
t=-1.791      
p=0.07 
t=-1.274                      
p=0.20       
Emotional Stability 
t=-0.761            
p=0.07 
t=-0.595                          
p=0.55       
Race 
t=-1.234     
p=0.22 
t=-1.343  
p=0.18       
Party 
t=6.467       
p=0.00 
t=3.639  
p=0.00       
Majority Status 
t=-1.473      
p=0.14 
t=0.765  
p=0.44       
Progressive Ambition 
t=2.667       
p=0.01 
t=0.884  
p=0.38       
First Term Dummy 
t=-0.998      
p=0.32 
t=-1.603  
p=0.11       
Party Leader 
t=1.601      
p=0.11 
t=2.688  
p=0.01       
Committee Leader 
t=2.815       
p=0.01 
t=1.007  
p=0.31       
Competitive Prior Election 
t=-2.474      
p=0.01 
t=-0.788  
p=0.43       
Years in Office 
t=2.428       
p=0.02 
t=4.648  
p=0.00       
Chamber 
t=0.817       
p=0.41 
t=-1.804  
p=0.07       
Professionalism 
t=0.958       
p=0.34 
t=-1.058  
p=0.29       
Term Limits 
t=-0.959      
p=0.34 
t=-1.712  
p=0.09       
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 Appendix C: Results of T-Tests for Dependent Variables       
  
 
      
Meeting with Citizens in the District 
t=1.552 
p=0.12        
Meeting with Constituents at the Capital 
t=1.436 
p=0.15       
Engaging in Fundraising 
t=-1.124 
p=0.26       
Attending Committee Meetings, Markups, and Other Meetings 
t=-3.598 
p=0.00       
Meeting in the State Capital on Legislative Issues 
t=-2.522 
p=0.01       
Studying, Reading, or Discussing Pending Legislation 
t=-4.039 
p=0.00       
Working with Informal Caucuses 
t=-1.763 
p=0.08       
Attending Floor Debate 
t=-1.133 
p=0.00       
Working with Party Leaders to Build Coalitions 
t=-0.858 
p=0.39       
Overseeing how Agencies Carry Out Policies and Programs 
t=0.577 
p=0.32       
Giving Speeches Outside the District about Legislation 
t=2.400 
p=0.02       
Bare Factor One 
t=1.429 
p=0.15       
Full Factor One 
t=0.840 
p=0.40       
Factor Two 
t=-3.665 
p=0.00       
Results of T-Tests for Personality and Control Variables  
Table A.2. Results of T-Tests for Personality and Control Variables  
 
